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Abstract 
The first part of this thesis deals with the right of lateral and subjacent support 
and explains how it should be applied in South African law. The thesis 
illustrates how the neighbour law principles of lateral support were incorrectly 
extended to govern conflicts pertaining to subjacent support that arose in 
South African mining law. From 1911 right up to 2007, these two clearly 
distinguishable concepts were treated as synonymous principles in both 
academic writing and case law. The thesis plots the historical development of 
this extension of lateral support principles to subjacent support conflicts. In 
doing so, it examines the main source of South Africa’s law of support, 
namely English law. The thesis then shows how the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA) 
illustrated how the English law doctrine of subjacent support, with all its 
attendant ramifications, could not be useful in resolving disputes that arise 
between a land surface owner and a mineral rights holder in South African 
mining law. 
 
The second of half of the thesis investigates the constitutional implications of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision in Anglo Operations in light of the 
systemic changes introduced by the Minerals and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act 28 of 2002. In terms of this new Act, all the mineral and 
petroleum resources of South Africa are the common heritage of the people of 
South Africa, and the state is the custodian thereof. This means that 
landowners are no longer involved in the granting of mineral rights to 
subsequent holders. In light of the Anglo Operations decision, landowners in 
the new dispensation of mineral exploitation face the danger of losing the use 
and enjoyment of some/all their land. The thesis therefore examines the 
implications of the statutory provisions in South African legislation (new and 
old) that have/had an impact on the relationship between landowners and 
mineral right holders with regard to the question of subjacent support, as well 
as the implications of the Anglo Operations decision for cases where mineral 
rights have been granted under the statutory framework. 
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Opsomming 
Die eerste deel van die tesis handel oor die reg op sydelingse en 
oppervlakstut en hoe dit in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg toegepas behoort te word. 
Die tesis wys hoe die bureregbeginsels rakende sydelingse stut verkeerdelik 
uitgebrei is na konflikte rakende oppervlakstut wat in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
mynreg ontstaan het. Vanaf 1911 en tot in 2007 is hierdie twee duidelik 
verskillende konsepte in sowel akademiese geskrifte en in die regspraak as 
sinonieme behandel. Die tesis sit die historiese ontwikkeling van die 
uitbreiding van laterale stut-beginsels na oppervlakstut-konflikte uiteen. In die 
proses word die hoofbron van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg ten aansien van steun, 
naamlik die Engelse reg, ondersoek. Die tesis wys uit hoe die Hoogste Hof 
van Appèl in Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 
363 (SCA) beslis het dat die Engelse leerstuk van oppervlakstut met al sy 
meegaande implikasies nie in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg sinvol aangewend kan 
word om dispute wat tussen die oppervlakeienaar van grond en die 
mineraalreghouer ontstaan, op te los nie. 
 
Die tweede helfte van die tesis ondersoek die grondwetlike implikasies van 
die Hoogste Hof van Appèl se beslissing in Anglo Operations in die lig van die 
sistemiese wysigings wat deur die Wet op Ontwikkeling van Minerale en 
Petroleumhulpbronne 28 van 2002 tot stand gebring is. Ingevolge die nuwe 
Wet is alle mineraal- en petroleumhulpbronne die gemeenskaplike erfenis van 
alle mense van Suid-Afrika en die staat is die bewaarder daarvan. Dit beteken 
dat grondeienaars nie meer betrokke is by die toekenning van mineraalregte 
aan houers daarvan nie. In die lig van die Anglo Operations-beslissing loop 
grondeienaars die gevaar om die voordeel en gebruik van al of dele van hulle 
grond te verloor. Die tesis ondersoek daarom die implikasies van verskillende 
bepalings in Suid-Afrikaanse wetgewing (oud en nuut) wat ‘n impak op die 
verhouding tussen die grondeienaar en die houer van die mineraalregte het, 
sowel as die implikasies van Anglo Operations vir gevalle waar mineraalregte 
onder die nuwe statutêre raamwerk en toegeken is. 
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Chapter 1 
The Right of Lateral and Subjacent Support 
1.1 Introduction 
The law pertaining to lateral support for land in South Africa may briefly be 
summarised in two propositions.1 Firstly, that every landowner has a right to 
the lateral support which his land naturally derives from adjacent land. 
Secondly, where a subsidence of soil on his land occurs, as a result of 
excavations or operations otherwise lawfully carried out on adjacent land, the 
owner of the adjacent land will be liable in an action for damages irrespective 
of whether he was negligent or not.2 A landowner’s entitlement to excavate 
the soil on his land and in particular to build or carry out any other digging 
operations is thus limited by the duty not to withdraw the lateral support which 
the land affords adjacent land. 
 
In Demont v Akal’s Investments3 the court said that the duty of lateral support 
owed to an adjacent landowner corresponded with the neighbour’s entitlement 
to such support. This means that the right to lateral support is reciprocal 
between neighbouring landowners. Every landowner is entitled to expect and 
require from land neighbouring his own such support as would be adequate to 
                                                 
1
 Kadirgamar L “Lateral Support for Land and Buildings - An Aspect of Strict Liability” (1965) 
82 SALJ 210-231 213. 
2
 Gijzen v Verrinder 1965 (1) SA 806 (D) 810. See further John Newmark and Co (Pty) Ltd v 
Durban City Council 1959 (1) SA 169 (D) 175; Milton JRL “The Lateral Support of Land: A 
Natural Right of Property” (1965) 82 SALJ 459-463 461; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and 
Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s the Law of Property 5th ed (2006) 121. 
3
 Demont v Akal’s Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another 1955 (2) SA 312 (N) 316. 
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maintain his land in a state of stability. In addition, the owner’s entitlement to 
lateral support remains the same whatever he may choose to do with the 
land. A landowner may alter the condition of his land, for example by 
excavating or building, but cannot normally, by mere fact of doing so, acquire 
greater or different rights to lateral support.4  
 
The right to lateral support has been described as an entitlement of 
ownership.5 A right of action accrues to a landowner who suffers damage as a 
result of the withdrawal or disturbance of lateral support, by a neighbouring 
landowner.6 It was held in Demont v Akal’s Investments7 that in proceedings 
for relief, the plaintiff would have to allege that he has in fact suffered 
damage, as a result of the withdrawal or interference with the lateral support 
of his land by the defendant. Neither culpa nor dolus is a requirement for 
liability for damage caused by the withdrawal of lateral support. Therefore 
“reasonable precautions”8 by the defendant is not a defence against the 
plaintiff’s claim for damages. 
 
The foregoing is a summary of the rules governing the relationship between 
landowners of adjacent land. However, this thesis is primarily centred on the 
question whether these same rules apply where subjacent support is a 
                                                 
4
 Demont v Akal’s Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another 1955 (2) SA 312 (N) 316. 
5
 Van der Vyer JD “Expropriation, Rights, Entitlements and Surface Support of Land” (1988) 
105 SALJ, 1-16 11. See Elektrisiteitvoorsieningskommissie v Fourie 1988 (2) SA 627 (T) 642. 
6
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s the Law of Property 
5th ed (2006) 120. 
7
 1955 (2) SA 312 (N) 316. 
8
 Grieves & Anderson v Sherwood (1901) 22 NLR 225 227. 
 3 
problem, in other words in support conflicts that pertain to the same piece of 
land, between the landowner and another user of his land. This is mostly a 
problem where a person who is not the landowner has the right to mine on the 
land. It seems that the rules of lateral support as spelt out in South African 
neighbour law were transplanted to this mining law relationship where, for 
example, a third party has a right to the minerals below the surface of a 
landowner’s property. In such a situation, is it correct to say that a surface 
owner may expect the same level of support for his land (surface) from the 
miner as is usually afforded to a landowner from adjacent land? Subjacent 
support involves one piece of land, and lateral support involves two pieces of 
land, but the differences between the two situations have until recently been 
ignored or misconstrued in case law and academic writing. 
 
1.2 Subjacent Support in South African Law 
1.2.1 Introduction 
The legal order in South Africa permits the separation of title to the land from 
that to the mineral rights in the land. Where mineral rights are severed from 
the title to the land, conflicts are bound to arise between the landowner and 
the holder of mineral rights when their respective interests come into 
competition. The concept of subjacent support explicitly refers to that 
relationship between a surface owner, and mineral rights holder in respect of 
one piece of land. When the owner of the surface and the holder of the 
mineral rights are able to reasonably enjoy their respective rights without any 
 4 
clash of interests no dispute is, as a rule, likely to arise.9 However, the 
question has arisen in South African law whether a landowner has a natural 
right of subjacent support from the minerals beneath his surface, where 
mineral rights in respect of those minerals have been granted to a third party. 
 
In the a quo decision in Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates,10 it was 
held that an owner of land was entitled to the natural right of subjacent 
support his land naturally derived from the minerals beneath the surface, and 
that a mineral rights holder in carrying out his operations had a duty to 
observe such right. This was because the law did not imply a term to the 
effect that the owner of land agrees to part with his right of subjacent support 
in favour of a mineral rights holder.11 It was held further by the Transvaal 
Provincial Division in Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates12 that an 
owner may not be deprived of subjacent support unless he or she has 
expressly or tacitly (consensually) agreed thereto. Waiver of a “right” to 
subjacent support by the owner is thus never implied by law, but has to be 
agreed upon by contract. This is because the right to subjacent support, like 
the right to lateral support, was seen by the court as a natural right of 
ownership. 
 
                                                 
9
 Franklin BLS and Kaplan M The Mining and Mineral Laws of South Africa (1982) 114; see 
also Badenhorst, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s the Law of Property 
5th ed (2006) 704, Viljoen HP and Bosman PH A Guide to Mining Rights in South Africa 
(1979) 55. 
10
 2006 (1) SA 350 (T) 381. 
11
 2006 (1) SA 350 (T) 376. 
12
 2006 (1) SA 350 (T). 
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The respondent in Anglo Operations,13 in support of the contention that the 
right to subjacent support was an “inherent” entitlement of ownership, relied 
on London and South Africa Exploration v Rouliot.14 In that case De Villiers J 
incorporated the English law rule of lateral support, which provided 
landowners, as an intrinsic element of their ownership, with the right of 
adjacent support of their land into our law. This rule never formed part of our 
law before this decision. De Villiers J said that, although the principle of lateral 
support formed no part of Roman-Dutch law, it was a just and equitable 
principle that should best be incorporated into our law.15 He therefore argued 
that, if the right to lateral support existed as a natural right incident to the 
plaintiff’s land, the parties to the contract must be deemed to have contracted 
with a view to the continued existence of that right. In the absence of such a 
stipulation the presumption was in favour of an intention to preserve a well 
established natural right of property rather than to part with such a right.16 
Therefore a landowner could never be deprived of his right of support without 
his express or tacit consent. 
 
The next step to the respondent’s argument was based on the judgement of 
Bristowe J in Coronation Collieries v Malan.17 The legal question in that case 
was whether the underground miner owed the landowner a duty of vertical or 
subjacent support of the surface. In answering this question Bristowe J began 
by stating that, according to well settled principles of English law, the right to 
                                                 
13
 2006 (1) SA 350 (T). 
14
 (1890-1891) 8 SC 74. 
15
 (1890-1891) 8 SC 74 91. 
16
 (1890-1891) 8 SC 74 94. 
17
 1911 577 TPD 590. 
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have the surface of land in its natural state supported by subjacent minerals is 
a right of property and not of easement; and that a lease or conveyance of the 
minerals, even though accompanied by the widest powers of working, carries 
with it no power to let down the surface, unless such power is granted either 
expressly or by necessary implication. Bristowe J thereafter acknowledged 
the fundamental conceptual differences between English Law and Roman-
Dutch law,18 but nevertheless disregarded them. He concluded that these 
differences between the two systems of law did not affect the right of support. 
He relied on London and South Africa Exploration v Rouliot19 for the 
contention that, as regards the rights of support for land in its natural state, 
there was no difference between the English and the Roman-Dutch law. This 
same view was repeated by Badenhorst, Mostert and Pienaar.20 This was the 
position that was consistently upheld in South African law until the Anglo 
Operations appeal decision.21 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Anglo Operations22 rejected this extension of 
the natural right of lateral support to the mining relationship of subjacent 
support. The conflict arising from the question of subjacent support was 
correctly placed under the law of servitudes. It was held that in South African 
law, the right to the minerals in the property of another was in the nature of a 
                                                 
18
 Butterknowle Colliery Co Ltd v Bishop Auckland Industrial Co-operative Co Ltd [1906] AC 
305.  
19
 (1890-1891) 8 SC 74. 
20
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s the Law of Property 
5th ed (2006) 120. 
21
 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA). 
22
 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA) 372-373. 
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quasi-servitude over that property.23 Therefore, as in the case of a servitude, 
the exercise of mineral rights would almost inevitably lead to a conflict 
between the right of the owner to maintain the surface and the mineral rights 
holder to extract the minerals underneath. In resolving this conflict, the answer 
did not lie in the adoption of the English law doctrine of subjacent support, but 
in invoking the principles applicable to servitudes developed by our law. Thus, 
in accordance with these principles, the owner of the servient property was 
bound to allow the holder of the servitudal rights to do whatever was 
reasonably necessary for the proper exercise of his rights. The holder of the 
servitude was in turn bound to exercise his rights civiliter modo, that is, 
reasonably viewed, with as much possible consideration and with the least 
inconvenience to the servient property and its owner. In applying these 
principles to mineral rights it can be accepted that the holder of mineral rights 
is entitled to go onto the property, search for minerals and if, he finds any, to 
remove them. This must include the right on the part of the holder to do 
whatever is reasonably necessary to attain his ultimate goal as empowered by 
the grant. It was held further, that in terms of South African common law, in 
the absence of any express or tacit term to the contrary in a grant of mineral 
rights, the mineral right holder was entitled by virtue of a term implied by law 
to conduct open-cast mining, thereby withdrawing subjacent support if it was 
reasonably necessary to do so in order to extract the minerals.24 However, 
this was to be done in a manner least injurious to the interests of the surface 
owner. 
 
                                                 
23
 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA) 373. 
24
 Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA) 373. 
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This is consistent with the statement on the scope of a mineral right holder’s 
common law ancillary rights in Hudson v Malan,25 where it was said that a 
mineral rights holder: 
 
“[M]ay resist interference with a reasonable exercise of those rights either 
by the grantor or by those who derive title through him. In the case of 
irreconcilable conflict the use of the surface rights must be subordinated 
to mineral exploration. The fact that the use to which the owner of the 
surface rights puts the property is earlier in point and time cannot 
derogate from the rights of the holder of mineral rights.”26 
 
It has been held in further judicial pronouncements27 that a holder of mineral 
or mining rights was entitled to enter the property to which his rights were 
attached to, search for minerals, and if he or she found any, to sever them 
and carry them away. A mineral rights holder is “entitled to exercise all such 
subsidiary or ancillary rights, without which he will not be able to effectively 
carry on his prospecting and/or mining operations.”28 These so-called 
subsidiary rights flowed from terms implied by law or from consensual terms 
in a contract, either express or tacit.29  
 
                                                 
25
 1950 (4) SA 485 (T). 
26
 1950 (4) SA 485 (T) 488. 
27
 Hudson v Mann 1950 (4) SA 485 (T) 488; Trojan Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd v Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd 1996 (4) SA 499 (A) 520; Ex Parte Pierce 1950 (3) SA 628 (O) 634. 
28
 Hudson v Mann 1950 (4) SA 485 (T) 488; Trojan Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd v Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd 1996 (4) SA 499 (A) 520. 
29
 2006 (1) SA 350 (T) 376. 
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Although the Supreme Court of Appeal has set the record straight,30 one of 
the objectives of this thesis is to sketch the historical development and the 
subsequent entrenchment of the extension of lateral support rules to the 
mining situation of subjacent support in South African law. To begin with, it will 
demonstrate how the Supreme Court of Appeal in Anglo Operations v 
Sandhurst Estates showed that the principle of lateral support is a concept of 
neighbour law, and how Rouliot31 was only concerned with the question of 
lateral support and not subjacent support. In that case it was held that a 
lessee of land for mining purposes could not prima facie withdraw support 
from the adjoining land of the lessor. The lease contemplated surface 
workings, but for Bristowe J the same principle would apply if the mineral 
rights holder’s workings were subterranean and the support in question was 
subjacent. 
 
Brand JA in the Anglo Operations v Sandhurst Estates32 appeal decision 
voiced his disapproval of the way the court in Coronation Collieries interpreted 
the judgement in Rouliot.33 Bristowe J’s reading of Rouliot was certainly 
curious. This is because, although the problem in Rouliot originated from 
mining activities, it did not relate to a conflict between the surface owner and 
the holder of mineral rights in respect of the same land. It was not against that 
backdrop that De Villiers J held that the principle of lateral support should best 
                                                 
30
 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA). 
31
 (1890-1891) 8 SC 74 91. 
32
 Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA). 
33
 London and South African Exploration Company v Rouliot (1890-1891) 8 SC 74. 
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be incorporated into our law.34 The claim in Rouliot was based on the alleged 
trespass by the defendant on the plaintiff’s property. It is clear that the 
principle of lateral support was adopted in Rouliot as a rule of neighbour law. 
Therefore, this principle of neighbour law should have never been extended, 
as was done in the Coronation Collieries case, to govern the relationship 
between mineral right holders and the owners of the same land.35 
 
Prior to the Anglo Operations decision, there were South African authors36 
who agreed with the extension of the principles of lateral support to the issue 
of subjacent support. Kaplan and Dale37 agree with the view that a mineral 
rights holder or person prospecting or mining with the surface owner’s 
consent, is at common law entitled, in the conduct of his mining or prospecting 
activities, to broad ancillary rights in respect of the use of the surface for 
purposes necessary for or incidental to such activities. However, in their view 
the right to withdraw subjacent support is not included under the “broad 
ancillary” umbrella, although it is incidental to the prospecting or mining 
activities of a mineral rights holder. According to them the surface owner is 
required to expressly or tacitly waive his right to subjacent support as it is 
regarded as a natural right of property.38 Of course, these views have now 
been overhauled by the Anglo Operations decision. Since the decision did not 
                                                 
34
 (1890-1891) 8 SC 74 91. 
35
 Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA) 373. 
36
 See Franklin BLS and Kaplan M The Mining and Mineral Laws of South Africa (1982) 114; 
Kaplan M and Dale MO A Guide to the Minerals Act 1991 (1992) 185; Badenhorst PJ, 
Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s the Law of Property 5th ed (2006) 704-
705.  
37
 Kaplan M and Dale MO A Guide to the Minerals Act 1991 (1992) 185. 
38
 Kaplan M and Dale MO A Guide to the Minerals Act 1991 (1992) 185. 
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consider the position under mining legislation, and especially new mining 
legislation that removes the granting of mineral and mining rights from the 
sphere of agreement between the landowner and the grantee, the remaining 
question is to determine the implications of Anglo Operations for surface 
support conflicts that arise out of mineral rights and mining grants that cannot 
be explained in terms of the quasi-servitude construction relied on in that 
decision. 
 
In the process of showing that the extension of lateral support principles to 
subjacent support conflicts in South African law was inappropriate, the 
material conceptual difference between English law and our law in this regard 
was highlighted by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Anglo Operations 
case. In English law it is possible for different horizontal layers of land to be 
owned by different persons. Based on this concept, the principle of subjacent 
support was succinctly stated as follows by Lord Macnaghten in Butterknowle 
Colliery Co Ltd v Bishop Auckland Industrial Co-operative Co Ltd:39 “[T]he 
result seems to be that in all cases where there has been a severance in title 
and the upper and lower strata are in different hands, the surface owner is 
entitled of common right to support of his property in its natural position ...”. 
The fundamental principle in our law, on the other hand, is that the owner of 
the land is the owner not only of the surface, but of everything legally 
adherent thereto and also of everything above and below the surface. 
Therefore, in terms of our law it not possible to divide ownership into separate 
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layers.40 In English law the holder of mineral rights becomes owner of a 
particular layer below the surface. He becomes a “vertical neighbour” of the 
surface owner, so to speak. This does not happen in our law. “In accordance 
with what has now become a settled law principle, a right to minerals in the 
property of another is in the nature of a quasi-servitude over that property.”41 
The owner of the servient property is bound to allow the holder of mineral 
rights to do whatever is reasonably necessary for the proper exercise of those 
rights. The holder of the servitude is in turn bound to exercise his rights 
civiliter modo, that is, reasonably viewed, with as much possible consideration 
and with the least possible inconvenience to the servient property and its 
owner. Therefore, if it is reasonably necessary for the mineral rights holder to 
let down the surface in carrying out his mining operations, he may do so, so 
long as he does so in a manner least injurious to the surface owner. 
 
However, the question is whether this servitude construction can hold in 
cases where the mineral right or mining right was not granted by the 
landowner but by the state, acting in terms of the new regulatory powers 
created in the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act of 2002. 
Whereas the first part of the thesis will describe the neighbour law character 
of the lateral support rule and subscribe to the Anglo Operations ruling that 
this principle does not fit into the relationship between landowner and mineral 
rights holder in so-called subjacent support conflicts, the second part will ask 
how this conclusion is affected by mining and minerals legislation. 
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1.2.2 The Impact of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act 28 of 2002 
The relationship between a landowner and a mineral rights holder has been 
complicated by the promulgation of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act.42 Anglo Operations v Sandhurst Estates was decided in 
accordance with the principles that existed before the Act. Prior to 1 May 
2004, mineral rights in respect of property formed part of the rights of the 
landowner. It was possible to sever the mineral rights from the surface rights 
and third parties could become holders of the mineral rights. These rights 
were freely transmissible and were valuable assets. The state could not force 
a mineral rights holder to start with the exploration of the minerals even if it 
would have been to the benefit of the public. Landowners could own valuable 
rights which they could sell to mining houses for lucrative amounts while 
retaining the surface rights. 
 
The thesis will show how the new Act has added a new dimension to the 
conflict between a landowner and a mineral rights holder that was not 
considered in Anglo Operations. Under the new dispensation, it is now the 
state that administer s mineral rights by granting them to miners and it is the 
state that receives royalty payments stemming from the exploitation of mineral 
rights. The thesis will consider the implications of the Mineral and Petroleum 
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Resources Development Act43 on the relationship between a landowner and a 
mineral rights holder in respect of the question of subjacent support. This will 
also necessarily require us to test constitutionality of the provisions of the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act. In order to grasp the full 
implications of the 2002 Act for the Anglo Operations decision, it will be 
necessary to refer to earlier mining and mineral legislation that also affects the 
relationship between the landowner and the mineral rights holder. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
Including this chapter, the thesis will be divided into five chapters. In the 
second chapter, my aim is to sketch out the principle of lateral support in 
South Africa. This will entail an overview of case law leading to the latest 
judicial pronouncements on the matter. At the end of this section, I will discuss 
the true nature of the right to lateral support, specifically whether it is a natural 
right inherent in the ownership of property, or whether it is in the nature of 
servitude. 
 
The bulk of the thesis will, however, be devoted to the question of vertical or 
subjacent support. This question will be dealt with in chapter 3. The chapter 
will specifically investigate the true legal position of the landowner whose land 
subsides as a result of prospecting and mining operations carried out on his 
land. To begin with, the preliminary part of the chapter will define the right of 
subjacent support and distinguish it from the right of lateral support. 
Thereafter the focus of the section will be to establish, with reference to South 
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African and English case law and literature, whether the extension of lateral 
support principles to govern the relationship of a landowner and a mineral 
rights holder where subjacent support is at stake can be sustained in South 
African law. This will involve a probe into the respective legal systems’ bodies 
of case law and academic writings on subjacent support. The most important 
court decision, for this purpose, is the Supreme Court of Appeal decision in 
Anglo Operations,44 where it was decided that the right to the minerals on the 
property of another was in the nature of a quasi-servitude over that property. 
Accordingly, as in the case of a servitude, the exercise of mineral rights would 
almost inevitably lead to a conflict between the right of the owner to maintain 
the surface and the mineral rights holder to extract the minerals underneath. 
Therefore, the answer in resolving such a conflict did not lie in the adoption of 
the English law doctrine of subjacent support, but by applying the principles 
developed by our law in resolving the inherent conflicts between the holders 
of servitudal rights and the owners of the servient properties,45 namely, that 
the owner of a servient property is bound to allow the holder to do whatever is 
reasonably necessary for the proper exercise of his rights. The holder of the 
servitude is in turn bound to exercise his rights civiliter modo, that is, 
reasonably viewed, with as much possible consideration and with the least 
possible inconvenience to the servient property and its owner. 
 
The second half of the chapter will entail a legislative survey of South African 
mining legislation that may add to or subtract from the mineral right holder’s 
position in respect of his so-called subjacent support obligation to the 
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landowner. Although I will briefly survey some older legislation that had an 
effect on the relationship between landowner and mineral rights holder, I will 
specifically look at the Minerals Act46 and the new Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act.47 I aim to determine whether the relevant 
legislation provides support for the proposition that a mineral rights holder has 
as one of his ancillary rights the right to withdraw subjacent support where it is 
reasonably necessary. Dale says that the common law position was statutorily 
restated in s 5(1) of the Minerals Act, but submits that statutory obligations, 
such as those in ss 38 to 42 of the Minerals Act relating respectively to 
rehabilitation; environmental management programmes, removal of buildings, 
structures and objects; restrictions in relation to use of surface; and 
acquisition or purchase of land and payment of compensation, started to 
erode the common law predominance of the mineral rights holder.48 The 
purpose of this second half of the chapter is to establish the implications of 
the Anglo Operations decision in cases where the mineral right or mining right 
was not granted by the landowner but by the state, acting in terms of the new 
regulatory powers created in the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act of 2002. In such a scenario can it be said that the landowner 
is expropriated or arbitrarily deprived of his land where the miner makes use 
of open-cast mining which results in the withdrawal of subjacent support? 
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The penultimate chapter of the thesis will be a constitutional enquiry, focused 
on the question whether the provisions of s 25 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, dealing with deprivation and expropriation of 
property, have any effect on the relationship between a mineral rights holder 
and a surface owner where subjacent support is at stake. The question would 
be whether, in allowing a mineral rights holder to withdraw subjacent support 
in the course of his operations where it is reasonably necessary, the 
landowner is arbitrarily deprived of property in terms of s 25(1) of the 
Constitution. This question is particularly important in light of the new 
regulatory system of mineral rights brought about by the new Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act, as it is no longer the landowner who 
severs mineral rights from the title to his land, but the state.49 
 
The thesis will be concluded by providing a summation of all my findings. The 
final chapter will provide answers pertaining to the questions of the true legal 
nature of the rights of lateral and subjacent support respectively. It will show 
how Anglo Operations conclusively rejected the extension, by Bristowe J in 
Coronation Collieries v Malan,50 of the neighbour law principles of lateral 
support to the problem of subjacent support is sustainable in South African 
law. It will also show what the effect of the new Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act on what was decided in Anglo Operations v 
Sandhurst Estates,51 namely, that the right to the minerals on the property of 
another was in the nature of a quasi-servitude. The conflicts arising therefrom 
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would be resolved in adopting the principles developed by our law in resolving 
the conflicts between holders of servitudal rights and the owners of servient 
properties.52 The aim of the thesis is therefore to establish the implications of 
Anglo Operations for cases where mineral rights no longer derive from an 
agreement between a landowner and a mineral rights holder. 
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Chapter 2 
The Right of Lateral Support 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Generally a landowner may, in the absence of any express law or servitude to 
the contrary, use and enjoy the property belonging to him in any way he 
pleases. According to Maasdorp and Hall, a landowner may alter the 
character of his land, and may even destroy it absolutely, subject only to the 
maxim sic utere tuo ut alieum non laedas, that is to say, provided such use, 
enjoyment, alteration, or destruction is not prejudicial or injurious to the legal 
rights of others.53 Subject to this limitation, it is open to a landowner to use his 
property as he deems fit, even though actual inconvenience may thereby 
result to others, provided he does not interfere with their legal rights.54 These 
principles apply to both movables and immovables. 
 
According to Maasdorp and Hall, all land is by the very nature of things 
subject to certain obligations in regard to adjoining lands, and these 
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obligations are sometimes spoken of by jurists55 as natural servitudes or 
servitudes of necessity. Some of these so-called servitudes are of a negative 
and others are of a positive nature. Servitudes of the latter kind entitle the 
holder to exercise certain rights over a neighbour’s land, such as a right of 
way of necessity, and are therefore regarded as servitudes proper.56 
Servitudes of the former kind, of which the prohibition of nuisances, the 
obligation of lateral support and of receiving water flowing naturally onto the 
land and restrictions upon the use of water streams are the most important, 
are mere limitations upon ownership in the common interest.57 This chapter is 
specifically concerned with the obligation of lateral support. 
 
2.2 Historical Background 
2.2.1 The Civil Law 
The South African law of lateral support to land is directly related to the 
discovery of diamonds in 1861. To track the development of the law of lateral 
support in South Africa, one has to examine the civil law approach to the 
subject.58 Save for a few scattered texts, Roman law had no detailed rules 
regulating lateral support of land. The Romans did not develop the concept 
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because they did not sever mineral rights from rights of ownership.59 
However, according to Van der Merwe the lack of authority for a right of lateral 
support in the Roman and Roman-Dutch sources does not mean that Roman 
law was totally devoid of remedies in the event of unlawful withdrawal of 
lateral or surface.60 Milton identifies a passage in the Digest where it was 
stated that if “I should make an excavation on my land so deep that your wall 
cannot stand, the stipulation of indemnity against threatened injury will 
become operative.”61 
 
An ancient law of Solon which lay down fixed rules stipulating the distances at 
which trenches and wells could be dug from a neighbouring property was also 
adopted and applied by the Romans.62 According to Kadirgamar, the Code 
forbade mining if it caused damage to buildings.63 Milton submits that the 
Romans would have probably approached the question of lateral support from 
the premise that an owner was entitled to use his land in any way he chose so 
long as he did not infringe his neighbour’s rights.64 Thus an owner would 
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either have had the operis novi nuntiatio65 or the cautio damni infecti66 to 
prevent any excavations which would cause damage to his property. 
 
Similarly, the Roman-Dutch law had very little to offer on the question of 
lateral support. The most notable contribution came from Voet, who stated 
that the operis novi nuntiatio would be available if a neighbour’s “party wall 
cannot stand on account of the foundation being weakened” by excavations.67 
Milton points out that Voet’s reason was that the city should not be “rendered 
unsightly … by fallen buildings”,68 as opposed to concern about the infringing 
of the neighbour’s rights. 
 
This want of authority in Roman-Dutch law is attributable to the fact that the 
right of lateral support was never one of practical importance, due to the lack 
of mines in Holland and because the necessity for deep excavations seldom 
arose.69 However, as was seen above, the fact that the development of the 
right of lateral support was deeply rooted in English law cannot overshadow 
the fact that Roman and Roman-Dutch law did in fact have remedies at hand 
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for a landowner who was threatened with or suffered loss from the withdrawal 
of lateral and surface support.70 
 
2.2.2 Development in South African Law 
Owing to the dearth of authority in Roman and Roman-Dutch law, it can be 
argued that the field of mining law with its attendant principles of lateral 
support is largely a product of South African jurisprudence.71 The 
development of the right of lateral support in South Africa is directly linked to 
the discovery of diamonds in 1861. At the onset mining claims were allocated 
and diggings commenced with great enthusiasm. Milton gives us a vivid 
picture of the situation on the ground in the mine fields: 
 
“Money and men began to flood the country. Land values boomed, 
especially on the diamond fields. There, hordes of eager diggers were 
allocated claims which they began to excavate. The diamonds were 
found in the throats of long extinct volcanoes. The vertical distribution of 
the gems in these ‘pipes’ gave a wide divergence to the value of claims, 
sometimes even where they were contiguous. The working of these 
claims became promiscuous, the industrious and the successful digger 
going ever deeper, the less fortunate or lazy lagging behind and often 
abandoning claims. To the novelist Trollope, the appearance of the mines 
in 1877 suggested that some diabolically ingenious architect had 
constructed a house with five hundred rooms, not one of which should be 
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on the same floor, and to from none of which should there be a pair of 
stairs or a door or a window.”72 
 
The result of this haphazard working of claims was inevitable. Earth began to 
fall from higher claims into lower ones with ensuing damage and loss. In 
dealing with the resultant claims, courts were faced with the problem of 
whether to apply the rules of lateral support existing in other jurisdictions 
(England) or to disregard them in the interest of the convenience of the 
diggers.73 The English rule of support stipulated that, where there was 
severance of title and the surface and minerals were in different hands, 
ownership of the land surface prima facie carried a natural right of support. 
This right was a right to have the surface kept in its natural position and 
condition, therefore a natural right incident to the ownership of the soil and not 
an easement.74 
 
The English law rule of support, if applied on the diamond fields of South 
Africa, would have led to a fatal outcome for the booming mining economy, 
because it was the very nature of the mining method employed in the 
diamond fields at the time to remove the lateral support of neighbouring 
claims for the sake of “digging down” as quickly and as far as possible. 
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The first judgement on the matter was delivered by De Villiers CJ in Murtha v 
Von Beek,75 where he said that he did not see how the principle of lateral 
support as embodied in English law could be made applicable to cases of this 
kind. The court therefore recognised an implied duty upon every claim holder, 
who held himself out as a digger to use reasonable diligence in working down 
his claims, and not to lag behind unnecessarily to the injury and detriment of 
his neighbours. The principle of lateral support could therefore not apply to 
cases where a person took a claim for the express purpose of digging.76 
 
The result the court in Murtha wanted to avoid at all costs was that, if the 
principle of lateral support as it stood in English law were to apply in the 
diamond fields, a claim holder far more conscientious than his counterparts 
would have to provide far-reaching lateral support for neighbouring claim 
holders, thereby leaving very little ground for him to work. The court correctly 
concluded that the principle of lateral support as defined in English law was 
not applicable to claims in a diamond field. 
 
The result was that a distinction was drawn between owners and diggers. The 
diggers were regarded to some extent as a community by themselves.77 What 
arose was a material difference between the position of the claim holders 
among themselves, persons who have leased claims in a mine for the 
express purpose of working them down, and the owners of the soil. 
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In MacFarland v De Beers Mining Board78 it was confirmed that the rule 
pronounced in Murtha, namely that every claim holder who held himself out as 
a digger was expected to use reasonable diligence in working down his 
claims, and not to lag behind unnecessarily to the injury and detriment of his 
neighbours, was only applicable to matters arising from the relationship 
between diggers inter se. So, if a dispute concerned a digger and an owner or 
an owner and an owner, the rule was not applied.  
 
In MacFarland the plaintiff was a digger who leased claims from an owner. 
Jones J held that the plaintiff could have no greater rights than the proprietor 
himself. As between the owners of the adjoining properties the common law 
right of lateral support would exist. Therefore the licence granted by the owner 
could not confer upon the plaintiff the right to mine so as to deprive the 
neighbouring proprietor of lateral support.79 
 
The rule in Murtha managed to survive for a period of thirteen years after its 
foundation, whereafter the circumstances under which the rule was created 
disappeared. The facts in Burnett and Taylor v De Beers Consolidated 
Mines80 provide an indication of the shift in conditions that occurred during 
that thirteen year period. The plaintiffs and the defendants were neighbouring 
claim holders in the Du Toit’s Pan Mine. The plaintiffs Burnett and Taylor were 
diggers and sub-lessees of a small block of claims near the middle of the 
mine. The defendants, on the other hand, leased virtually the rest of the mine, 
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save for the portions being worked by the company which had leased to the 
plaintiffs the claims held by them. Before the plaintiffs began working their 
claims, the adjoining claims of the defendants were significantly higher than 
their own, because the defendants had left all their claims un-worked for 
about four years prior to the action. The work being done in the mine was 
partly open and partly underground. 
 
When a collapse of reef occurred the plaintiff, relying on Murtha, sued for 
damages. It was held that the rule in Murtha could no longer apply. Solomon J 
held that he did not think that Murtha v Von Beek was intended to lay down an 
absolute rule for all times. In view of the fact that there was no longer a 
number of claim holders in the Du Toit’s Pan mine all working down their 
claims in the open, but practically only a few large holders working partly in 
the open and partly underground, it could no longer possibly be said that open 
working was the general and approved method of working in that mine. The 
whole foundation upon which the principle of an implied obligation between 
the claim holders to work down the claims with reasonable diligence could be 
based was absent and the ratio decidendi of Murtha v Von Beek could not be 
taken to apply to the facts in Burnett and Taylor.81 The time had come when 
open workings had become impracticable and therefore no such implied 
obligation could be held to attach to the claim holders in the mine.82 
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2.3 Content and Nature of Right of Lateral Support 
2.3.1 Introduction 
It was not until 1891 that the principle of lateral support was definitively 
enunciated in South Africa in the case of London and South African 
Exploration Company v Rouliot.83 Before then it was always assumed (mainly 
because they found it necessary to formulate an exception to it for diamond 
claims, as in Murtha84) that the principle formed part of South African law. The 
rule was specifically referred to in MacFarland v De Beers Mining Board, but 
Milton says that the court seems to have accepted as axiomatic that the right 
of lateral support existed.85 In Rouliot Buchanan J pointed out that judges 
previously merely assumed that the right existed.86 
 
In incorporating this rule of English law into South African law, De Villiers CJ 
said that, although the principle of lateral support did not form part of Roman-
Dutch law, it was a just and equitable principle that should best be integrated 
into our law.87 Thus the right was accepted into our jurisprudence. 
 
The law pertaining to lateral support for land in South Africa may briefly be 
summarised in two propositions. Firstly, every landowner has a right to the 
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lateral support which the land naturally derives from adjacent property. 
Secondly, where a subsidence of soil on land occurs as a result of 
excavations or operations otherwise lawfully carried out on adjacent land, the 
owner of the adjacent land will be liable in an action for damages irrespective 
of whether he was negligent or not. 88  
 
It seems that the right of lateral support has been given two conflicting 
constructions in South African law.89 Firstly, it has been suggested that the 
right of support is in fact a servitude. Secondly, it has also been argued that 
the right of lateral support is in fact a right incidental to the ownership of 
property.90 As was seen in the introduction to this chapter, the right of lateral 
support is generally viewed as a natural right inherent in the ownership of 
property in South African law. To help us understand the implications of these 
two conflicting views, the two sub-headings that follow will examine both 
theories in detail. 
 
2.3.2 Servitude 
Generally speaking, a servitude is a limited real right or ius in re aliena which 
entitles its holder to the use and enjoyment of another person’s property or to 
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insist that such other person shall refrain from exercising certain entitlements 
flowing from his ownership over and in respect of his property which he would 
have but for the servitude.91 A servitude is constituted in favour of the 
dominant tenement against a servient tenement. According to an anonymous 
writer there are three possible ways a servitude may be constituted in favour 
of one property against another, namely, by grant, by prescription, and by 
natural situation.92 
 
However, according to this same anonymous writer,93 there is another class of 
servitudes, namely natural servitudes, which have been almost entirely 
neglected by the text-book writers on Roman-Dutch law. The right of lateral 
support to land is one of these so-called natural servitudes. On the boundary 
of adjacent properties, every portion of the soil of the one naturally supports 
every portion of the soil of the other immediately above it. A natural servitude 
exists on either property in favour of the other to support the other. This 
continues to any depth; each property is therefore absolutely entitled to the 
lateral support naturally afforded by the other.94 
 
Milton explains that the above relationship between the two adjoining 
properties is servitutal, because of the fact that when there are two adjacent 
                                                 
91
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s the Law of Property 
5th ed (2006) 321. 
92
 Anonymous “Natural Rights and Natural Servitudes” (1892) 9 Cape LJ 225-231 229; 
Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s the Law of Property 
5th ed (2006) 332-333. 
93
 Anonymous “Natural Rights and Natural Servitudes” (1892) 9 Cape LJ 225-231 230. 
94
 Anonymous “Natural Rights and Natural Servitudes” (1892) 9 Cape LJ 225-231 230; Milton 
JRL “The Law of Neighbours in South Africa” 1969 Acta Juridica 123-254 199.  
 31 
properties the actual mass of earth comprising these properties, is, in the 
eyes of the law, divided.95 It is the nature of the earth to press downwards and 
sideways until adequately resisted. To describe the right of lateral support as 
a natural servitude is thus an obvious way of explaining the rights the law 
imputes to this situation, namely to say that one property dominates and 
imposes upon another a positive and constant burden, the sustenance of 
which by the servient tenement is necessary for the safety and stability of the 
dominant tenement.96  
 
However, it is clear that there is in fact no dominant or servient property, for 
the burden and its sustenance are reciprocal and inseparable from each 
other, thus making it irrelevant which sustains and which imposes. In the case 
of reciprocal servitudes, all the tenements are at once dominant and 
servient.97 
 
To consider the right of lateral support as a servitude brings about important 
consequences. The most important consequence is that the right will exist 
only in respect of land itself and not in respect of artificial erections on the 
                                                 
95
 Milton JRL “The Law of Neighbours in South Africa” 1969 Acta Juridica 123-254 199; 
Anonymous “Natural Rights and Natural Servitudes” (1892) 9 Cape LJ 225-231 230. 
96
 Milton JRL “The Law of Neighbours in South Africa” 1969 Acta Juridica 123-254 199. See 
further Emden ACR The Law Relating to Building (1980) 256.  
97
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s the Law of Property 
5th ed (2006) 120. See further Milton JRL “The Law of Neighbours in South Africa” 1969 Acta 
Juridica 123-254 199; Demont v Akal’s Investments (Pty) Ltd 1955 (2) SA 312 (D) 316. 
 32 
land. In short, it will be a servitude of support of land by land and not of 
buildings by land.98 
 
A further consequence of regarding the right of lateral support as a servitude 
is that any breach of it will be dealt with by proprietary remedies. An example 
would be the actio confessoria in Roman and Roman-Dutch law.99 Liability of 
the defendant will arise from the withdrawal of support and not from any 
damage which such withdrawal causes and in consequence prospective 
damages cannot be claimed.  
 
2.3.3 Natural Right Incidental in the Ownership of Things 
The second school of thought regards the right of support as a natural right of 
property, protected by the doctrine of nuisance.100 In Gijzen v Verrinder101 the 
court regarded the right of lateral support as a natural right of property, given 
in the nature of things. The court took the view that it is a right to the integrity 
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of the land, a natural and necessary incident of the ownership of land which 
ensures its full use and enjoyment.102  
 
The central question in Gijzen was whether a subsidence of land, in the sense 
of a collapse, was an essential requirement of an action for the removal of 
lateral support. In 1956, the defendant Verrinder had levelled his land for the 
purpose of building a house. The excavations were made up to the boundary 
between his land and that of the plaintiff. In 1964 the plaintiff initiated an 
action, alleging that the excavations had deprived his land of the necessary 
lateral support and that as a result it had subsided, causing him damage. The 
plaintiff claimed prospective damages and, in the alternative, an order 
requiring the defendant to provide artificial support for his land. 
 
Henning J found that there had been no actual subsidence of the plaintiff’s 
land. However, what had happened was that over the years the action of 
rainwater had eroded away forty square feet of the plaintiff’s soil. Milton points 
out that Henning J relied on a passage from Maasdorp,103 which he regarded 
as correctly setting out the law relating to lateral support in South Africa.104 
According to this passage, every owner of land was entitled to demand that 
the natural surroundings of his ground to be left undisturbed in so far as their 
                                                 
102
 Gijzen v Verrinder 1965 (1) SA 806 (D) 810. See further Elektrisiteitvoorsieningskommissie 
v Fourie 1988 (2) SA 627 (T) 627; Van der Vyver JD “Expropriation, Rights, Entitlements and 
Surface Support of Land” (1988) 105 SALJ 1-16 11. 
103
 Maasdorp AFS and Hall CG Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African Law: The Law of 
Things (1960) 80. 
104
 Milton JRL “The Lateral Support of Land: A Natural Right of Property” (1965) 82 SALJ 459-
463 459. 
 34 
continued existence was essential to the stability of his own land and to the 
proper and reasonable enjoyment by him of his rights of ownership, and 
among these surroundings the lateral support which ground receives from all 
adjacent ground was one of the most important. A man could, therefore, dig 
upon his own ground to any depth he pleased, provided he did not remove the 
natural support to which his neighbour’s ground was entitled or, if he did, he 
provided some other equally efficient artificial support. 
 
When considering the matter of subsidence, Henning J was unable to find 
authority to the effect that to succeed in an action for removal of lateral 
support it was necessary to establish a subsidence in the sense of a “falling-
down or caving-in.”105 The right to support exists not only in respect of solid 
soil but also in respect of semi-liquid substances such as silt. The court 
accordingly held that the defendant was liable for damage caused as a result 
of the excavations on his land,106 but no order was made in respect of the 
claim for prospective damage.  
 
An important aspect of the Gijzen decision is the fact that the court regarded 
the right of lateral support as a natural right of property given in the nature of 
things, thus adopting the view that the right is a right to the integrity of the 
land. It is a natural and necessary incident of the ownership of land which 
ensures its full use and enjoyment. According to Milton this view is to be 
“distinguished from the view that the right is a natural servitude of support 
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from the adjoining land”,107 and apparently he is vindicated by the court’s 
refusal to award prospective damages. If the right to lateral support is 
regarded as a right to the integrity of the land, it is only when this integrity is 
violated that liability arises. Only where a subsidence has occurred and actual 
damage has been suffered can it be said that the right of support has been 
violated.108 So it is clear that the damage, and not the withdrawal of support, 
is the cause of action. Prospective damages cannot be recovered, as there is 
no cause of action in respect of them. 
 
It seems harsh to expect the plaintiff to sit by and await further damage to his 
property before he can bring an action. However, the rule that the removal of 
lateral support is not a continuing wrong alleviates his position to a degree. In 
terms of this rule, each successive subsidence, although emanating from the 
original act or omission, gives rise to a fresh cause of action.109 The result of 
the rule is virtually to force the defendant to take steps to restore lateral 
support unless he is prepared to face a series of actions for each future 
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subsidence.110 In addition, it is open to the plaintiff to take the positive step of 
seeking an interdict directing the defendant to prevent future subsidences.111 
To succeed, the plaintiff would merely have to establish a clear right, a 
reasonable apprehension of damage and the absence of any other 
satisfactory remedy.112 
 
Milton offers some insight as to why the court in Gijzen and in general 
favoured the approach that the right of support is a natural right of property 
which is part and parcel of ownership. If the courts had favoured the notion 
that the right is servitutal, it would have then followed that any excavation 
which had the effect of removing support would give rise to liability, even if no 
subsidence or damage occurred. “The result will be that an owner could not 
excavate on his land without being liable to an action even if he avoided 
causing actual damage by providing an alternative means of support.”113 He 
goes on to point out that this is in every respect contrary to the general 
principle that an owner can use and enjoy his land as he pleases so long as 
he does not cause injury to his neighbour’s land in doing so.114 On the whole 
this approach adopted by the courts in South Africa seems more practical and 
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realistic. As was mentioned above, the right of lateral support is generally 
viewed as a natural right inherent in the ownership of land. 
 
The approach that was followed in Gijzen is compatible with what was 
established in the locus classicus that expressly incorporated the right of 
lateral support into South African law. In Rouliot,115 the view that the right of 
lateral support is a natural right incidental to the ownership of the property, 
and not servitudal in nature, was established. What happened in Rouliot, in 
short, was that the defendant (Rouliot) leased a claim in the Du Toit’s Pan 
Mine from the plaintiff company. The defendant made use of the open-cast 
method of mining in conducting his operations. Over the years a sloping 
buttress of diamondiferous ground was left by Rouliot to support the adjoining 
un-leased portion belonging to the plaintiff, forming the periphery of the mine. 
Rouliot then decided to mine the buttress, but before doing so, he removed a 
quantity of ground from the un-leased property, because he considered that 
the working of the buttress would cause a fall of the reef into his land. The 
removal of the earth allegedly constituted a trespass. 
 
In the court of first instance116 it was held that the legal basis for the plaintiff’s 
claim was that, by common law, it had a right of lateral support for its property 
and that this right had not been given up by the lease. The judge decided that, 
since open-cast mining had been contemplated by the parties, the plaintiff 
must indeed be taken to have given up its right to lateral support for its 
adjoining property. It was subsequently decided that the defendant had acted 
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lawfully in removing ground on the adjoining un-leased land before he 
exercised his right to remove lateral support. Cast in this mould, the right to 
lateral support is quasi-servitutal. A landowner can be deprived of lateral 
support where it is reasonably necessary for an adjoining landowner to carry 
out his operations.  
 
Chief Justice De Villiers in the appeal case117 disagreed with the decision a 
quo and argued that if the right to lateral support existed as a natural right 
incident to the plaintiff’s land, as in his opinion it did, the parties to the contract 
must be deemed to have contracted with a view to the continued existence of 
that right. “If they had intended that the plaintiff should be deprived of this right 
ought not the defendant to have stipulated to that effect?” 118 In the absence of 
such a stipulation the presumption is in favour of an intention to preserve a 
well-established natural right of property rather than to part with such a right. 
This rule was further qualified in Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates 
(Pty) Ltd,119 where Brand J made it clear that the right of lateral support was 
accepted as a rule of neighbour law, and therefore the right was incidental to 
the landowner’s ownership. This is consistent with what was said in the 
introduction of this chapter. Accordingly, a landowner could only be deprived 
of it with his consent, be it express or tacit, but never to be implied by law. 
 
 
                                                 
117
 (1890-1891) 8 SC 74. 
118
 (1890-1891) 8 SC 74 93. 
119
 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA) 371. 
 39 
2.4 Lateral Support for Buildings and other Artificial Structures on 
Land 
The applicability of the right of lateral support to buildings on land depends on 
which of the above two theories our courts find to be authoritative. If the right 
is in the nature of a natural servitude, it will not extend to buildings or artificial 
erections that increase the burden of support of land. It will be a servitude of 
support of land by land and not of buildings by land. On the other hand, if the 
right to lateral support is a right incidental to the ownership of a piece of 
property, then the right extends to buildings and any other artificial structures 
permanently erected and that have therefore acceded to the land. This is 
because it will be regarded as a natural and necessary right of ownership 
which ensures the full use and enjoyment of land. 
 
Gregorowski supported the view that Roman law was more correct and 
consistent with our law than English law because the former extends the right 
of support not only to the surface, but to a wall built upon it, the erecting of a 
wall falling under the ordinary user.120 In addition, an anonymous writer 
pointed out that in consequence of the favour with which erected buildings 
were regarded in Roman law, not only the soil itself but also the buildings 
upon it were protected against any interference with their stability arising from 
withdrawal of lateral support from land.121 
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The first authoritative judicial statement on this debate came courtesy of 
Morice J in Johannesburg Board of Executors v Victoria Building Company.122 
The plaintiff and the defendant were owners of adjoining stands in 
Johannesburg. In 1888 the plaintiff erected a double storey building on his 
stand. At that point in time, there was a small building on the defendant’s 
stand, which was pulled down in 1893 to make room for a large double storey 
building. The foundations of the new building were excavated in the 
immediate vicinity of the plaintiff’s building. At about the same time when the 
western wall of the defendant’s building was finished, the eastern adjoining 
wall of the plaintiff began to crack and subsequently, on account of this, it had 
to be pulled down and rebuilt. The plaintiff attributed this to the fact that the 
foundations of the defendant’s building were much deeper than those of his 
own building. 
 
The court favoured the view that lateral support was owed to both land and 
buildings. It was held that owners of adjoining erven were mutually obliged to 
refrain from doing anything that would result in the necessary support for 
buildings on neighbouring properties being removed. Morice J found that 
there was no trace to be found in Roman law of the distinction, adopted in 
English law, between lateral support for the ground and lateral support for the 
buildings on the ground.123 Thus it was held that in South Africa, the duty of 
lateral support extended to both the land in its natural state and to land 
encumbered by buildings. 
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The same view was reiterated in Phillips.124 In that case the first defendants 
employed the second defendant to erect a building on their property. In the 
course of the building operations the second defendant made certain 
excavations close to the plaintiff's building, as a result of which it collapsed. 
De Villiers AJ held that the Roman-Dutch law recognised a right of lateral 
support for land and buildings as between adjoining tenements.125 He 
accordingly held that the plaintiff's building would not have collapsed if 
ordinary precautions had been taken by the defendants, and because the 
second defendant had acted in accordance with the contract between himself 
and the first defendants, they should be held jointly and severally liable in 
damages to the plaintiff. 
 
The case of Municipal Council of Johannesburg v Robinson GMC126 provides 
further support for the view that the right of support is a natural right incidental 
to the ownership of property and thus extends to buildings and other artificial 
structures permanently affixed to the land, although indirectly. The important 
facts in Robinson GMC were that the plaintiff expropriated a portion of the 
defendant’s land for the purposes of laying a sewer through it. The 
defendants, who were miners, withdrew the lateral and subjacent support for 
the sewers in the course of their operations. Krause J referred to the English 
decisions in Dalton v Angus127 and Backhouse v Bonomi128 which established 
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the rule that a right to support for buildings could exist if acquired by an 
easement, usually by the elapse of a prescriptive period of twenty years. On 
the strength of these two judgements, Krause J found that the defendants 
were bound to provide support for the plaintiff’s sewer. Krause J then 
concluded that “what is said here about the right of the owner of land applies 
equally to the owner of a building or other structures, like a sewer, when once 
the right of support has been acquired.”129  
 
Milton is of the opinion that Krause J erred in reaching this conclusion, 
because English law does not extend the right of support to buildings on 
land.130 English law simply provides that a right to support for buildings can be 
acquired by a servitude. This is different from a natural right of support for 
buildings, which was said in Victoria131 to exist in Roman-Dutch law. Milton 
believes that Krause J may have based his argument essentially on the fact 
that the council had expropriated the ground, so that failure by the defendants 
to provide lateral support amounted to a derogation from the grant. He 
concludes that in this sense this decision would be in harmony with English 
authorities.132 Milton found it worth noting that Krause J did not refer to any 
South African authorities in reaching his decision.  
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What was said in the Victoria decision was seemingly repudiated in 1947, in 
Douglas Colliery v Bothma.133 The applicant was the holder of mineral rights 
over two adjoining properties and the respondent was the owner of the 
surface of one of the properties. The respondent had erected a permanent 
dwelling house on the property and had permitted his servant to build a hut; 
on another portion of the farm a wattle and clay structure had also been 
constructed. The applicant complained that he would be precluded from 
carrying on mining operations under or within a horizontal distance of three 
hundred feet from the buildings, by reason of regulation 2 of Chapter 2 of the 
Mines and Works Regulations. This amounted to a gross interference with the 
applicant’s mining operations that would occasion a considerable loss in 
revenue. 
 
Neser J held that while the holder of mineral rights is obliged to leave support 
for the surface in its natural state when conducting his mining operations, the 
owner of the surface is obliged to desist from doing anything on the surface 
which would interfere with the mineral right holder’s right to sever and remove 
the minerals.134 It was held in that case that there was no right of support for 
that which is artificially constructed on land. 
 
Milton was at pains to make the point that the Douglas decision was 
essentially concerned with mining law, and as shall be seen, different 
provisions exist in South African law regarding rights to land used essentially 
                                                 
133
 1947 (3) SA 602 (T). 
134
 1947 (3) SA 602 (T) 612. 
 44 
for mining purposes.135 He submits that a clear distinction must be drawn 
between the right of support as existing in private property law and as existing 
in mining law; and that in the former field the view that the right of support is 
owed both to land and buildings is to be preferred. The Douglas decision did 
not purport to alter the law relating to lateral support, but rather to define the 
right of support in the special field of mining law.136 
 
Franklin and Kaplan indicate that other South African authors also heed this 
distinction drawn by Milton, namely between the right of support as existing in 
private law of property and the right of support as existing in mining law.137 
Franklin and Kaplan, like Milton, favour the view that the right of support is 
extended to buildings in South African law138 and that the Douglas case did 
not purport to alter the law relating to lateral support in private law of property, 
but simply defined the rights of support in mining law. 
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In East London Municipality v South African Railways and Harbours139 it was 
held that the right to lateral support only extended to land in its natural state. 
The pertinent facts in that case were that the landowner had granted to the 
municipality and the public in general a public road over his property. The 
municipality laid high tension electric cables along the road. The defendant, in 
carrying out his quarrying operations, removed the lateral support and caused 
a subsidence. Reynolds J found that in regard to artificial constructions on 
land our law was substantially the same as the law of England. He could not 
see how on principle a right of support for all buildings, even those increasing 
the natural burden of support, could exist. He concluded that the right of 
support to land in its natural state rests upon principles common to all 
jurisprudence; hence on principle there can be no right of support for an 
artificial construction which did not exist in nature.140 However, Reynolds J 
defines “land in its natural state” as meaning that:  
 
“[T]he land to be supported is in such a state at the time of the withdrawal 
of support that no extra burden artificially there (ie not placed there by 
nature) increases the amount of support it requires beyond the amount it 
would require if the artificial burden were not there so as itself to cause 
subsidence which would not otherwise have occurred if the land was 
without the burden.”141  
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So, if the supporting earth would have escaped in the same way in the 
absence of the burden in the form of for example a building, damages will be 
awarded. 
 
Milton explains that the factor that caused Reynolds J to come to this verdict 
was that the plaintiff company had acquired the land as a result of a grant by 
the defendant. It is an elementary principle of law that every grant carries with 
it all that is necessary for the enjoyment of the subject matter granted. He 
concludes that failure thus to provide lateral support as a necessary incident 
to the rights granted to the plaintiff would have rendered the grant futile.142  
 
In Gordon v Durban City Council,143 the plaintiff was the owner of a piece of 
land known as 17, Churchill Road, Durban. One end of his land adjoined on to 
Churchill Road and the other on to an unnamed lane and, next to the lane, a 
shed or garage building existed on the plaintiff's land at all material times. The 
plaintiff alleged that, during the month of December, 1952, the defendant by 
its servants, acting within the course and scope of their employment, 
excavated a trench along the unnamed lane in a direction parallel to the back 
wall of this garage or shed, and at a distance from that wall of approximately 3 
feet, and thus caused soil, which was supporting the wall, to slip and/or 
gradually to flow away, and that in consequence the footing of part of the wall, 
and a part of the floor-slab of the garage, subsided.  
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The decision in East London Municipality144 was uncritically accepted by 
Selke J. He said he took the common law regarding support applicable as 
between contiguous properties to be as indicated in East London Municipality 
v SAR & H,145 namely, that as between contiguous properties the equivalent 
of reciprocal real servitudes exist, as it were ex jure naturae, by virtue of 
which each property is prima facie entitled as against the other to a 
continuance of that amount of lateral support which the last-mentioned 
property provided in its natural state. By “natural state,” Selke J specifies that 
he meant “the condition in which the land was when unchanged and 
unaffected by the activities of man,”146 thereby effectively excluding buildings 
and other artificial constructions from the scope of the right of lateral support 
in South African law. 
 
As was seen above, South African courts have adopted the theory that 
explains the right of lateral support as a natural right inherent in the ownership 
of property. The right of lateral support was received in Rouliot147 as a natural 
right incidental to the ownership of the property and not as a servitude or 
easement. This view was endorsed by the decision in Johannesburg Board of 
Executors v Victoria Building Company.148 In that case it was found that the 
right of lateral support was not only available to land in its natural state but 
also to land that was encumbered by buildings and other artificial fixtures. 
This was only possible because the right of lateral support was seen as 
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shorthand for saying that a landowner had a right to use and enjoy his 
property.149 After the Victoria150 case a few cases151 followed, confirming the 
same view that the right of lateral support was a natural right inherent in the 
ownership of property. Douglas Colliery v Bothma,152 constituted the only 
decision that decided that the right of support was in the nature of a servitude, 
by saying that it did not extend to buildings on land. According to this view 
lateral support is only available to people where there is an agreement of 
easement to that effect. However, as was seen above, this case was a mining 
law case and it was explained that different provisions exist in South African 
law regarding rights to land essentially used for mining purposes. Milton 
submit that a clear distinction must be drawn between the right of support as 
existing in private property law and as existing in mining law; and that in the 
former field the view that the right of support is owed both to land and 
buildings is to be preferred.153 The exclusion of built-up land was clearly 
influenced by English law. 
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2.5 English Law of Support 
2.5.1 Extent of the Right of Support in English Law 
In English law, landowners have certain “natural rights,” protected by the law 
of torts, which come into being automatically and that are not the subject of 
any grant.154 The right to support for land is one such right. Every landowner 
has a right to enjoy his own land in its natural state and is therefore entitled to 
have his land physically supported by the lateral thrust provided by his 
neighbour’s land.155 Interference with this right gives rise to strict delictual 
liability in the neighbour.  
 
As was pointed out above, every landowner has a natural right that the lateral 
thrust exerted on his soil by his neighbour’s land should not be removed, for 
example by mining or excavation operations carried out on adjacent land. This 
natural right to support includes an entitlement to support from a neighbour’s 
subjacent minerals and from any adjacent bed of wet sand or running silt.156 
However, this natural right of support does not extend to any claim that land 
should be supported by subterranean water present in adjacent land, with the 
result that no action lies in respect of a neighbour’s extraction of such water 
and consequent subsidence.157 The natural right does not imply an obligation 
upon the neighbouring landowner to preserve his own land in its natural state. 
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2.5.2 English Law of Support for Buildings 
It is at this juncture in the development of the right to support for buildings, 
that Milton finds it appropriate to examine the English law of support. He 
begins by citing Halsbury’s Laws of England, where it is clearly stated that the 
owner of land has no natural right to support for buildings or additional weight 
which the buildings cause: “Support for that which is imposed on land cannot 
exist ex jure naturae, because the thing supported does not itself exist.”158 
 
In Wilde v Minsterley159 an extract from an early abridgement of the common 
law was quoted with approval. The extract held that where a neighbour B 
removed support from land and so caused a house on the neighbouring 
property of A to collapse, no action lies at the suit of A against B, because this 
was the fault of A himself that he built his house so near to the land of B, for 
he could not by his act hinder B from making the most profitable use of B’s 
own land. 
 
This rule was justified as follows in Wyatt v Harrison:160 “if I have laid an 
additional weight upon my land, it does not follow that he (ie a neighbour) is to 
be deprived of the right of digging his own ground, because mine will then 
become incapable of supporting the artificial weight which I have laid upon it.” 
In Humphries v Brodgen161 it was said that this rule stands on natural justice, 
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and that it is essential for the protection and enjoyment of the property in the 
soil. However, in Dalton v Angus162 Lord Penzance conceded, although obiter, 
that the rule does work some injustice. The judge said: 
 
“If the matter were res integra, I think it will be inconsistent with legal 
principles to hold, that where an owner of land has used his land for an 
ordinary and reasonable purpose, such as placing a house upon it, the 
owner of the adjacent soil could not be allowed to deal with his own soil 
by excavation as to bring his neighbour’s house to the ground. It would 
be, I think, no unreasonable application of the principle sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas to hold that the owner of adjacent soil should take 
reasonable precautions, to prevent the excavation from disastrously 
affecting his neighbour.”163 
 
This, however, is not the law of England, as Lord Penzance immediately 
admitted. There is no duty on an owner in carrying out his excavations to 
consider his neighbour, and thereby take reasonable precautions to prevent 
him from suffering damage.164 
 
According to Gray and Gray, the decision in Dalton has always been viewed 
as providing venerable authority for the proposition that the natural right of 
support avails land only in its original state unencumbered by buildings or 
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other constructions.165 So, if excavations or demolitions on neighbouring land 
cause a landowner’s house to collapse, the landowner normally has no 
remedy in the absence of either nuisance, negligence or a duly acquired 
easement of support. An action in nuisance will therefore exist where the acts 
or omissions of an adjoining landowner unduly interfere with the neighbouring 
landowner’s comfortable and convenient enjoyment of the demised 
property.166  
 
It is important to note that this rule of English law does not apply to all artificial 
constructions on land. In Halsbury’s it is qualified by saying that the mere fact 
that there are buildings on land does not preclude a right of support, so long 
as the buildings do not “materially affect the question, or their additional 
weight” does not cause the subsidence that follows the withdrawal of 
support.167 So, if the building did not increase the pressure on the land then it 
is “as if the model stood there, the weight of which bore so small a proportion 
to that of the soil as practically to add nothing to it.”168 
 
In recent years, there has been a growing criticism of the confinement of the 
natural right to support to undeveloped land in English law. It has been 
criticised as being incompatible with the high intensity use of land in urban 
areas.169 Moreover, according to Gray and Gray the dogmatic restriction of 
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this ancient rule leaves uncomfortable anomalies in its wake. A landowner’s 
land, if left undeveloped, commands a strict duty of support from his 
neighbour’s soil, but if the landowner invests in the developing his land, the 
neighbour may immediately excavate with impunity on his side, thereby 
causing the landowner’s new building/s to crumble.170 Furthermore, the 
neighbour’s freedom to disregard the landowner’s need of support for 
buildings on his land is rather oddly transformed, after the effluxion of a 20 
year prescription period, into a positive duty of support in respect of the 
landowner’s buildings.171 
 
Gray and Gray cite a decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal as an 
example to be followed by other common law jurisdictions.172 It was held in 
Xpress Print Pte Ltd v Monocrafts Pte Ltd and L & B Engineering (S) Pte 
Ltd,173 that it is “inimical to a society which respects each citizen’s property 
rights’ that, within the prescriptive period, a landowner could ‘excavate his 
land with impunity, sending his neighbour’s building and everything in it 
crashing to the ground.’”174 Instead, the court appealed to the maxim sic utere 
tuo ut alieum non laedas to uphold, on behalf of an injured party, a right of 
support in respect of his buildings by neighbouring lands from the time such 
buildings are erected. 
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2.5.3 Differences from South African Law 
The English law rule as to lateral support owed to buildings on land seems to 
stem from the application of the natural servitude construction of the right of 
lateral support. By contrast, the natural right in the ownership property basis 
of the right to lateral support seems to have prevailed in Roman law and it 
should thus apply in South African law. The natural right in the ownership of 
property basis, as illustrated above, does not draw a distinction between 
support for land in its natural state and support for buildings burdening the 
land. As was indicated above, Milton and other noteworthy authors in South 
African law submit that on principle the Victoria approach is preferable for 
South African law.175  
 
South African authors attribute the failure of modern South African law to 
acknowledge the Victoria doctrine to two facts.176 The first is the existence of 
bye-laws and building regulations in urban areas that guarantee that buildings 
will not be rendered dangerous or caused to collapse by the removal of lateral 
support afforded by neighbouring properties.177 Milton rightfully submits that 
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these statutory regulations have made it unnecessary for courts to evolve 
rules dealing with removal of lateral support in urban areas.178 
 
The second fact is the development of a new body of law regarding mines and 
mining which has significantly influenced the law of lateral support.179 South 
African mining law draws a distinction between the rights of surface owners 
and those of mineral right holders. Where these rights come into conflict, our 
law subordinates the use of the surface to mineral exploration.180 This 
influence of mining law will be developed in the next chapter, dealing with 
subjacent support. For now, suffice it to say that the mining industry is the 
backbone of the South African economy. The interests of mineral right holders 
are thus likely to be given preference. Those exploiting the mineral wealth of a 
nation should not be called upon to provide more support for the surface than 
necessary. Thus the erection of buildings on the surface is accordingly 
restrained.181 
 
The current position in English law, namely that the right of lateral support 
only extends to land in its natural state and not to buildings, is in fact in 
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conflict with the very clear choice for the inherent incident of ownership theory 
that is accepted as the basis of the lateral support rule as illustrated above. 
 
2.6 The Action for Failure to Provide Lateral Support 
2.6.1 English Law 
In English law, as is the case in South African law, the natural right to 
support is only infringed where the excavation of the adjacent land of a 
neighbour causes actual damage to the surface of the claimant’s 
land.182 Therefore, a cause of action only accrues to a landowner upon 
the occurrence of actual physical damage. The mere apprehension of 
future damage or a mere loss of stability is not sufficient to found a 
cause of action, thereby precluding the possibility of recovering 
prospective damages. 
 
In Bonomi v Backhouse183 it was held that no cause of action arose until the 
subsidence took place. In his judgement, Willes J in the Exchequer Chamber 
said that: 
 
“We think that the right which a man has to enjoy his own land in the 
state and condition which nature placed it, and also to use it in such a 
manner as he thinks fit, subject always to this: that, if his mode of it does 
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damage to his neighbour, he must make compensation. Applying these 
two principles to the present case, we think that no cause of action 
accrued for the mere excavation by the defendant in his own land, so 
long as it caused no damage to the plaintiff; and that the cause of action 
did accrue when the actual damage first occurred.”184 
 
The House of Lords confirmed this decision and reiterated that the right of 
lateral support was a right to the ordinary use of land: until that ordinary 
enjoyment was interfered with, no cause of action accrued.185 Milton 
comments that this statement of law is consistent with the premise that the 
right of support is not a natural servitude but is in fact a natural right in the 
ownership of property, that is, the right to the use and enjoyment of land. If the 
right was seen as a natural servitude or easement, the mere removal of 
support would have given rise to an action for damages, even where the 
plaintiff had suffered none.  
 
In Darley Colliery v Mitchell186 it was held that each recurring subsidence, 
although following from the same original act of withdrawal of lateral support, 
formed a new and independent cause of action. This is so because the 
defendants would have permitted the state of things to continue without taking 
any steps to prevent the occurrence of future injury. A fresh subsidence took 
place, causing a new and further disturbance of the plaintiff’s enjoyment, 
which gave him a new and distinct cause of action.187  
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Furthermore, the natural right of support in English law cannot obligate 
a neighbour to take active steps to maintain lateral support. Gray and 
Gray submit that in reality the right of support entails no positive right at 
all, but merely a right not to have lateral support withdrawn by a 
neighbour’s positive actions. What is prohibited is an active interference 
with the support which causes damage.188 Therefore an accidental 
slippage of land on a neighbouring piece of land constitutes no breach 
of the right to support. In such a case, however, the neighbour may be 
liable on the alternative grounds of negligence and nuisance, as there is 
a duty of care to prevent danger to higher land from lack of support 
caused by natural erosion. Under these circumstances, liability only 
arises where the owner or occupier of the lower land knows or is 
presumed to know of a patent defect in his land which could reasonably 
and foreseeably cause damage to higher land.189 
 
It follows that violation of a landowner’s right to support gives rise to 
liability in the form of damages and may even be the subject of a 
mandatory injunction. However, the natural right to support is not 
infringed if the land which has been excavated and the neighbouring 
land from which lateral support has thereby been removed are both, at 
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the date of excavation, within the common ownership of one person.190 
A subsequent purchaser of the portion of land from which lateral 
support has been removed cannot claim any violation of his natural right 
in the event of a later collapse of his land, but may be able to sue in 
negligence.191 
 
2.6.2 South African Law 
A landowner may lawfully dig upon his own soil to any depth as he desires. In 
doing so, he may not cause injury to the rights of his neighbour or the public 
at large by digging so near to the neighbour’s ground or to any road or other 
public place as to endanger its stability. If he causes injury to his neighbour or 
any person lawfully on or using the public road or space he may not only be 
interdicted, but held liable for any damage endured thereof.192 
 
Milton submits that South African authority193 classically restates English 
law,194 and in John Newmark & Co (Pty) Ltd v Durban City Council195 
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Henochsberg J said that “it is clear that in our law, as in English law, where 
there is a removal of lateral support …, each successive subsidence, although 
proceeding from the original act or omission gives rise to a fresh cause of 
action apart altogether from the question of negligence.”196  
 
As to the question of culpa or dolus in subsidence cases, our law is consistent 
with the English law. In proceedings for relief, it would be sufficient for the 
plaintiff to allege that the defendant has in fact withdrawn or interfered with the 
lateral support of his land to an extent which infringes his entitlements and 
that this has produced damage.197 Neither negligence nor intention is a 
requirement for liability for damage caused by the withdrawal of lateral 
support. It was accordingly held in Grieves & Anderson v Sherwood198 that 
“reasonable precautions” by the defendant is not a defence against the 
plaintiff’s claim for damages. Neither the care nor the skill with which the work 
may have been done, nor the unstable nature of the soil, nor the difficulty of 
propping it up, will form any defence to the action. However, Maasdorp and 
Hall add to this that if an aggrieved landowner can prove that he suffered 
pecuniary loss through the dolus or culpa of the wrongdoer, he can likewise 
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recover damages in delict by virtue of the Lex Aquilia.199 The fact that liability 
is not dependant on the presence of dolus or culpa and that it only follows 
where withdrawal of support has caused damage on neighbouring land 
illustrates that the right of support is a natural right in the ownership of 
property. This is in line with what was said in the introduction to this chapter 
above. 
 
In Oslo Lands Co Ltd v Union Government,200 a distinction between an action 
based on negligence and one based on the withdrawal of support was 
tendered. It was said that in negligence cases the cause of action is an 
unlawful act plus damage, so that as soon as the damage has occurred all the 
damage from the unlawful act can be recovered, including prospective 
damage and depreciation in market value. By contrast, in subsidence cases 
there is no unlawful act; the cause of action is damage and damage only. It 
follows from this that depreciation in value of property owing to risk of future 
subsidence cannot be recovered in such actions.201 A similar statement to that 
effect, namely that in subsidence cases there is usually no unlawful act and 
that the cause of action is damage and damage alone, was made by Henning 
J in Gijzen v Verrinder.202 
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Milton is of the opinion that this statement may be misleading.203 He explains 
that there was in fact an unlawful act in that there had been a substantial 
interference with adjoining land that caused damage. He concludes by saying 
that it is the presence of damage which converts a normally lawful act (digging 
upon one’s land) into an unlawful act.204 In other words, what begins as a 
lawful and harmless activity becomes unlawful when lateral support is 
withdrawn from a neighbour’s land and the latter suffers actual physical 
damage to his land. 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
It is clear from the above that in South African law, the view that the right of 
lateral support is a natural right incidental in the ownership of property is the 
theory that convincingly explains the nature of the right of lateral support. 
Milton states that the natural right theory has deeper significance, and that the 
servitudal theory has given rise to uncertainty as to the true nature of the 
right.205 However, he submits that most writers include this right in their 
discussion of servitudes while simultaneously stating that it is a natural right of 
property.206  
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As was explained above, the theory that describes the right of lateral support 
as a natural right inherent in the ownership of property therefore informs the 
nature of the remedies available to a landowner whose property subsides as a 
result of the withdrawal of lateral support caused by the activities of the 
neighbouring landowner. Thus, he could either claim damages via the 
neighbour law action of nuisance, or by way of a delictual action. 
 
It was held in Demont v Akal’s Investments207 that in proceedings for relief, it 
will be sufficient for the plaintiff to allege that the defendant has in fact:  
 
“[W]ithdrawn or interfered with the lateral support of his land to the extent 
which infringes his basic rights, and that this has produced damage. It is 
unnecessary for him to allege any specific details of negligence.”208  
 
The fact that the plaintiff need not prove culpa, or dolus for that matter, 
indicates that the action for withdrawal of support is a real action based on 
nuisance. This is distinguishable from the personal action based on delict 
where an aggrieved landowner would be required to show fault, either in the 
form of culpa or dolus.209 
 
Viljoen and Bosman submit that it is clear that the right to support derives 
from the law of neighbours, although it should be added that this branch of 
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law has had a very unsystematic treatment in South African law.210 It has 
been submitted that if lateral support of land is removed, the basic measure of 
damage is the reasonable cost to provide support to the property in 
question.211 Viljoen and Bosman submit that when a landowner has not 
suffered damage but a neighbour has interfered with or has threatened to 
interfere with the landowner’s reasonable enjoyment of his property, he is 
entitled to an interdict or abatement or both.212 In claiming an interdict, the 
affected landowner simply has to show a clear right, that no other remedy is 
available to him and that his enjoyment of his property is being threatened or 
disturbed. 
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In a real action based on nuisance, the successful plaintiff who has suffered 
damage because of the withdrawal of lateral support would claim 
compensation for the cost of repairing the damage caused by the withdrawal 
of lateral support. A neighbouring owner cannot with impunity excavate on his 
land, if such activities would have the effect of reducing the above-mentioned 
quantum of lateral support.213 
 
If a plaintiff opts to pursue the Aquilian (delictual) action based on the actio 
legis Aquiliae, he will have to prove that he suffered actual pecuniary 
(financial) loss caused deliberately or negligently by the defendant.214 If he is 
successful he will be able to recoup what he actually lost as a result of the 
removal of subjacent support. The lex Aquilia accordingly aims at restoring to 
a successful plaintiff the difference between his universitas rerum as it was 
after the act causing loss, and as it would have been if the act had not been 
committed.215 
 
As is evident from the above, South African courts have preferred the theory 
that explains the right of lateral support as a natural right inherent in the 
ownership of property over the servitudal theory. The right of lateral support 
was clearly received in Rouliot216 as a natural right incidental to the ownership 
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of the property and not as a servitude or as an easement. From the 
discussion of buildings and the right of lateral support, it was seen that the 
natural rights theory was endorsed by the decision in Johannesburg Board of 
Executors v Victoria Building Company.217 In holding that the right of lateral 
support was not only available to land in its natural state but also to land that 
was encumbered by buildings, the court in Victoria upheld the natural rights 
theory. The right of lateral support was seen as shorthand for saying that a 
landowner had a right to use and enjoy his property, 218 hence its availability to 
buildings and other permanent fixtures erected on land. Subsequent to the 
Victoria219 case a few other cases220 confirmed the same view that the right of 
lateral support was a natural right inherent in the ownership of property. 
Douglas Colliery v Bothma,221 constituted the only decision that decided that 
the right of support was in the nature of a servitude, by saying that it did not 
extend to buildings on land. This was because lateral support would only be 
available to buildings where there was an agreement of easement to that 
effect. However, as was emphasized above Douglas Colliery v Bothma was a 
mining law case, therefore different provisions existed/exist in South African 
law regarding rights to land essentially used for mining purposes. For that 
reason, a clear distinction must always be drawn between the rights of 
support as existing in private property law and as existing in mining law; and 
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that in the former field the view that the right of support is owed both to land 
and buildings is to be preferred.222 
 
From the above, it is clear that in South African law, the right of lateral support 
is generally accepted as being a natural right inherent in the ownership of 
property, and is only available in a neighbour law setting. This premise was 
repeated in Anglo Operations,223 where the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
distinguishing the concept of subjacent support from that of lateral support 
demonstrated that the right of lateral support was received as a neighbour law 
principle by Rouliot.224 In doing so, the Supreme Court of Appeal removed any 
doubt as to the true legal nature of the right of lateral support. It is now settled 
law that the right of lateral support is a natural right inherent in the ownership 
of land. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
222
 In this regard see Milton JRL “The Law of Neighbours in South Africa” 1969 Acta Juridica 
123-254 208. Franklin BLS and Kaplan M The Mining and Mineral Laws of South Africa 
(1982) 123. This will also be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
223
 Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) 363 (SCA) 372. 
224
 London and South African Exploration Company v Rouliot (1890-1891) 8 SC 74 99. 
 68 
Chapter 3 
The Right of Subjacent Support 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The preliminary section of this chapter will specifically show how the 
neighbour law principles of lateral support (as discussed in chapter two 
above) were extended to govern the conflict pertaining to subjacent support 
that arises between a landowner and a mineral rights holder in South African 
mining law. Thereafter, the chapter will illustrate how the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Anglo Operations v Sandhurst Estates225 rejected this extension, by 
clearly distinguishing between lateral support and subjacent support. They 
held that the right to minerals on the property of another was in the nature of a 
quasi-servitude, and therefore all conflicts arising therefrom were to be 
resolved in accordance with the principles of servitudes developed by our 
law.226 Therefore, in applying these principles of servitude to mineral rights, 
the court found that the landowner was bound to allow the holder of mineral 
rights to do whatever was reasonably necessary to attain his ultimate 
objectives. In the absence of an express or tacit term to the contrary in the 
grant of minerals, this would include on the part of the mineral rights holder 
the right to employ the open-cast method of mining. They added that the 
mineral rights holder was in turn bound to exercise his rights civiliter modo, 
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that is, reasonably viewed, with as much possible consideration and with the 
least possible inconvenience to the landowner. 
 
The possible effect of legislation with regard to the question of subjacent 
support will be discussed. Firstly the implications of the Anglo Operations 
decision in light of the systemic changes of mineral ownership and 
administration brought about by the new Act,227will be examined. The 
question is whether this servitude construction can hold in cases where the 
mineral right or mining right was not granted by the landowner but by the 
state, acting in terms of the new regulatory powers created in the Act. The 
effect of older legislation in this regard (mainly the Minerals Act 50 of 1991) on 
the relationship between a landowner and a mineral rights holder will also be 
considered. This will help us establish the extent of the new Act’s impact on 
the landowner. 
 
Secondly, in addition to the above, the general effect of legislation (old and 
new) on the relationship of between a landowner and a mineral rights holder 
with regard to the question of subjacent support will also be investigated. 
 
3.2 The Origin and Development of the Subjacent Support 
Problem in Case Law and Academic Writing 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Traditionally, the legal position in South Africa was that the mineral rights 
holder was obliged to leave sufficient subjacent support for the landowner on 
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whose property his mining operations were being carried on and lateral 
support for the neighbouring landowner.228 Kaplan and Dale submit that a 
mineral rights holder or person prospecting or mining with the surface owner’s 
consent is entitled, at common law, to broad ancillary rights in respect of the 
use of the surface for purposes necessary for or incidental to such 
activities.229 However, the right to withdraw subjacent support is not included 
under the “broad ancillary rights” umbrella, although it is incidental to the 
prospecting or mining activities of a mineral rights holder. The surface owner 
was required to expressly or tacitly waive his right to subjacent support as it 
was regarded as a natural right inherent in the ownership of property. Viewed 
in this light, the right of subjacent support, like the right to lateral support, was 
shorthand for the right to use and enjoy property (a natural right inherent in 
the ownership of property).230 Depriving a landowner of this right would have 
been tantamount to him losing all value and beneficial use of his property. So 
the law would have never implied a term to that effect. The landowner would 
have been required to expressly or tacitly waive the right of subjacent support 
before a mineral rights holder could withdraw subjacent support even under 
circumstances that demanded such withdrawal. 
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The practice of treating subjacent support and lateral support as synonymous 
concepts can be traced back to the case of Witbank Colliery v Malan and 
Coronation Collieries.231 This practice was maintained right up to the Anglo 
Operations232 a quo decision. The facts of the former case were as follows. 
Witbank Colliery acquired from Malan, the owner of the land, the right to mine 
for coal under a portion of his land. They concluded a notarial agreement 
registered against the title in 1898. Thereafter a third party by the name of 
Coronation Colliery constructed a railway siding across that same portion 
granted to Witbank Colliery to connect their workings with the main line of 
railway by virtue of a contract, of which they were the cessionaries, granted to 
the cedent by Malan in 1896. The contract was notarial and registered in the 
Deeds Office, but not against the title, and its existence was unknown to 
Witbank Colliery at the time of the contract in 1898. The existence of a railway 
siding caused the Government Mining Engineer to prohibit, in terms of a 
regulation, the Witbank Colliery from mining under it, by directing that a pillar 
of coal be left vertically under the siding for its whole length and for a specified 
distance on each side of it. 
 
It was held by the Transvaal Provincial Division that the rights of Witbank 
Colliery, conferred by a notarial deed duly registered against the title, ranked 
in priority over those conferred by the contract of 1896 which was not 
registered against the title. Coronation Colliery was held to be liable in 
damages to Witbank Colliery, the measure of damages being the value of the 
coal under the siding which could not be mined, less the cost of extraction. It 
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was held further that the owner of the land, Malan, was not liable in damages 
since he himself had done nothing to violate the rights of the Witbank Colliery. 
 
This case set the scene for the crucial decision by the same court in 
Coronation Collieries v Malan.233 The plaintiff sought to recover from Malan, 
the owner of the surface who had granted the Witbank Colliery the right to 
mine on it, damages which the court in the 1910 case had awarded against it. 
The central question in that case for our purposes was whether the 
underground miner owed the landowner a duty of vertical or subjacent support 
of the surface. In answering this question Bristowe J began by saying: 
 
“It is well settled in England that the right to have the surface of land in its 
natural state supported by the subjacent minerals is a right of property 
and not an easement; and that a lease or conveyance of minerals, even 
though accompanied by the widest powers of working, carried with it no 
power to let down the surface, unless such power is granted either 
expressly or by necessary implication.”234 
 
In this regard he cited a few English law authorities.235 He then went on to 
draw the distinction between English and South African law in this regard. In 
South Africa there can be no lease or cession of mineral rights. Horizontal 
layers of the earth’s surface cannot, as they can in England, be separately 
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owned. He then cited Innes CJ in Van Vuuren v Registrar of Deeds,236 who 
said that every grant or reservation of mineral rights is in truth the constitution, 
by the owner of the property affected, of a quasi-servitude in favour of the 
grantee.237 Bristowe J then inexplicably went on to say that: 
 
“…this difference between the two systems of law does not affect the 
right of support, and that the case of London and South African 
Exploration Co. v Rouliot,238 shows that as regards the right of support of 
land in its natural state, there was no difference between the English law 
and the Roman-Dutch law. In that case it was held that a lessee of land 
for mining purposes cannot prima facie withdraw support from the 
adjoining land of the lessor. There it was only lateral support that was in 
question, because the lease contemplated surface workings, but the 
same principle would apply, if his workings were subterranean and the 
support in question was vertical. In giving judgement, De Villiers CJ, said 
‘If the right to lateral support exists as a natural right incident to the 
plaintiff’s land, as in my opinion it does, the parties to the contract must 
be deemed to have contracted with a view to the continued existence of 
that right… I am of the opinion that, in the absence of such a stipulation, 
the presumption is in favour of an intention to preserve a well-established 
natural right of property rather than to part with such a right.’”239 
 
This above passage forms the basis for the view that a landowner may not be 
deprived of vertical support which his property naturally derives from the 
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minerals below the surface, without his express or tacit consent. It constitutes 
the foundation of the respondent’s contention in Anglo Operations.240 
 
Several noteworthy South Africa authors subscribe to this view.241 Viljoen and 
Bosman discuss the right of lateral support and the right of subjacent support 
under the heading “The Rights of the Landowner.” They refer to Rouliot242 and 
fail to appreciate that it specifically dealt with lateral support and not subjacent 
support. Kaplan and Dale make the same oversight.243 
 
Since the extension of this rule of neighbour law to govern the relationship of 
landowners and mineral rights holders in respect of the same land in 1911 by 
Bristowe J, there was no clarity as to whether the ancillary rights of mineral 
right holders included the right to withdraw subjacent support in carrying out 
his mining operations. 
 
3.2.2 Development of Subjacent Support in English Law 
3.2.2.1 Introduction 
The material conceptual difference between English law and South African 
law is that in English law it is possible for different horizontal layers of land to 
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be owned by different persons. One of the most basic principles of South 
African law, on the other hand, is that the owner of the land is the owner of the 
whole of the land, including the air space above the surface and everything 
below it.244 This principle finds expression in the maxim cuis est solum eius 
est usque ad caleum et usque ad inferos. In Coronation Collieries245 Bristowe 
J said that this difference between the two systems of law did not affect the 
right of support.246 This cannot be true in light of the above fundamental 
conceptual difference between the two systems of law in the field of mining 
law. Coronation Collieries v Malan,247 clearly followed English law cases of 
support. 
 
3.2.2.2 Development of Concept of Subjacent Support in English 
Case law 
In the leading English decision of Harris v Ryding,248 the owner of the land 
(the defendant) transferred ownership of the freehold but reserved for himself 
all the mines beneath the surface. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had 
wrongfully and injuriously, and without leave and licence, carelessly and 
negligently failed to provide sufficient support. By working the mines which 
were underground, near and contiguous to premises that were partly in the 
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possession, and partly in the reversion of the plaintiff, the defendants had 
withdrawn lateral and subjacent support. The ensuing result was damage to 
the houses, garden and land of the plaintiff. The substance of the defendant’s 
defence was that when he sold the surface to the plaintiff he reserved for 
himself the mines, with a certain liberty of working them, and such liberty 
extended to all the mines and minerals. The defendant’s attitude was that the 
exception in the grant enabled him to extract the coal in any manner he 
pleased. The court rejected this submission. 
 
The court held that in all cases of exception out of grants, there was an 
implied agreement between the parties that the owner of the minerals would 
use the thing excepted in a fashion that would not prejudice the grantee in the 
enjoyment of the subject matter of the grant. The exception was always 
interpreted in favour of the lessee, and against the lessor. It is a rule that what 
will pass by words in a grant will be excepted by the same words in an 
exception. Such a construction should be made of the words in a deed as is 
most agreeable to the intention of the grantor; the words are not the principal 
things in a deed, but the intent and design of the grantor.249 It was concluded 
on the facts that the parties could never have intended a right to work the 
mines to an extent that rendered the surface totally useless. There was an 
implied covenant to work the mines in the usual way. It must have been 
necessary to leave support for the surface, whether there were houses or not. 
Therefore the defendant was bound to work them in the ordinary usual mode 
which provided subjacent support to the surface owner. 
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It was also contended on behalf of the defendant that he had a right to use 
every means he pleased to work the mines and extract the minerals, so long 
as he paid reasonable compensation as agreed in their contract. However, it 
was held that the true meaning of the clause was that he should pay 
compensation for necessary injuries to crops growing upon the surface. The 
clause did not contemplate damage arising from working the mines in an 
improper way.  
 
In English law the right of support is not affected by the nature of the strata, or 
the difficulty of propping up the surface, or the comparative values of the 
surface and the minerals.250 Further, it is impossible to measure out degrees 
to which the right may extend.251 Thus, a surface owner’s right is not modified 
by the fact that the obligation not to cause damage by subsidence renders the 
effectual working of the subterranean minerals impossible, as where the 
extent of the pillars needed to maintain the surface is such as to make the 
remaining minerals unprofitable to work.252 In regard to this principle it is 
submitted in Halsbury’s Laws of England that it appears to have been 
assumed that the minerals could always be worked commercially, to some 
extent, without letting down the surface, so that it may have seemed 
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reasonable to infer an intention at the time of severance that they could be 
worked to that extent but no further.253 
 
On the strength of the above authorities, the principle of subjacent support 
was concisely stated as follows by Lord Macnaghten in Butterknowle Colliery 
Co Ltd v Bishop Auckland Industrial Co-operative Co Ltd:254  
 
“[T]he result seems to be that in all cases where there has been a 
severance in title and the upper and lower strata are in different hands, 
the surface owner is entitled of common right to support of his property in 
its natural position.”255 
 
In Humphries v Brodgen256 an action was brought by the plaintiff, alleging that 
he had been deprived of subjacent support for his land by the mining 
operations of the defendant. The plaintiff was possessed of diverse closes of 
pasture and arable land,257 what we would term pasture land and cropping 
land in South African law. The defendant was the owner of the subterranean 
minerals beneath these pasture and cropping lands belonging to the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant wrongfully, carelessly, negligently, 
improperly, and without leaving any proper or sufficient pillars of support, and 
contrary to the custom and course of practice of mining used and, approved of 
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in the country where the mines are situated, worked certain coal mines under 
and contiguous to the said closes. As a result the plaintiff’s pasture and 
cropping lands subsided and he suffered damage. 
 
The question before the court was whether, when the surface of land (the soil 
lying over the minerals) belonged to one man, and the minerals belonged to 
another, and there was no evidence of title appearing to regulate or qualify 
their respective rights of enjoyment, the owner of the minerals could extract 
them without leaving support sufficient to maintain the surface in its natural 
state. 
 
The court began by distinguishing the then contemporary state of affairs 
regarding the legal position of the right to subjacent support from adjacent 
support. Campbell CJ began by saying that where portions of the freehold, 
lying over another, perpendicularly belong to different individuals and 
constitute, as it were, separate closes, the degree of support to which the 
upper is entitled from the lower has, as yet, by no means been distinctly 
defined, but in the case of adjoining closes, which belong to different persons 
from the surface to the centre of the earth the law of England has long settled 
the degree of lateral support which each may claim from the other.258 He went 
on to say that examining the principle of lateral support might be useful in 
reaching a solution for the question of subjacent support.  
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The right to lateral support from adjoining soil, he said, was not like the 
support of one building upon another, supposed to be gained by grant, but 
was a right passing with the soil. For example, if the owner of two adjoining 
properties conveyed away one of them, the receiver, without any grant for the 
purpose, was entitled to the lateral support afforded by the other property the 
instance the conveyance was executed. Immediately after saying this 
Campbell J said that where there were separate freeholds, the surface of the 
land and the minerals belonging to different owners, they were of the opinion 
that “the owner of the surface, while unencumbered by buildings, and in its 
natural state, is entitled to have it supported by the subjacent mineral 
strata.”259 The owner of the minerals remains entitled to remove them, so long 
as he leaves sufficient support for the owner of the surface. If the surface 
subsides as a result of the removal of that mineral stratum, though, the 
operations were not carried out negligently or contrary to the custom of the 
country, the owner of the surface has an action against the owner of the 
minerals for the damage sustained by the subsidence. The court explained 
that, but for this right of support from subjacent minerals, which corresponds 
with the lateral support from adjoining properties, the surface cannot be 
enjoyed as property, and under certain circumstances, as where the mineral 
strata approach the surface, and are of great thickness, it might be entirely 
destroyed.260 
 
Campbell J subsequently summed up by stating that they likewise thought 
that the rule giving the right of support to the surface which was above the 
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minerals, in the absence of any express grant, reservation, or covenant, 
should be laid down generally, without reference to the nature of the strata, or 
the difficulty of propping up the surface, or the comparative value of the 
surface and the minerals.261 
 
This is the same line of reasoning adopted by Bristowe J in Coronation 
Collieries,262 when he said that the differences between English law and 
South African law in this regard did not affect the right of support, thereby 
extending the principles governing lateral support between two adjoining 
properties to the mining context where a third party had a right to the minerals 
beneath the surface of another’s property. 
 
So it follows that in English law, where there has been a severance of title and 
the surface and the minerals are in different hands, ownership of the land 
surface prima facie carries a natural right of support which is a right to have 
the surface kept in its natural position and condition.263 The right is not an 
easement but a natural right incident to the ownership of the soil.264 This is the 
same construction that is given to the right of lateral support in South African 
law. The right of lateral support is described as a natural right intrinsic or 
                                                 
261
 [1843-1860] All ER 779 783. 
262
 1911 TPD 577 591. 
263
 Lord Mackay Halsbury’s The Laws of England - Mines, Minerals and Quarries: 
Misrepresentation and Fraud 4th Ed (2003) Vol 31 para 116. See further Humphries v 
Brodgen (1850) 12 QB 739; Bonomi v Backhouse (1859) EB & E 646; Ex Ch (affd 1861) 9 
HL; Butterknowle Colliery Co Ltd v Bishop Auckland Industrial Co-Operative Co Ltd [1906] AC 
305. 
264
 Butterknowle Colliery Co Ltd v Bishop Auckland Industrial Co-Operative Co Ltd [1906] AC 
305.See further Bonomi v Backhouse (1859) EB & E 646, Ex Ch (affd 1861) 9 HL.  
 82 
inherent in the ownership of property.265 In short, the right of lateral support 
can be described as a landowner’s entitlement to the use and enjoyment of 
his property. 
 
It is further submitted that there exists no natural right of support for anything 
artificially erected on the land; “such a right cannot exist ex jure naturae 
because the thing itself did not do so.”266 This means that any right of support 
of such an artificial erection can only be acquired as an easement. 
Accordingly, rights and obligations in regard to support may be varied by the 
instrument of severance of the surface and minerals or by a separate 
instrument.267  
 
In English law the principles that apply in respect of support from subjacent 
mines which are severed from the surface are similar to those which regulate 
the mutual rights and liabilities of the owners of adjacent closes in respect of 
lateral support. These same principles also apply to the support of an 
underground stratum by a deeper stratum and to the support of the surface 
                                                 
265
 Van der Vyver JD “Expropriation, Rights, Entitlements and Surface Support of Land” 
(1988) 105 SALJ 1-16 11. See further Milton JRL “The Lateral Support of Land: A Natural 
Right of Property” (1965) 82 SALJ 459-463 460; Milton JRL “The Law of Neighbours in South 
Africa” 1969 Acta Juridica 123-254 210; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s the Law of Property 5th ed (2006) 121; Gijzen v Verrinder 1965 (1) SA 806 
(D) 810; John Newmark and Co (Pty) Ltd v Durban City Council 1959 (1) SA 169 (D) 175. 
266
 Lord Mackay Halsbury’s The Laws of England - Mines, Minerals and Quarries: 
Misrepresentation and Fraud 4th Ed (2003) Vol 31 para 117. See further Dalton v Angus & Co 
(1881) 6 HL 286 293. 
267
 Lord Mackay Halsbury’s The Laws of England - Mines, Minerals and Quarries: 
Misrepresentation and Fraud 4th Ed (2003) Vol 31 para 103. See further Harris v Ryding 
(1839) 5 M & W 60; Humphries v Brogden [1843-1860] All ER 779. 
 83 
land from mines under adjacent land, the reason being that English law does 
not recognise the cuis est solum principle. The principles governing lateral 
support and subjacent support are synonymous.268 Therefore, horizontal 
strata on the same land can be owned by different persons, and their 
relationship is that of neighbours. 
 
In Halsbury’s Laws of England it is added that the application of the common 
law principles is subject to statutory provisions. By the effect of such 
provisions or of subordinate instruments, rights and obligations in regard to 
support may be created, overridden or varied, or new remedies may be 
established where the withdrawal of support has caused subsidence 
damage.269 
 
3.3 The Distinction between the Right of Subjacent Support and 
the Right of Lateral Support 
3.3.1 The Legal Nature of Mineral Rights 
Unlike most other legal concepts, the legal nature of mineral rights cannot 
usefully be described by a comparison with the corresponding concepts in 
Roman and Roman-Dutch law.270 Roman law did not develop the concept of 
mineral rights because they did not sever mineral rights from rights of 
ownership in land. In Holland at the time of the reception of Roman law, the 
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mining of minerals was insignificant in the economic activity of the land. This 
is why Viljoen and Bosman submit that the concept of mineral rights, as we 
know it today, is largely a product of South African jurisprudence.271 Further, 
judges who were initially confronted with conflicts and practical problems 
stemming from mining activities frequently had an English training. This 
resulted in some English legal influence on the shaping of the law. 
 
In Lazarus and Jackson v Wessels and Others272 Innes J, when confronted 
with the question of what the true legal nature of mineral rights was, 
confessed to have initially encountered considerable difficulties in classifying 
them. He explained that these rights were peculiar to the circumstances of 
South Africa, and thus did not readily fall under any of the classes of real 
rights discussed by the commentators. At first blush, they seemed to him to 
be very much of the nature of personal servitudes; but then they were freely 
assignable. But what was decisive for him was that to be valid against third 
parties, mineral rights had to be registered, so he regarded them as real 
rights. The further fact that the holder of the mineral rights was entitled to 
enter upon the property of another and exercise privileges which were 
generally attached only to rights of ownership (taking away and appropriation 
of part of the realty) led Innes J to conclude that they were real rights in the 
nature of a servitude. However, they differed from personal servitudes in that 
they were freely assignable.273 
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The next significant step in the development of the concept of mineral rights 
came courtesy of the same court, but in the case of Van Vuuren and Others v 
Registrar of Deeds.274 The right to minerals was again regarded as being in 
the nature of personal servitude, but freely assignable.275 The court then 
referred to an important principle that stated that the owner of the land 
remained the owner of the minerals therein until the minerals were severed 
from the land. The result of this was that, in order to transfer the ownership in 
a particular mineral or minerals not yet severed, the dominium in the land 
itself had to be transferred.276 If A sold to B his farm reserving the mineral 
rights thereon, such a reservation may be affected by a provision duly 
inserted in the transfer of the farm which was passed to B. However, the true 
nature of such a transaction is that A transfers the ownership of the property 
to B, on condition that B, when he takes transfer, constitutes a personal quasi-
servitude in favour of A.277 The point is that servitudes, whether real or 
personal, must originate from the dominus of the land affected by them. They 
cannot be constituted by any person except the owner.278 
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This classification of a reservation of mineral rights as constituting a quasi-
servitude was since adopted in a large number of decisions.279 The 
conclusion that was reached in Webb was that if a servitude was created in 
favour of land, it was praedial, and if it was created in favour of an individual 
person, it was personal. A praedial servitude is not transferable apart from the 
land to which it attaches, and ordinary personal servitudes are not 
transferable.280 Unlike ordinary personal servitudes, the quasi-servitude of 
mineral rights if it is personal, is transferable and it is for this reason that it is 
described as a quasi-servitude.281 
 
There are crucial differences between mineral rights and servitudes. Mineral 
rights are always attached to a person and not to a dominant tenement. They 
are capable of being alienated separately from the land to which they relate. 
They are divisible and no fusion takes place when the mineral rights and the 
ownership of the land they relate to come under one person.282 They differ 
from personal servitudes in that they are freely assignable.283 They persist 
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beyond the lifetime of the holder and, minerals being consumable in nature, 
are not exercised salva rei substantia, that is, preserving their essential 
attributes excepting ordinary wear and tear.  
 
Ex parte Pierce and Others284 is the one case that did not ascribe the quasi-
servitudal construction to a reservation or grant of mineral rights. On the facts 
a testator had stipulated in his will that if minerals were found on any of his 
three farms, the profits derived therefrom should be divided among his five 
children equally. The registrar of deeds refused to register the notarial 
cessions of mineral rights in favour of the beneficiaries because he was of the 
opinion that the right to share in profits was a personal right and therefore not 
registrable in the Deeds Registry. An ex parte application for an order 
declaring that the rights to share in the profits were real rights, capable of 
registration, and not merely personal rights was brought before Brink J. 
Making reference to Innes J’s judgement in Van Vuuren285 he said that 
mineral rights had been alluded to as personal quasi-servitudes, and not 
praedial servitudes because they were not constituted in favour of any 
praedium, and that they differed from personal servitudes in so far as they did 
not expire upon the death of the holder and were freely transferable. He 
concluded by saying that there could be no doubt, however, that a grant of 
mineral rights conferred real rights, because it entitled the holder to go on to 
the property of another to search for minerals and to remove them. From this 
he concluded that there was clearly a subtraction from the full dominium of the 
owner of the land concerned, thus perhaps it was correct to say that mineral 
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rights constituted a class of real rights sui generis.286 This construction failed 
to take root in South African jurisprudence. In the recent decision of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Anglo Operations287 it was held that it is now a 
settled principle of law that a right to the minerals in the property of another is 
in the nature of a quasi-servitude over that property. 
 
3.3.2 Implications for the Concept of Subjacent Support 
3.3.2.1 Introduction 
In light of the above, the concept of subjacent support explicitly refers to the 
relationship between a surface owner, and a mineral rights holder in relation 
to a single piece of land. The said piece of land derives vertical support from 
the minerals beneath the surface that are the subject matter of a mineral right 
holder’s rights. Therefore the question of subjacent support only becomes 
important upon the severance of mineral rights from the title to the land. The 
landowner’s interest to preserve the integrity of the surface is threatened 
where a mineral right holder’s mining operations entail the removal of the 
minerals that provide vertical support for the surface. In severing the mineral 
rights related to his property from the land and granting them to another 
person, a landowner constitutes a personal quasi-servitude in favour of the 
mineral rights holder. 
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3.3.2.2 Common Law Ancillary Rights of a Mineral Rights holder 
Of all the dicta dealing with the conflicts that may arise between a mineral 
rights holder and a landowner handed down in our courts, none is as widely 
acknowledged and cited as the passage delivered in Hudson288 by Malan J:  
 
“The grantee of the mineral rights may resist interference with a 
reasonable exercise of those rights either by the grantor or by those who 
derive title through him. In the case of irreconcilable conflict the use of the 
surface rights must be subordinated to mineral exploitation. The solution 
of a dispute in such a case appears to me to resolve itself into a 
determination of a question of fact, viz, whether or not the holder of the 
mineral rights acts bona fide and reasonably in the course of exercising 
his rights. He must exercise his rights in a manner least onerous or 
injurious to the owner of the surface rights, but he is not obliged to forego 
ordinary and reasonable enjoyment merely because his operations or 
activities are detrimental to the interests of the surface owner. The fact 
that his use is earlier in point of time cannot derogate from the rights of 
the holder of mineral rights.”289 
 
It has been held in further judicial pronouncements290 that a holder of mineral 
or mining rights is entitled to enter the property to which these rights are 
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attached, to search for minerals, and if he or she finds any, to sever them and 
carry them away. Moreover, a mineral rights holder is entitled to exercise all 
such subsidiary or ancillary rights without which he will not be able to 
effectively carry on his prospecting and/or mining operations.291 This is 
because the right held by the mineral rights holder, namely to go upon the 
property of a third party to search for minerals, and if he finds any to extract 
and carry them away has been treated by our courts as being in the nature of 
a quasi-servitude over that land.292 Once this quasi-servitude has been 
established, all things necessary for its exercise are considered to have been 
granted, at the same time. 
 
In West Witwatersrand Areas Ltd v Roos,293 Curlewis ACJ cited with approval 
a passage from Broom in which the author dealt with the maxim cuicunque 
aliquis quid concedit concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipse non potuit, 
meaning that whosoever grants a thing is deemed also to grant that without 
which the grant itself would be of no effect. Therefore these rights do not only 
extend to his actual prospecting and/or mining operations, but to all activities 
that could be viewed as reasonably necessary for the exercise of the mineral 
rights.294 
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It follows that these so-called subsidiary rights flow from terms implied by law 
or from consensual terms in a contract, either express or tacit.295 Therefore, if 
a landowner leases his land and all the mines therein, where there are no 
open mines the mineral rights holder may dig for the minerals, and where 
minerals rights are granted the presumption is that they are to be enjoyed and 
that a power to extract them is also granted by necessary implication.296 The 
manner in which the minerals are extracted depends entirely on the nature of 
the minerals in question and the depth at which they occur. The problems 
concerning their extraction are primarily of a technical, scientific and economic 
nature.297 However, during the extraction process the holder of mineral rights 
has to remove a certain amount of soil and/or to reach the minerals in respect 
of which he holds the rights. It is submitted that the holder of the mineral rights 
becomes the owner of all the stone, soil and clay that is removed during bona 
fide mining operations and is entitled to sell these.298 
 
Therefore, it would seem that a holder of mineral rights is generally entitled to 
erect buildings and equipment and to construct the necessary roads, railways 
and power lines, pipelines, reservoirs, pump houses, engine houses, vertical 
shafts, housing for employees, and as well as to apply for water rights.299 The 
holder of the mineral rights is entitled to use the surface not only for the 
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purpose of sinking boreholes and shafts to mine the minerals, but also for all 
purposes which are necessary for the proper exploitation of the mineral 
deposits.300 He is entitled to restrict a land owner from doing anything that 
may impede or burden him in carrying out his mining operations. If any 
dispute should arise as to the extent of holder’s rights, the courts will be called 
upon to decide the matter on the facts of each case.301 
 
However, Coronation Collieries v Malan302 incorrectly held that the right of 
subjacent support, like the right to lateral support, was in the nature of a 
natural right incidental to the ownership of land. This was consistent with the 
English law position, where the right of the landowner to insist on subjacent 
support was a right incidental to the ownership of the property and not an 
easement.303 This erroneously implied that in South Africa the surface owner 
could never be deprived of this right without his express or tacit consent, 
because the law could never imply a term that had the effect of depriving a 
landowner of all the (beneficial) use and enjoyment of his property.304 
 
From the discussion about the legal nature of mineral rights above, it was 
made clear that the right to minerals on the property of another was in the 
nature of a quasi-servitude. Therefore, the legal nature of mineral rights 
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should have determined how the right of subjacent support should have 
developed in South Africa. This is because the concept of subjacent support 
is an aspect of the relationship between a mineral rights holder and a 
landowner. 
 
Therefore if the rights to the minerals on the property of another are in the 
nature of a quasi-servitude over that property, according to the principles of 
servitude, in the absence of an express or tacit term in the grant of the 
servitude, the owner of the servient property is bound to allow the holder of 
the servitudal rights to do whatever is reasonably necessary for the proper 
exercise of those rights. Therefore if it is reasonably necessary for the mineral 
rights holder to let down the surface in carrying out his mining operations, he 
may do so, so long as he does so in a manner least injurious to the surface 
owner.305  
 
3.4 Rejection of the Extension of the Lateral Support Principles to 
Subjacent Support Conflicts 
3.4.1 Introduction 
As was seen above, a principle of fundamental importance in South African 
law is that the owner of the land is not only the owner of the surface, but of 
everything legally adherent thereto and also of everything above and below 
the surface. In terms of our law it is thus not possible to divide ownership of 
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land into separate layers,306 whereas in English law the holder of mineral 
rights becomes the owner of that particular layer below the surface. In English 
law the person entitled to the minerals below the earth becomes a “vertical 
neighbour” of the surface owner, so to speak. This does not happen in South 
African law. 
 
3.4.2 The decision in Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates 
(Pty) Ltd307  
The question as to whether the principles of lateral support were correctly 
extended to the mining question of subjacent support came to a head in the 
recent case of Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates.308 In that case the 
appellant held all the coal rights in respect of several adjoining properties, one 
of which was a farm owned by the respondent, on which coal mining had 
been conducted for many years. The dispute between the parties arose when 
the appellant decided to conduct its mining operations on the farm by way of 
open-cast mining and to divert a stream on the farm to facilitate these 
operations. The grant of the mineral rights in favour of the appellants did not 
refer, either expressly or tacitly, to open-cast mining. The appellant applied to 
the Transvaal Provincial Division for orders firstly allowing it to conduct open-
cast mining as opposed to underground mining on a portion of the property, 
                                                 
306
 Except in the case of special legislation, for example the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
307
 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA). 
308
 Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2006 (1) SA 350 (T); Anglo Operations 
Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA). 
 95 
and secondly permitting the diversion of an existing stream on the property in 
order to facilitate those open-cast mining operations. 
The respondents objected to open-cast mining because it is generally seen as 
the more invasive method of mining. This technique of mining is also known 
as open-pit mining or strip mining. It refers to a method of extracting rock or 
minerals from the earth by their removal from an open pit or burrow. The term 
is used to differentiate this form of mining from other extractive methods that 
require tunneling into the earth. Open pit mines are used when deposits of 
commercially useful minerals or rock are found near the surface; that is, 
where the overburden (surface material covering the valuable deposit) is 
relatively thin or the material of interest is structurally unsuitable for tunneling 
(as would be the case for sand, cinder, and gravel). For minerals that occur 
deep below the surface — where the overburden is thick or the mineral occurs 
as veins in hard rock — underground mining methods are used to extract the 
valued material.309 Franklin and Kaplan point out that the use of this invasive 
method has increased following the introduction of machinery which removes 
the over-burden, allowing minerals at shallow depths, such as coal, to be 
extracted. “Strip and open-cast mining ordinarily deprives the surface owner 
of the use of substantial portions of his property, either permanently or for 
long periods of times. Even if the land is ultimately returned to him, its 
character and usefulness are likely to be materially altered.”310 
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The court a quo in Anglo Operations held that an owner of land is entitled to 
require subjacent support of land from holders of mineral or mining rights 
conducting mining operations on their land.311 In spite of the broad statement 
of the rights of mineral right holders in Hudson,312 the right to let down the 
surface in carrying out his mining operations was not included in the absence 
of the landowner’s express or tacit consent. The court concluded that an 
owner could not be deprived of subjacent support unless he or she has 
expressly or tacitly (consensually) agreed thereto. Waiver of a “right” to 
subjacent support by the owner was thus never implied by law, but had to be 
agreed upon by contract. This was because the right to subjacent support was 
a natural right inherent in the ownership of property.313 
 
The court a quo and the respondent in Anglo Operations314 relied on 
Coronation Collieries v Malan315 for this proposition that the right of subjacent 
support was a natural right incidental in the ownership of property, and 
therefore could not be waived without the landowner’s express or tacit 
consent. As was seen above, the central question in Coronation Collieries 
was whether the underground miner owed the landowner a duty of vertical or 
subjacent support of the surface. It was also seen that in answering this 
question Bristowe J began by acknowledging that in English law, the right to 
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have the surface of land in its natural state supported by the subjacent 
minerals was a right of property and not an easement; and that a lease or 
conveyance of minerals, even though accompanied by the widest powers of 
working, carried with it no power to let down the surface, unless such power 
was granted either expressly or by necessary implication.316 
 
He then went on to draw the distinction between English and South African 
law in this regard. In South African law there can be no lease or cession of 
mineral rights. Horizontal layers of the earth’s surface cannot, as they can in 
England, be separately owned. He then cited Innes C J in Van Vuuren v 
Registrar of Deeds,317 who said that every grant or reservation of mineral 
rights is in truth the constitution, by the owner of the property affected, of a 
quasi-servitude in favour of the grantee.318 Bristowe J then unaccountably 
relied on De Villiers CJ’s judgement in London and South Africa Exploration v 
Rouliot.319 As was established in the preceding chapter, De Villiers J 
incorporated the English law rule of lateral support, which provided 
landowners, as an intrinsic element of their ownership, with the right of 
adjacent support for their land into our law. De Villiers J said although the 
principle of lateral support formed no part of Roman-Dutch law, it was a just 
and equitable principle that should best be incorporated into South African 
law.320 So as the argument goes, if the right to lateral support existed as a 
natural right incident to the plaintiff’s land, the parties to the contract must be 
                                                 
316
 1911 TPD 577 591. 
317
 1907 TS 289. 
318
 Coronation Collieries v Malan 1911 TPD 577 591. 
319
 (1890-1891) 8 SC 74. 
320
 (1890-1891) 8 SC 74 91. 
 98 
deemed to have contracted with a view to the continued existence of that 
right. In the absence of such a stipulation the presumption was in favour of an 
intention to preserve a well-established natural right of property rather than to 
part with such a right.321 Therefore a landowner can never be deprived of his 
right of support without his express or tacit consent. Bristowe J founded his 
judgement in Coronation Collieries v Malan322 on the strength of these 
utterances by De Villiers CJ in Rouliot.323 
 
Counsel for the respondent and the Transvaal Provincial Division in Anglo 
Operations324 failed to appreciate the conceptual distinction between the 
principle of lateral support and the principle of subjacent support. The latter 
refers to a situation where a mineral right holder has rights to the uncovered 
minerals under the surface of a landowner. Accordingly, the question arises 
whether such a mineral rights holder has a duty to uphold the surface to which 
his rights relate. The landowner for practical reasons has an interest in 
maintaining the integrity of the surface by resisting operations of a mineral 
rights holder that will lead to a subsidence of the surface. 
 
Lateral support, on the other hand, refers to a situation where an adjacent 
(neighbouring) land surface owner has an interest in maintaining the integrity 
of his land against the activities of a neighbouring property owner or holder of 
mineral rights on the neighbouring property. 
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It is fundamental that this distinction be drawn in our law. The reason lies in 
the historical reception of the rule of lateral support into South African law. If 
one carefully reads the facts of the locus classicus325 in which the rule of 
lateral support was imported into our law, the respondent’s argument in Anglo 
Operations fails. 
 
In Rouliot, the defendant leased a claim in the Du Toit’s Pan Mine from the 
plaintiff company. The defendant made use of the open-cast method of mining 
in conducting his operations. Over the years, a sloping buttress of 
diamondiferous ground was left by Rouliot to support the adjoining un-leased 
portion belonging to the plaintiff, forming the periphery of the mine. Rouliot 
then decided to mine the buttress, but before doing so, he removed a quantity 
of ground from the un-leased property, because he considered that the 
working of the buttress would cause a fall of the reef into his land. The 
removal of the earth is what constituted the alleged trespass. 
 
In the court of first instance326 it was held that the legal basis for the plaintiff’s 
claim was that, in terms of common law, it had a right of lateral support for its 
property and that this right had not been given up by the lessor. The judge in 
that case then decided that, since open-cast mining had been contemplated 
by the parties, the plaintiff must indeed be taken to have given up its right to 
lateral support for its adjoining property. It was subsequently decided that the 
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defendant had acted lawfully in removing ground on the adjoining un-leased 
land before he exercised his right to remove lateral support. 
 
Although the problem in Rouliot originated from mining activities, it did not 
relate to a conflict between the surface owner and the holder of mineral rights 
in respect of the same land. It was not against that backdrop that De Villiers J 
held that the principle of lateral support should best be incorporated into our 
law.327 The claim in Rouliot was based on the alleged trespass by the 
defendant on the plaintiff’s property. It is clear that the principle of lateral 
support was adopted in Rouliot as a rule of neighbour law, and that De Villiers 
CJ did not at that time, expressly or by necessary implication envisage the 
situation contemplated in Anglo Operations in delivering his judgement. 
 
Evidently there is a material difference between the facts in Rouliot and the 
facts in Anglo Operations. Rouliot is clearly concerned with the question of 
lateral support as explained above, whereas Anglo Operations specifically 
deals with the question of subjacent support. Different rules should therefore 
apply to these two distinguishable concepts. Thus Brand JA rightfully points 
out in the Anglo Operations appeal judgement that, unlike the court of first 
instance, he did not believe that the question regarding the continued 
recognition of the principle of lateral support was the one the court should 
concern itself with, but that the real legal question before the court was 
whether that principle of neighbour law was correctly extended, to govern the 
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relationship between mineral rights holders and the owners of the same 
land.328 
 
Once the distinction between lateral and subjacent support is understood, it 
becomes clear that the extension of the neighbour law principle of lateral 
support to the mining question of subjacent support was illogical in the South 
African context. Brand JA correctly said in the Anglo Operations appeal 
judgement that “the extension of the lateral support rule in Coronation 
Collieries to the relationship between owner and mineral rights holder was 
founded in a substructure that cannot be sustained,”329 and that Rouliot simply 
did not provide authority for the proposition on which the judgment by 
Bristowe J was built. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Anglo Operations v Sandhurst Estates330 
finally settled the matter when it held that a right to minerals in the property of 
another was in the nature of a quasi-servitude over that property.331 Thus, as 
in the case of a servitude, the exercise of mineral rights will almost inevitably 
lead to a conflict between the right of the landowner to maintain the surface 
and the mineral rights holder to extract the minerals underneath.332 Therefore 
the correct approach in resolving this conflict did not lie in adopting the 
English law doctrine of subjacent support. This inherent conflict had to be 
resolved in accordance with the principles developed by our law to resolve 
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conflicts between the holders of servitudal rights and owners of servient 
properties.333 Therefore, the owner of the servient property was bound to 
allow the holder of the servitudal rights to do whatever is reasonably 
necessary for the proper exercise of those rights. The holder of the servitude 
is in turn bound to exercise his rights civiliter modo, that is, with as much as 
possible consideration and with the least possible inconvenience to the 
servient property and its owner. In applying these principles to mineral rights, 
the holder was entitled to go onto the property, search for minerals and, if he 
found any, to remove them and carry them away. This had to include the right 
on the part of the holder of mineral rights to do whatever was reasonably 
necessary to attain his ultimate goal.334 And in terms of South African 
common law, in the absence of any express or tacit term to the contrary in the 
grant, the mineral rights holder was entitled by virtue of a term implied by law 
to conduct open-cast mining. Therefore in the absence of such a term, if it 
was reasonably necessary for the mineral rights holder to let down the surface 
in carrying out his mining operations, he could do so, so long as he did so in a 
manner that was least injurious to the surface owner. 
 
3.4.3 Conclusion 
Minerals are by their nature usually found under the surface of the land. The 
right granted to the holder of mineral rights to extract and remove the minerals 
can generally only be exercised by excavating the land. Damage to the 
surface of the land is inevitable and so is the curtailment or even deprivation 
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of the rights of use normally enjoyed by the owner of the surface. The 
difference between the various methods of mining, be it underground or open-
cast mining, lies in the degree of such disturbance and not in whether damage 
will be occasioned. Even in the case of underground mining the degree of 
disturbance to the surface, and hence to any right on the part of the owner of 
the land to preserve the surface, must depend upon the location and extent of 
the reserves to be mined.335  
 
Therefore, the exercise of mineral rights will almost always inevitably lead to a 
conflict between the rights of the landowner to preserve the surface and the 
mineral rights holder to extract the minerals underneath. How is this inherent 
conflict to be resolved? In our law, the answer cannot be based on Coronation 
Collieries,336 which inappropriately incorporated the English law doctrine of 
subjacent support into our law. The correct approach in South African law 
would be to invoke the principles developed by our law in resolving the 
inherent conflicts between the holders of servitudal rights and owners of 
servient properties. This is because the right to minerals in the property of 
another is in the nature of a quasi-servitude over that property.337 
 
Further, it was established in the preceding chapter that if the right of support 
was treated as a natural right incidental to ownership of land, one of the 
consequences would be that the right would extend to buildings and other 
artificial fixtures erected on land. This construction will have serious 
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ramifications if applied to the question of subjacent support in South African 
mining law. There are numerous cases in South African law that laid down the 
principle that a surface owner is obliged to use the surface with due regard to 
the possibility that as a result of his user of the surface the holder of the 
mineral rights might be impeded in his mining operations.338 The holder of 
mineral rights is entitled to be protected against a user of the surface that will 
prevent the exploitation of the minerals. Buildings and other permanent 
artificial fixtures were clearly envisaged when these principles were 
enunciated. Therefore to hold that the right of subjacent support is a natural 
right inherent in the ownership of things will have unacceptable results in 
South African mining law. 
 
The owner of minerals in England does not appear to be protected as 
extensively as the holder of mineral rights in South Africa. This is because he 
is put on the same footing as a land surface owner. Both are owners and are 
treated as such. They are neighbours (vertical neighbours so to speak), and 
the principles of neighbour law are applied to their relationship without any 
prejudice or favour to any of the parties. 
 
The Anglo Operations339 decision illustrated that the law pertaining to 
subjacent support as it stood before the Supreme Court of Appeal handed 
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down its judgement was not in line with the principles of South African mining 
law. This discord was evident in both South African case law and academic 
writings. The Supreme Court of Appeal in deciding Anglo Operations set the 
record straight,340 but an in-depth enquiry into the implications of the decision 
is imperative, especially in light of the changes in the ownership of mineral 
rights that have been brought about by the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act.341 
 
Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd342 was decided by the 
Transvaal Provincial Division on the 23rd of September 2004, and on the 29th 
of November 2007 by the Supreme Court of Appeal, and yet neither 
considered the impact of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Act.343 However, the Act has important implications for the question of 
subjacent support. It further complicates the relationship between a landowner 
and mineral rights holder by abolishing the system of private mineral rights 
and introducing a new order of state controlled mining rights. 
 
Therefore it is necessary to establish whether and how the conclusion that 
was reached in Anglo Operations is affected by the new Act. The effect of 
older legislation such as the Minerals Act of 1991 will also be examined to 
establish whether and how it too would have affected the conclusion that was 
reached in Anglo Operations. The Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
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Development Act certainly makes a difference, in light of the fact that new 
order mineral rights are granted to the holder by the state and not the 
landowner. Although the Minerals Act recognised the private ownership of 
mineral rights, it too had provisions that interfered with the landowner’s 
common law contractual powers to exclude certain mining activities by the 
mineral rights holder. For this reason it will be seen that the interference by 
the new Act, with the common law contractual capacity of the landowner in 
constituting a quasi-servitude in favour of a third party is not groundbreaking 
but is merely the continuation and extension of a tradition that had already 
begun in previous statutory enactments. 
 
The section on legislation will thereafter be concluded by examining the 
general effect of old and new legislation alike on the question of subjacent 
support. Provisions in both the old and the new Act dealing with the optimal 
utilization of mineral rights and rehabilitation of the surface by the mineral 
rights holder upon completion of his operations will be discussed. 
 
3.5 The Impact of Statutory Enactments on Subjacent Support 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Before the promulgation of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act,344 mineral rights in respect of property formed part of the 
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rights of the landowner.345 It was open to the landowner to sever the mineral 
rights from the surface rights and grant them to a third party. The third party 
would in turn pay the landowner royalties or some other form of compensation 
provided for in the contract between them. Further, the landowner could 
protect himself by withholding certain rights and privileges that normally 
accrued to a mineral rights holder under the common law, or by imposing 
obligations on the mineral rights holder in the deed of grant. Therefore, the 
exploitation of minerals was arguably advantageous to the surface owner 
because of the monetary benefits which he could derive, and the measure of 
control he had in defining the extent of the mineral right holder’s rights. For 
that reason, conflicts between himself and a mineral rights holder were 
minimal. However, it must be added that there was legislation in place at the 
time, which did in fact have a bearing on the quasi-servitudal relationship 
between the landowner and the mineral rights holder. As stated above the 
extent of the interference by this legislation on the common law rights of a 
landowner versus those of a mineral rights holder will be investigated below. 
This will reveal whether and to what extent the legislation was consistent with 
or deviated from what was decided in Anglo Operations. 
 
Nevertheless, the new licensing regime introduced by the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act, presents difficult questions when the 
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interests of the landowner and the mineral rights holder enter into competition. 
Anglo Operations v Sandhurst Estates346 only dealt with the common law 
position, where there was conflict between a landowner and a mineral rights 
holder with regard to the question of subjacent support. Within that context it 
was the landowner who granted the mineral rights to a third party, and in 
doing so had the opportunity to determine the manner in which the third party 
exploited the minerals. In this way a landowner could have insisted that a 
mineral rights holder leaves subjacent support for the surface. The first half of 
this chapter dealt with this question. In short, Anglo Operations established 
that because the right to the minerals in the property of another is in the 
nature of a quasi-servitude, the solution in resolving any conflict that arose 
between the respective parties lay in the adoption of the principles developed 
by our law to resolve the inherent conflicts between holders of servitudal 
rights and owners of servient properties.347 Therefore, in the absence of any 
express or tacit term to the contrary in the grant of mineral rights, the mineral 
right holder was entitled by virtue of a term implied by law to withdraw 
subjacent support where it was reasonably necessary to do so in order to 
remove the minerals.348 
 
In light of the above, there are two reasons why older legislation and the new 
Act are relevant to this thesis. The first is that, older legislation, like the new 
Act contains specific provisions that regulate the relationship between the 
landowner and the mineral rights holder; and the question is whether and how 
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they affect the decision in Anglo Operations. Secondly, the decision in Anglo 
is definitely affected by the fact that the servitude construction becomes 
problematic under the new order rights created by the new Act. This is 
because new order mining rights and permits are now not granted by the 
landowner to the subsequent holder, but by the state. The question is whether 
the servitude construction expressed in Anglo Operations can hold in cases 
where the mineral right or mining right was not granted by the landowner but 
by the state, acting in terms of the new regulatory powers created in the 2002 
Act. 
 
3.5.2 Section 3(1) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act and Section 68(5) of the Minerals Act 
The advent of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act349 
heralded a new era in the development of mineral rights in South Africa. The 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act repealed the system of 
private mineral rights and replaced it with a new order of state-controlled 
mineral and petroleum rights.350 Writing in 2006, Van der Schyff states that s 
3(1) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act can be 
regarded as one of the most controversial legislative clauses promulgated 
during the last five years.351 The said provision stipulates that the mineral and 
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petroleum resources found in the Republic are the common heritage of the 
nation and that the state is the custodian thereof. 
 
There has been disagreement amongst contemporary academic writers in 
South Africa as to the true meaning and effect of the above provision. 
According to Badenhorst and Mostert the legislature borrowed from the law of 
the sea in crafting s 3(1).352 In terms of this construction, mineral resources 
became res publicae and accordingly became vested in the people of South 
Africa at the inception of the Act. 
 
Dale strongly disagrees with Badenhorst and Mostert’s interpretation of s 3(1), 
and submits that the Mineral and Petroleum and Resources Development Act 
did not change the common law principle that un-severed minerals belong to 
the owners of the land in which the minerals are situated.353 He argues that 
what s 3(1) did was to merely demolish the legal institution of the rights of a 
landowner to deal with and exploit his minerals. The basis for this argument 
he says, is founded on the wording of the s 3(1). The wording refers to the 
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collective wealth, as opposed to the minerals in situ on individual properties. 
In addition, no provision purporting to vest minerals in situ on individual 
properties in anyone else other than the owner of the land can be found in the 
rest of the Act. Thus an interpretation that suggests that the well-entrenched 
common law principle of “cuis est solum” was abrogated is not warranted.  
 
Dale contends further that the nation is not endowed with juristic personality 
and therefore ownership cannot legally vest in the nation. He rounds off his 
argument by stating that the formulation of custodianship does not fit a private 
law interpretation that ownership of minerals in situ vests in the state. 
 
Van der Schyff advances a third viewpoint. She submits that s 3(1) is placed 
into perspective by reading it in context with other provisions of the Act. She 
commences her argument by looking at the preamble of the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act. From the preamble of the Act, she 
deduces amongst other things an intention by the legislature to acknowledge 
that South Africa’s mineral and petroleum resources belong to the nation and 
that the state is the owner thereof. This intention of the legislature again 
comes through in s 2 of the Act. Section 2 of the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act contains the objects of the Act. Van der Schyff 
identifies the first four objects contained in s 2 as directly reinforcing the 
legislature’s intention to acknowledge that South Africa’s mineral and 
petroleum resources belong to the nation and that the state is the custodian 
thereof.354 According to Van der Schyff these objectives together with the 
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intention of the legislature as set out in the preamble of the Act set the scene 
for s 3(1) which explicitly states that the mineral and petroleum resources are 
the common heritage of all the people of South Africa and the state is the 
custodian thereof for the benefit of all South Africans.355 
 
Van der Schyff’s argument is taken further by s 4(1) and s 4(2) of the Act. 
Section 4(1) provides that when interpreting a provision of the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act, any reasonable interpretation which 
is consistent with the objects of the Act must be preferred over any other 
interpretation which is inconsistent with such objects. Section 4(2) provides 
that in so far as the common law is inconsistent with the Act, the Act prevails. 
 
Van der Schyff’s line of contention culminates in the provision contained in s 
5(1) where the legislature determines that a prospecting right, mining right, 
exploration right or production right granted in terms of the Act is a limited real 
right in respect of the mineral or petroleum and the land to which such rights 
relate. This is further enhanced by Item 11 of Schedule 2 of the Mineral and 
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Petroleum Resources Development Act which stipulates that contractual 
royalty payments will generally only be made to the holder of the common law 
mineral right until the old order mining right ceases to exist, whereafter 
royalties will be paid to the state. 
 
Through the interaction of the above provisions Van der Schyff argues that 
the “Public Trust Doctrine” finds application in South African jurisprudence. 
She states that the public trust doctrine is the legal vehicle for transporting the 
notion that mineral resources are the common heritage of the nation- even 
though the nation is not an entity clothed with legal personality.356 The public 
trust doctrine seeks to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource 
management problems. It is based of the premise that the public’s interest in 
certain natural resources is a property right that subrogates private ownership 
rights in favour of public use rights and curtails the sovereign’s power over 
these resources.357 
 
Whether one subscribes to Badenhorst and Mostert’s res publicae argument, 
or Dale’s contention that the Act never changed the common law principle that 
un-severed minerals belong to the owners of the land in which the minerals 
are located but merely obliterated the legal institution of the rights of an owner 
to deal with and exploit his minerals, or Van der Schyff’s public trust doctrine 
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formulation; what is clear is that mineral rights have been taken away from the 
private domain. 
 
Prior to 1 May 2004, mineral rights in respect of property formed part of the 
rights of the landowner. It was possible to sever the mineral rights from the 
surface rights and third parties could become holders of the mineral rights. 
These rights were freely transmissible and were valuable assets. The state 
could not force a mineral rights holder to start with the exploration of the 
minerals even if it would have been to the benefit of the public.358 Landowners 
could own valuable rights which they could sell to mining houses for lucrative 
amounts while retaining the surface rights.359 For this reason conflicts 
between the landowner and the mineral rights holder were minimal. However, 
since the inception of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
the position of landowners has increasingly become precarious.  
 
The Act has placed the conflict between a landowner and mineral rights with 
regard to the question of subjacent support in a new light. In the old system of 
private mineral rights, it was the landowner who granted the mineral rights to 
the subsequent holder. In doing so, as was noted earlier, he could protect 
himself by defining the extent of the rights of the holder of mineral rights. He 
could also provide for royalty and compensation payments. Under the new 
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dispensation, it is now the state that grants and administer s mineral rights. 
However, it is still the landowner whose right of use and enjoyment is affected 
by the exploitation of the minerals. The question is whether the servitude 
construction within which Brand JA explained the right of surface support in 
Anglo Operations still fits these changed circumstances. 
 
Under the new dispensation introduced by the new Act, a landowner who 
stands to lose the use and enjoyment of his land because of the proposed 
operations of a mining right holder is provided with a platform to raise 
objections or claim compensation. In terms of s 54(1), if a mining right holder’s 
efforts to commence operations are frustrated by a landowner or occupier, the 
former must in accordance with the Act notify the relevant regional 
manager.360 In terms of s 54(1), preventing commencement of operations 
must be due to the fact that the landowner or occupier had refused entry to, 
posed unreasonable demands in return for entry by the holder or could not be 
found in order to apply for access. Refusal by the owner or occupier is 
unlawful, as the holder of the permit or right to mine has a statutory right to 
gain access to the land.361 
 
However, in terms of s 54(1), the landowner is given an opportunity to be 
heard and, accordingly, to raise objections. Subsequently, if in the opinion of 
the regional manager the owner or the occupier has suffered or is likely to 
suffer loss or damage as a result of the proposed operations, he must request 
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the conflicting parties to enter into negotiations aimed at agreeing to the 
payment of compensation for such loss or damage.362 In my opinion the right 
to withdraw subjacent support is implicitly included in this provision. By 
requiring the parties to enter into negotiations aimed at the payment of 
compensation to the landowner, the provision subordinates the landowner’s 
claim to that of the mining right holder, but at the same time provides him (the 
landowner) with some reparation for the loss he will suffer. 
 
In terms of s 54(4) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 
if the parties fail to reach an agreement, compensation must be determined by 
arbitration in terms of the Arbitration Act363 or by any competent court. If, after 
considering all the issues raised by all the respective parties and 
recommendations by the Regional Mining Development and Environmental 
Committee, the regional manager concludes that any further negotiations may 
be detrimental to some of the objects of the Act, he may recommend to the 
Minister that such land be expropriated in terms of s 55 of the Act.364 If the 
regional manager determines that failure to reach an agreement is the fault of 
the holder of the mining right or permit, the regional manager may in writing 
prohibit commencement or continuation of the mining operations until the 
dispute is resolved by a court of law. This power is invoked in terms of s 54(6) 
and has been dubbed a “Draconian Power.”365 This to my mind is consistent 
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with the proposal that the right to withdraw subjacent support should be 
available to a mining right or permit holder where “reasonably necessary.” The 
mining right holder can only be allowed to withdraw subjacent support where it 
is reasonably necessary for exercise of his rights. This provision was enacted 
solely to protect a landowner who is now in danger of losing all use and 
enjoyment of his land.  
 
However well meaning this provision may be, it still falls short of the protection 
the landowner had under the old common law dispensation of private mineral 
rights. Under that old system it was open to him to prevent open-cast mining 
in the grant of mineral rights.  
 
Although the Minerals Act recognised the principle that mineral rights in 
respect of property formed part of the rights of the landowner, it made 
provision for the removal of legal or contractual impediments or other 
difficulties that frustrated its stated object of optimal utilization of the 
Republic’s natural resources in s 68(5). This section provided that the Act 
would not be affected by any term or condition in any agreement, whether 
such agreement was entered into before or after the commencement of the 
Act. The effect of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act on 
what was said in Anglo Operations366 may already have begun under the 
Minerals Act of 1991. Section 68(5) of the Minerals Act had the same effect of 
limiting the landowner’s right to define the extent of a mineral rights holder’s 
powers in carrying out his mining operations. Thus a term in a grant of 
                                                 
366
 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA). 
 118 
minerals to the effect that a mineral rights holder could not carry out open-cast 
mining could have been overridden by invoking this provision.367 
 
Section 68(5) of that Act, had the effect of diminishing the common law 
contractual powers of the landowner to prevent certain detrimental mining 
practices. This is evidence of the fact that the relationship between a 
landowner and a mineral rights holder was never completely unaffected by 
legislation. Therefore, the promulgation of the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act did not introduce the regulatory eroding of a 
landowner’s contractual powers to limit a mineral right holder’s operations. 
Older legislation with a similar effect did in fact place extensive limitations on 
the common law contractual freedom of the landowner when he constituted 
the quasi-servitude by granting mineral rights to a third party. The Minerals 
Act was one such piece of legislation. However, its impact was not as far 
reaching as the new Act’s, in that the landowner still had a say as to who and 
when mineral rights relating to his land where granted.  
 
Under the new Act, the landowner no longer has a say in this regard. What 
was said in Anglo Operations, namely that the right to the minerals on the 
property of another was in the nature of a quasi-servitude was completely 
thrown out and replaced by a new state regulated process in terms of s 54 of 
the new Act as outlined above. 
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The following section will now consider how specific provisions in legislation 
over the years have generally always affected the relationship between a 
landowner and a mineral rights holder. Provisions relating to restrictions on 
surface use in older ad hoc legislation will be discussed first. Then provisions 
relating to the optimal exploitation of minerals and the rehabilitation of the 
surface in both the Minerals Act,368 and the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act369 will be looked at. 
 
3.5.3 The General Effect of Older Legislation  
3.5.3.1 Introduction 
Dale370 submits that the common law position was statutorily restated in s 5(1) 
of the Minerals Act, but submits that statutory obligations, such as those in ss 
38 to 42 of the Minerals Act relating respectively to rehabilitation; 
environmental management programmes, removal of buildings, structures 
and objects; restrictions in relation to use of surface; and acquisition or 
purchase of land and payment of compensation, started to erode the common 
law predominance of the mineral rights holder.371  
 
The equivalent of s 5(1) of the Minerals Act is contained is s 5(3) of the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act. It provides that any 
holder of a prospecting right, a mining right, exploration right or production 
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right may enter the land to which such right relates. Such a holder may bring 
on to such land any plant, machinery or equipment and build, construct or lay 
down any surface, underground or under sea infrastructure which may be 
required for the purposes of their operations, as the case may be. They may 
also prospect, mine, explore or produce, as the case may be, for their own 
account, on or under that land for the mineral for which their right has been 
granted. Further, they may remove and dispose of any such mineral found 
during the course of the prospecting or mining processes. Subject to the 
National Water Act,372 they may also use water from any natural spring, lake, 
river or stream, situated on or flowing through such land or from any 
excavation previously made and used for prospecting, mining, exploration or 
production purpose, or sink a well or borehole required for use related to their 
activities. Finally, they may also carry out any other activity that is incidental to 
prospecting, mining, exploration or production operations, which activity does 
not contravene the provisions of the Act. 
 
With regard to the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, it is 
important to note that it has been stated that the concept of mineral rights was 
abolished by ss 2(a) and (b) and ss3(1) and (2), read with Schedule 2 of the 
Act, which provides for transitional periods of 1, 2 and 5 years.373 Therefore, 
Dale says that the pertinent question is whether and to what extent the 
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common law rights and obligations of a mineral rights holder can also be 
attributed to the holders of prospecting rights, mining rights, exploration rights 
and production rights granted in terms of the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act.374 
 
In the old case of Turffontein Estates Ltd v Mining Commissioner 
Johannesburg,375 Innes CJ discussed the history of a statutory prohibition on 
a mineral rights holder. For many years it had been the policy of the 
legislature to prohibit prospecting and mining on or under certain surface 
areas which it was considered should either for public or for sentimental 
reasons remain intact. “As far back as 1885 roads, railways, cemeteries, 
streets and public squares in townships were placed upon the reserved list… 
[u]nder all the enumerated areas, whether situated on a proclaimed field or 
not, prospecting and mining were absolutely forbidden.”376 From this provision 
emerged the principle that a surface owner was obliged to use the surface 
with due regard to the possibility that as a result of his user of the surface the 
holder of the mineral rights could be restricted in his mining operations, and 
that if such restriction occurred the surface owner could either be restrained 
from so using the surface or be held liable in damages to the holder of the 
mineral rights.377 
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What follows are examples of the above common law principles (now 
contained in legislation) as they were applied in South African case law and 
bolstered by ad hoc legislation. The conflicts in these cases inter alia involved 
the construction of railway lines, tramways, buildings, and the development of 
townships, agricultural holdings, waterworks, dams and lakes by the land 
surface owners, contrary to the interests of the mineral right holders. 
 
3.5.3.2 Railway Lines, Tramways and Railway Sidings 
Witbank Colliery v Malan and Coronation Colliery Co Ltd378 was one of the 
earliest cases decided under this heading. The plaintiff brought an action 
against the second defendant after the latter had constructed and begun to 
use a certain railway siding and tramline on the farm Blesboklaagte. He 
alleged that such siding and tramline were a derogation of certain rights to 
mine for coal under the said siding granted to the Witbank Colliery Company 
by the first defendant. The existence of a railway siding caused the 
Government Mining Engineer to prohibit, in terms of a regulation, the Witbank 
Colliery from mining under it, by directing that a pillar of coal be left vertically 
under the siding for its whole length and for a specified distance on each side 
of it. The court gave judgement against the second defendant for the value of 
the coal which the Witbank Colliery Company had been required by the 
Government Mining Engineer to leave under the land on which the siding or 
line had been constructed. 
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The principle was recognised in the Witbank Colliery case that the holder of 
the mineral rights is entitled to be protected against a user of the surface that 
will prevent the exploitation of minerals. This principle was approved in the 
case of Transvaal Property & Investments Co Ltd and Reinhold & Co v SA 
Townships Mining and Finance Corp Ltd and the Administrator.379 Schreiner J 
acknowledged that the facts in Witbank Colliery were substantially different 
from those of the latter case. But the same principle that recognised the 
holder of the mineral rights’ entitlement to be protected against a user of the 
surface that would prevent the exploitation of the minerals is applicable to the 
facts that were presented in Transvaal Property & Investments. There the 
owner had parted with the ownership of the land and retained the mineral 
rights, whereas in Witbank Colliery the mineral rights had been granted away 
by the owner. Schreiner J held that no valid distinction could be drawn 
between the cases on this ground, for the applicant’s claim was founded on 
the interference with their proprietary rights and not on any doctrine of 
derogation from a grant. 
 
3.5.3.3 Buildings on the Site 
The principles applied in disputes arising from the construction of railway 
lines, tramlines and railway sidings have also been applied to other structures 
on land, such as buildings erected for the purposes of a trading site, and a 
substantial dwelling house together with a hut and a wattle and clay structure.  
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In Witbank Colliery Ltd v Lazarus,380 the court impliedly approved the principle 
recognised in Witbank Colliery v Malan. However the court dismissed the 
plaintiff’s claim for damages flowing from the inability to mine coal under or 
near buildings which had been erected on a trading site leased to the 
defendant’s predecessor in title. The trading site had been altogether omitted 
from the area in respect of which the plaintiff had acquired the mineral rights.  
 
In Douglas Colliery v Bothma,381 the applicant was the holder of the mineral 
rights over two adjoining properties and the respondent was the owner of the 
surface of one of the properties. The surface owner had erected on the 
property a permanent dwelling house and had permitted his servant to build a 
hut; on another portion of the farm a wattle and clay structure had also been 
constructed. The applicant argued that when undermining those portions of 
the farm on which the buildings had been erected it would be obliged to 
refrain from carrying on any mining operations under or within a horizontal 
distance of 300 feet from the buildings, also to leave thousands of tons of coal 
un-mined as support. This amounted to a serious interference with the 
applicant’s mining operations and would occasion considerable loss of 
revenue. The applicant sought an order declaring that the respondent was not 
entitled to erect buildings on his property and thus restraining him from 
erecting further buildings.  
 
The respondent’s contention was that as the owner of the surface he was 
entitled to reasonable use and that the applicant was obliged to carry out its 
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mining operations so that the respondent could make reasonable use of the 
surface. The court rejected this argument and Neser J questioned whether the 
owner of the land was entitled to do anything on or to the surface of the land 
which would interfere with the rights of a mineral rights holder, even if the use 
to which the owner of the land made of the surface could be described as the 
normal and reasonable user of the land.382 
 
The court concluded that while the holder of mineral rights was obliged to 
conduct his mining operations so as to leave support for the surface in its 
natural state,383 the owner of the land was obliged to do nothing on the 
surface that would interfere with the holder’s right to sever and remove the 
minerals. 
 
As to the phrase “the surface in its natural state,” Franklin and Kaplan 
highlight the fact that there is considerable controversy as to whether the right 
of support is confined, as in English law; to land in its natural state or whether 
it extends to such buildings as might reasonably be put upon the land.384 This 
contentious issue is discussed in Chapter Two. 
 
Franklin and Kaplan comment that Douglas Colliery is an example of the 
lengths to which the courts will resort in order to protect the interests of the 
holder of the mineral rights and to prevent any interference with the 
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exploitation of those mineral rights. They also point out that the decision is 
authority for the proposition that a surface owner is obliged to use the surface 
with due regard to the possibility that as a result of his user of the surface the 
holder of the mineral rights may be restricted in his mining operations, and 
that if such restriction occurs the surface owner may either be restrained from 
so using the surface or be held liable in damages to the holder of the mineral 
rights. It follows that the owners of the surface are bound to use the surface 
with due regard to the implications to the right of lessees or holders of mineral 
rights to carry out their prospecting and mining operations without interference 
in the sense referred to above.385  
 
3.5.3.4 Townships 
Conflict is bound to arise where a township is proposed to be established on 
land in respect of which the landowner has parted with the mineral rights. This 
question was first dealt with, although obiter, in Coronation Collieries Ltd v 
Malan.386 Innes J discussed the same statutory prohibition that was discussed 
in Turffontein Estates Ltd v Mining Commissioner Johannesburg.387  
 
In Transvaal Property,388 Schreiner J granted an interdict restraining the 
establishment by the surface owner of a township, on the ground that it would 
deprive the mineral rights holders of any opportunity of exploiting their mineral 
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rights, in spite of the fact that, on the evidence, the prospects of finding 
payable minerals under the land were extremely remote. The establishment of 
the township would have automatically operated to deprive the holders of the 
mineral rights permanently of the right to prospect and mine for precious 
minerals, which right was a fundamental part of their title. The fact that the 
mineral right holders had not exercised their rights since they had acquired 
them was of no consequence to the court. Schreiner J went as far as saying 
that “it is possible that they may never exercise them at all. But there is no 
obligation upon them to prospect at any particular time, or within any 
particular period. No user of the surface by the owner is defensible which has 
the effect of taking away the right of the holder of the mineral rights, when he 
decides to do so, to prospect for precious metals and if they are found to mine 
for them.”389  
 
In Nolte,390 Tindall J commented that the court in Transvaal Property may 
have gone too far. He distinguished the facts in Transvaal Property from the 
facts in Nolte. On the facts before him in Nolte, prospecting had already taken 
place and there was evidence that minerals existed in payable quantities.  
 
In Yelland and Others v Group Areas Development Board,391 where the 
establishment of a township was proposed on land in respect of which the 
owner had parted with the mineral rights, the court regarded the prospect of 
payable minerals in the ground as a factor relevant to the exercise of its 
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discretion. Although the mineral rights holder had not yet carried out any 
prospecting or mining operations, the court found that the applicant had made 
out a prima facie case that minerals existed in payable quantities.  
 
3.5.3.5 Agricultural Holdings 
In Nolte’s case,392 the applicant succeeded in obtaining an interdict against 
the surface owner who had proposed the establishment of agricultural 
holdings on land that was subject to the mineral rights of the applicant. Tindall 
JA said that in respect of both precious and base metals “common law 
principles must be applied in reconciling the conflicting interests of the holder 
of mineral rights and the owner of the land.”393 With regard to the relevant 
common law principles, he held that it was not advisable to attempt to lay 
down a comprehensive rule defining limits of the restriction on the owner’s 
use of the surface to which such owner is subject when he has made a grant 
of mineral rights. It seemed impossible to do so, for in many cases a question 
of degree may be involved. The likelihood that minerals exist in payable 
quantities in the land in question may also be an important factor. That being 
the case, the facts in each particular case would determine whether the court 
will come to the assistance of the holder of the mineral rights. He stressed the 
point that from the view of the rights of the holder of mineral rights it did not 
follow that, by refraining from prospecting, he could hold up for an unlimited 
period the development of the surface by the owner of the land, whether such 
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development be in the course of the ordinary use of the land (having regard to 
the user at the time of the severance of title) or not.394 
 
Tindall JA explained the above passage in the Zuurbekom case.395 In his 
view, all that the relevant passage in the judgement meant was that it did not 
follow that, when a clash of interests between the owner of the land and the 
holder of the mineral rights actually occurred, the latter could by refraining 
from prospecting hold up for a period without limit the development of the 
surface by the owner of the land. It did not mean that the mere abstention 
from prospecting by the holder of the mineral rights for a long period 
disentitled him from interdicting the owner of the land when a clash of 
interests subsequently occurred.396  
 
3.5.3.6 Waterworks 
In Hudson v Mann and Another,397 the holder of the mineral rights applied for 
and was granted an interdict prohibiting the landowner from preventing him 
from having access to a shaft sunk on the property and using it for 
prospecting and mining purposes. The court rejected the surface owner’s 
argument that the applicant’s prospecting and mining operations would have 
the effect of destroying his waterworks, thus rendering valueless a valuable 
irrigation project. 
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The implications of Hudson v Mann appear to be that the grantee of mineral 
rights may resist interference with the reasonable exercise of those rights 
either by the grantor or by those who derive title through him. In the event of 
irreconcilable conflict the courts will subordinate the use of the surface to 
mineral exploration. The fact that the use to which the owner of the surface 
rights puts the property is earlier in point of time does not detract from the 
rights of the holder of the mineral rights.398 
 
3.5.3.7 Dams or Lakes 
In the Free State Gold Areas399 case, the owners of the land had granted the 
respondents the right to pump water from their mines into a pan overlying a 
part of the area over which the applicants held the mineral rights. The effect of 
such pumping would have been to increase the pan, which was a natural 
depression of approximately 280 morgen in size. The pan had never held 
more than three or four feet of water, and was normally dry for a number of 
months each year. The right to pump water into the pan would lead to the 
formation of a lake covering 820 morgen with an ultimate depth of 
approximately seventy feet. This lake would have had the effect of flooding at 
least 14 per cent of the surface, thereby preventing any possible future mining 
lease area. The applicant sought and obtained an interdict prohibiting the 
pumping of water into the pan. Williamson J, in deciding whether or not to 
                                                 
398
 1950 (4) SA 485 (T) 488. See further Franklin BLS and Kaplan M The Mining and Mineral 
Laws of South Africa (1982) 114. 
399
 Free State Gold Areas Ltd v Merriespruit (OFS) GM Co Ltd & Another 1961 (2) SA 505 
(W). See also Franklin BLS and Kaplan M The Mining and Mineral Laws of South Africa 
(1982) 127. 
 131 
grant an interdict, referred to the passage in Zuurbekom400 explaining a point 
made in Nolte.401 He held that the court could take into account the fact that 
the applicant had taken no steps or inadequate steps to determine whether 
the mineral rights had any value or potentiality that demanded protection. 
 
He went on to conclude that from the decisions in Nolte and Zuurbekom, this 
right of prospecting could come into conflict with the owner’s right to use the 
surface, and that the holder of mineral rights could not permanently hold up 
the full use of the surface by the owner. Nonetheless this did not suggest that 
the owner of the surface or persons deriving title from him could dictate where 
and how the right to prospect could be exercised by subjecting the mineral 
rights holder with a fait accompli of changed conditions on the surface.402 
 
3.5.4 The General Effect of the Minerals Act and the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act 
3.5.4.1 Introduction 
Under the common law, as was established above, the mineral rights holder 
mostly prevailed in instances of conflict between himself and the landowner. 
The mineral rights holder was endowed with wide powers of working, which in 
most cases were exercised at the expense of the land-surface owner.403 
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According to Dale, this common-law state of affairs was restated in s 5(1) of 
the old Minerals Act.404 
 
However, Kaplan and Dale submit that this ostensible statutory restatement of 
the common law in terms of s 5(1) of the Minerals Act did not actually restate 
the common law comprehensively but that the section was in fact deemed, in 
accordance with the principle of interpretation of statutes, not to interfere with 
or detract from the common law unless the legislature expressly intended to 
do so.405 They therefore submit that the section did not interfere with or 
detract from the common law position. Therefore, because the Minerals Act of 
1991 did not have any provisions dealing specifically with the question of 
subjacent support, conflicts pertaining to this question, were resolved in terms 
of the common law. 
 
Although the Minerals Act did not have provisions specifically dealing with the 
question of support, it had provisions that had important implications for the 
question of support. These provisions included the optimal exploitation 
provisions and the rehabilitation of the surface provisions contained in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 of the Act respectively. The Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act also contains similar optimal utilization 
provisions and environmental management provisions, although both are 
couched in the 4th chapter of the Act. The following section will discuss the 
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optimal utilization and exploitation provisions of both the Minerals Act and the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act. 
 
3.5.4.2 Optimal Exploitation and Utilization of Minerals and the 
Right of Support  
In terms of the long title to the Minerals Act of 1991, one of its objects was to 
regulate the optimal exploitation, processing and utilization of minerals. 
According to Kaplan and Dale, this was to be achieved in a twofold manner; 
firstly by a system of authorizations that vested control over the method and 
manner of mining in the responsible officers, and secondly by making 
provision for the removal of legal or contractual impediments or other 
difficulties that could frustrate the stated object of optimal utilization of the 
Republic’s natural resources.406 
 
In terms of s 5(1) of the old Act the right to prospect and mine for minerals 
and to dispose thereof was re-vested in the common law holder of the rights 
to such minerals. However, this common law right was qualified by s 5(2) of 
the Minerals Act, requiring the said holder to obtain the necessary authority to 
prospect or mine. According to Kaplan and Dale, this authorization system, in 
contrast to the conferral system of the common law, reflected the object of 
optimal exploitation by stipulating, as a prerequisite to the granting of such 
authority, that the regional director should be satisfied with regard to various 
criteria relating to optimal utilization.407 Thus, in terms of s 6(2)(b), an 
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application for a prospecting permit and particulars about the manner in which 
the applicant intended to prospect was required. More significantly, s 9(3)(a) 
and 9(3)(c) provided that, before a mining authorization was granted, the 
regional director had to be satisfied with the manner in which and the scale on 
which the applicant intended to mine the mineral concerned optimally, and 
further that he had the capacity or could make the necessary provision to do 
so. In terms of s 14, the Minister also had the power to suspend or cancel any 
such authority to prospect or mine if the holder failed or contravened any 
provisions of the Act, in this case the obligation to mine optimally. 
 
However, despite the objects stated in the long title of the Minerals Act there 
was no provision in the Act itself that imposed an obligation on the holder of a 
prospecting or mining authorization to prospect or mine optimally. Nor was 
there a provision to oblige such holders to comply with the representations 
made by them in regard to prospecting or mining optimally as part of their 
applications for such permits or authorization. Thus, according to Kaplan and 
Dale, s 14 of the Minerals Act, which provided for the suspension or 
cancellation of a prospecting permit or mining authorization, could not 
operate.408 
 
Nevertheless, as was mentioned, s 9(3)(a) and 9(3)(c) required the regional 
director to be satisfied with the manner in which and the scale on which the 
applicant intended to mine for minerals (optimally and safely) and, if he was 
not satisfied, the regional director would not issue the authorization. However, 
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having issued the authorization, the regional director could not require the 
applicant to mine in accordance with the manner and scale covered in his 
application. However, s 22 provided for steps that the Minister could take 
against an underperforming mining right holder. Section 22 provided that, if 
the holder of any mining authorization conducted his operations in a manner 
and on a scale which, in the Minister’s opinion, was detrimental to the object 
of the Act in relation to the optimal exploitation of any mineral, the Minister 
could cause an investigation to be held in the matter; and after consideration 
of the result of the investigation, the Minister could issue a direction ordering 
such holder to take such rectifying steps, within a period specified in the 
direction, as was required by the Minister.  
 
According to Kaplan and Dale, s 22 was in fact the policing provision that 
ensured optimal exploitation of minerals.409 It operated in regard to mining 
authorizations and not prospecting. As there were no regulations regarding 
“optimal” utilization of minerals in the Act, s 22 ensured the best exploitation of 
minerals to keep in step with the objects of the Minerals Act. 
 
Section 22 of the Minerals Act was further reinforced by s 23 and s 24 of the 
same Act. In terms of s 23, if any person intended to exercise or exercised the 
surface rights contrary to the object of optimal exploitation of minerals and the 
Minister was of the opinion that such use would be detrimental to the object of 
the Act in relation to the optimal exploitation of any mineral which occurred in 
economically exploitable quantities in or on such land or in tailing on such 
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land, the Minister could issue a direction ordering such a person to make 
rectifying steps within a period specified in the direction.  
 
Section 24 bestowed upon the Minister the power to expropriate surface or 
mineral rights if he deemed it to be in the public interest. The section did not 
specifically provide that this power to expropriate could be invoked by the 
Minister because the optimal exploitation object of the Act was being 
impeded. However, the fact that this provision was contained in Chapter 4 of 
the Act, which dealt with optimal exploitation of minerals, suggests that the 
power to expropriate was only exercisable under those circumstances. 
 
The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act contains similar 
provisions dealing with the optimal utilization and exploitation of minerals. 
However, due regard must be had to the different contexts within which these 
seemly similar provisions operate/operated. It was seen above that under the 
old Minerals Act, the landowner was also the owner of mineral rights. 
Accordingly he was under no obligation to grant them to a third party. 
Therefore the landowner was only affected by the optimal utilization 
provisions of the Minerals Act once he had on his own accord granted the 
rights to the minerals on his property to a third party. Whereas, under the new 
Act, all the mineral and petroleum resources in South Africa are the common 
heritage of all South Africans, and the state is the custodian thereof.410 
Therefore it is the state that grants mineral rights, and not the landowner, thus 
the optimal utilization provisions of the new Act operate against him even if it 
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was the state that granted the mineral rights to a third party. It is important to 
keep this distinction in mind, as it has a bearing on the prejudice suffered by 
the landowner under the new Act. This will be discussed in chapter 4 below. 
 
Nevertheless, In terms of s 51(1) of the Act, a specialised board411 may 
recommend that the Minister should direct a holder of a mining right to take 
corrective measures if the said board establishes that the holder is not mining 
optimally in accordance with his mining work programme. In terms of the 
same provision, if the same board establishes that continuation by the mining 
right holder of his mining practice will detrimentally affect the object of the Act, 
the board will make the same recommendation to the Minister. If the Minister 
agrees with the recommendation, he will issue a notice in terms of s 51(3), 
requiring the holder of the mining right to take corrective measures. Failure to 
comply with the notice may result in the cancellation or suspension of the 
mining right in terms of s 51(4)(a) and (b).412 
 
In terms of s 53, any person who intends to use the surface of any land in any 
way that could be contrary to any object of the Act or that is likely to impede 
any such object must apply to the Minister for approval. The Minister may 
direct the person to take necessary corrective measures within a specified 
period.413 According to Dale, the administrative remedy provided by s 53 is in 
addition to, and does not supplant, the judicial remedies that avail to mining 
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right/permit holders. Therefore s 53 should be considered in the light of the 
primary and ancillary rights accorded to holders of prospecting, mining, 
exploration and production rights by s 5(2) and (3) and to holders of mining 
permits by s 27(7). He also says that those rights are accordingly subject to 
the corollary that the landowner or occupier may not do anything which would 
impede or restrict the exercise of the rights afforded by the foregoing sections. 
Accordingly, although the remedies now flow from the statutory rights 
accruing to holders of rights and permits in terms of the Act, Dale submits that 
the main judicial remedy available to a holder remains an interdict against 
adverse surface use.414 Prior to the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act the remedies flowed from common law ancillary surface use 
rights accorded to the holders of common law mineral rights. 
 
Furthermore, s 55(1) of the Act affords the Minister the power to expropriate 
property for the purposes of prospecting and mining. This power will be 
invoked if it is necessary for the achievement of the objects referred to in s 
2(d), (e), (f), (g), and (h). The Minister may in accordance with s 25(2) and (3) 
of the Constitution,415 expropriate any land or any right therein and pay 
compensation in respect thereof.416 
 
All the above provisions bring to the fore the question of the possible methods 
of mining that the holders of the prospecting or mining rights could possibly 
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employ. This question inevitably has implications for the issue of support, as 
some methods of mining are more invasive and detrimental to the rights of a 
surface owner. The respondents in Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates 
(Pty) Ltd417 objected to open-cast mining because it is generally seen as the 
more invasive method of mining. Open-cast mining, as was defined above, 
refers to a method of extracting rock or minerals from the earth by their 
removal from an open pit or burrow. Extractive methods of mining, on the 
other hand, require tunneling into the earth and are therefore less detrimental 
to the rights of land surface owner.418 Franklin and Kaplan point out that the 
use of this invasive method has increased following the introduction of 
machinery which removes the over-burden, allowing minerals at shallow 
depths, such as coal, to be extracted. “Strip and open-cast mining ordinarily 
deprives the surface owner of the use of substantial portions of his property, 
either permanently or for long periods of times. Even if the land is ultimately 
returned to him, its character and usefulness are likely to be materially 
altered.”419 
In light of the optimal utilization objects that were contained in the Minerals 
Act it can be argued that the use of the open-cast method of mining, although 
more detrimental to the land surface, was acceptable under the Minerals Act. 
The right to withdraw subjacent support was implicit in the legislative scheme 
of the Minerals Act. As was seen above, the legal vehicle that allowed a 
                                                 
417
 See Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2006 (1) SA 350 (T); Anglo 
Operations v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA). 
418
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-pit_mining 06/06/09. 
419
 Franklin BLS and Kaplan M The Mining and Mineral Laws of South Africa (1982) 138. See 
further Badenhorst PJ, Mostert H and Dendy M “Mineral and Petroleum” in Joubert WA and 
Faris JA (eds) LAWSA 18 (2007) 1-515 para 78. 
 140 
mineral rights holder to carry out open-cast mining and thereby withdraw 
subjacent support where necessary was contained in s 68(5) of the Minerals 
Act. The section provided that the provisions of the Minerals Act were not to 
be affected by any term or condition in any agreement entered into before or 
after the commencement of the Act. According to Kaplan and Dale, the 
provisions of the Minerals Act could be invoked to override any contractual 
restriction or limitation that could have been an impediment to the optimal 
utilization of any mineral resource.420 Therefore, a miner confronted by a 
contractual term (preventing him from carrying open-cast mining) agreed to by 
his predecessor (or even by himself) could rely on s 68(5). Consequently, a 
landowner could not by way of contract preclude a mineral rights holder from 
employing the open-cast method of mining where it was reasonably 
necessary. 
 
The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act does not appear to 
have an equivalent provision. The closest would be s 4(2) of the Act, which 
provides that insofar as the common law is inconsistent with the Act, the latter 
prevails. Under the common law the landowner could, by way of contract, 
prevent the mineral rights holder from doing certain things on his land.  
 
The following section will discuss a provision that has provided some measure 
of protection to a landowner by limiting the predominance of mineral right 
holders. This provision is the rehabilitation and environmental management 
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scheme of the Minerals Act.421 It will be cross referenced with the equivalent 
provision in the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act.422  
 
3.5.4.3 Statutory Obligations of a Mineral Rights Holder 
3.5.4.3.1 Introduction 
Prospecting for and mining of minerals can cause environmental damage, 
pollution or ecological degradation.423 To overcome these problems, the 
legislature has over the years adopted environmentally related legislation that 
also governs prospecting and mining operations. According to Badenhorst, 
Mostert and Dendy,424 the Mineral’s Act425 was the first mining statute to 
contain provisions aimed at the protection of the environment and 
rehabilitation of the surface of land during and after prospecting for and 
mining of minerals. They add that the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act426 continued this tradition and added even more 
comprehensive measures to ensure the protection of the environment during 
and after operations.427 
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3.5.4.3.2 Rehabilitation and Environmental Management 
Obligations of Mineral Right Holders 
Chapter 6 of the Minerals Act dealt with the rehabilitation of the surface 
following the operations of a prospecting or mineral rights holder. Section 38 
provided that the rehabilitation of the surface of the land following prospecting 
or mining operations was to be carried out by the holder of the prospecting 
permit or mining authorization. Such rehabilitation could either be carried out 
in accordance with a rehabilitation programme approved in terms of s 39 of 
the Act if any; or could be integral to the prospecting or mining operations 
concerned; or could be undertaken simultaneously with the operations, unless 
determined otherwise in writing by the regional director. As was seen above 
Dale argues that, the predominance of the mineral rights holder under 
common law was eroded by statutory obligations such as those in ss 38 to 42 
of the Minerals Act relating respectively to rehabilitation; environmental 
management programmes, removal of buildings, structures and objects; 
restrictions in relation to use of surface; and acquisition or purchase of land 
and payment of compensation.428 
 
The same could be said about the effect of the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act. The only difference between the old Act and the 
new Act is that the latter has as one of its objectives the duty to give effect to 
the environmental rights enshrined in the Constitution.429 According to 
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Badenhorst, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act seeks to 
ensure that South Africa’s mineral resources are developed in an orderly and 
ecologically sustainable manner while promoting justifiable social and 
economic development. The Act achieves this by a combination of 
“command-and-control” and “management planning” regulatory techniques, 
creating relatively stringent environmental management and protection 
obligations throughout the life-cycle reconnaissance, prospecting and mining 
operations.430 The Act prohibits the commencement of any operations in 
relation to minerals, or the commencement of any work incidental to those 
activities, without an approved environmental management programme or 
plan, as the case may be.431 
 
Section 38(1)(d) creates a duty to rehabilitate the environment to its natural or 
predetermined state. In terms of this section, the right or permit holder is 
required to rehabilitate the environment affected by his operations to its 
natural or predetermined state as far as reasonably practicable or to a land 
use which conforms to the generally accepted principle of sustainable 
development. According to Dale, this is the first time the phrase “as far as 
reasonably practicable” has been used in the context of environmental 
management.432 
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With regard to the phrase rehabilitate to its “natural state”, Dale submits that it 
is not clear whether “natural” state means original state or previous condition, 
for example where its natural state may have been fallow land, but prior to 
mining the land may have been used for agricultural/grazing purposes. He 
says it should be noted that the environmental management programme and 
closure plan require details of what end use is contemplated and how this will 
be achieved. Although no reference is made in s 38(1)(d) to the programme or 
closure plan, this must have been intended, as the very object of these 
documents is to manage the rehabilitation process until the end of the project 
concerned and presumably the Minister would not approve the programme or 
plan if the proposed end use in such documents was unacceptable or not 
sustainable.433 
 
Badenhorst, Mostert and Dendy434 describe a mining practice in Gauteng 
where gold mines are mining gold-bearing rock which is overlain by dolomitic 
formations containing large quantities of water. These formations would be 
divided into compartments, each consisting of a layer, some thousands of feet 
deep, of porous rock containing water, bounded by solid dykes of impervious 
rock which for practical purposes prevents the underground movement of 
water from one compartment to another. Where the gold-bearing strata 
underlying such a compartment are mined, the existence of the vast quantity 
of water contained in the compartment above the workings may constitute a 
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potential danger, particularly if fissures exist or develop through which water 
can seep into the workings. For this reason certain mines have embarked, 
where the sizes of the compartments concerned have not made it impractical, 
on a policy of pumping the water out of the compartments overlying their 
workings. The resulting lowering of the water table has led to the drying up of 
boreholes on land adjoining the mines concerned and damage to the land 
itself and surface installations on it, such as buildings, roads and railways. 
The question has therefore arisen as to the liability of the mines concerned to 
landowners on land situated in the same water compartment for damage 
resulting from the drying up of boreholes on their land or depressions and 
sinkholes caused by subsidences on their land.435 
 
In terms of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, a holder 
of a mining right or permit or a holder of an old order prospecting right or an 
old order mining right, is strictly responsible for any environmental damage, 
pollution or ecological degradation occurring as a result of his operations.436 
Being responsible for environmental damage implies delictual liability for non-
compliance with the provisions of s 38(1) of the Act. According to Dale, 
responsibility for environmental damage, pollution or ecological degradation 
contemplated by the s 38(1)(e) is interpreted to arise if, by negligence or 
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intent, the holder has not complied with the requirements of s 38(1).437 The 
responsibility is accordingly in the form of civil liability. Section 38(1)(e) may 
therefore give rise to delictual liability on the basis of a civil action, founded on 
the breach of a statutory duty.438 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
As was seen above, minerals are by their nature usually found under the 
surface of the land. The right granted to the holder of mineral rights to extract 
and remove the minerals can generally only be exercised by excavating the 
land. Damage to the surface of the land is inevitable and so is the curtailment 
or even deprivation of the rights of use normally enjoyed by the owner of the 
surface. The difference between the various methods of mining, be it 
underground or open-cast mining, lies in the degree of such disturbance and 
not in whether damage will be occasioned. Even in the case of underground 
mining the degree of disturbance to the surface, and hence to any right on the 
part of the owner of the land to preserve the surface, must depend upon the 
location and extent of the reserves to be mined.439  
 
Therefore, the exercise of mineral rights will almost always inevitably lead to a 
conflict between the rights of the landowner to preserve the surface and the 
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mineral rights holder to extract the minerals underneath. How is this inherent 
conflict to be resolved? In terms of our common law, the answer cannot be 
based on Coronation Collieries,440 which inappropriately incorporated the 
English law doctrine of subjacent support into our law. The correct approach 
in South African law is to invoke the principles developed by our law in 
resolving the inherent conflicts between the holders of servitudal rights and 
owners of servient properties. This is because the right to minerals in the 
property of another is in the nature of a quasi-servitude over that property.441 
 
The Anglo Operations442 decision illustrated that the law pertaining to 
subjacent support as it stood before the Supreme Court of Appeal handed 
down its judgement was not in line with the principles of South African mining 
law. This discord was evident in both South African case law and academic 
writings. The Supreme Court of Appeal in deciding Anglo Operations set the 
record straight,443 by holding that the neighbour law principles of lateral 
support were inappropriately extended to govern the conflict of subjacent 
support which arose where mineral rights were severed from the title to the 
land.444 They held that subjacent support referred to the relationship between 
a landowner, and a mineral rights holder in respect of a single piece of land 
whereas lateral support necessarily involved two pieces of land. Therefore it 
could not be said that the right of subjacent support like the right of lateral 
support was in the nature of a natural right inherent in the ownership of 
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property, but was an aspect of the quasi-servitudal relationship between a 
landowner and a mineral rights holder. Accordingly where a conflict pertaining 
to subjacent support between a landowner and a mineral rights holder arose, 
the solution to such a dispute lay in adopting the principles of servitudes 
developed by our law. 
 
However, as was seen above, an in-depth enquiry into the implications of the 
decision in Anglo Operations was still necessary, because of the new order of 
state issued and controlled mining rights and permits. To place the effect of 
the new Act into context, old legislation and the old Minerals Act in particular 
was examined to establish whether its provisions would have had an impact 
on the quasi-servitudal construction discussed in Anglo Operations. This 
impact that the old Minerals Act would have had on the quasi-servitudal 
construction that was described in Anglo Operations above was compared to 
and contrasted with the impact of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act.445 The second half of this chapter illustrated how the new 
Act removed mineral rights from the private domain. The relationship between 
the landowner and the mineral rights holder has been complicated, by this 
new regime of state controlled mineral rights. The quasi-servitude 
construction described in Anglo Operations was thrown out and replaced by a 
comprehensive statutory scheme that determines the rights and duties of 
landowners and mineral rights holders respectively. A landowner under the 
new dispensation does not have the opportunity to preclude, by contract, the 
possibility of open-cast mining being conducted by a mineral rights holder, 
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whereas under the common law system of private mineral rights he could do 
so. This is because it is now the state that grants mineral rights and not the 
landowner. However, as was seen above, the new Act’s impact on the 
landowner’s common law contractual capacity in constituting the quasi-
servitude in favour of the mineral rights holder should not be seen as 
revolutionary. As was seen above, the Minerals Act had provisions that had a 
similar effect on the quasi-servitudal relationship of landowner and a mineral 
rights holder, although not as far reaching as the new Act’s. 
 
Although the Minerals Act recognised the principle that mineral rights in 
respect of property formed part of the rights of a landowner, it made provision 
for the removal of legal or contractual impediments or other difficulties that 
frustrated its stated object of optimal utilization of the Republic’s natural 
resources in s 68(5). The section provided that the Act would not be affected 
by any term or condition in any agreement, whether such agreement was 
entered into before or after the commencement of the Act. It is conceivable 
that the effect of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act on 
what was said in Anglo Operations446 may already have begun under the 
Minerals Act of 1991. Section 68(5) of the Minerals Act had the same effect of 
limiting the landowner’s right to define the extent of a mineral rights holder’s 
powers in carrying out his mining operations. Thus a term in a grant of 
minerals to the effect that a mineral rights holder could not carry out open-cast 
mining could have been overridden by invoking this provision.447 
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The next chapter will commence by briefly illustrating what was said by Brand 
JA in Anglo Operations about the constitutionality of what was decided in 
Anglo Operations v Sandhurst Estates,448 namely that in the absence of a 
provision to the contrary in a grant of mineral rights, a holder may conduct 
open-cast mining where it is reasonably necessary even if it means that the 
landowner is deprived of subjacent support. More importantly, the 
constitutionality of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act’s 
effect on the landowner will be investigated, in light of the fact that he no 
longer has the opportunity to protect himself against open-cast mining. As 
was seen above, the landowner previously had this right. He could do so in 
the grant of mineral rights to a mineral rights holder, by stipulating that the 
latter was precluded from carrying out open-cast mining. The constitutionality 
of the Minerals Act’s effect as described above on the landowner’s common 
law rights will also be considered. Although it is no longer in force, its effect 
was described above to show that the new Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development did not introduce the limitation on the landowner’s common law 
rights relating to subjacent support. 
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Chapter 4 
The South African Constitution and the Right of 
Subjacent Support 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter 3 above, it was established that a principle of fundamental 
importance in South African law was that the owner of the land was the owner 
not only of the surface, but of everything legally adherent thereto and also of 
everything above and below the surface.449 Therefore, in terms of South 
African law, it is not possible to divide ownership into separate layers.450 It 
was also seen that where rights to minerals were severed from the rights to 
the surface, the two respective parties, namely the land surface owner and 
the mineral rights holder, do not become “vertical neighbours” as was 
suggested by Bristowe J in Coronation Collieries.451 The Supreme Court of 
Appeal correctly described the relationship between the mineral rights holder 
and the land surface owner, when mineral rights were severed from the 
ownership of the land by saying that:452  “[I]n accordance with what has now 
become a settled principle of our law, that a right to minerals on the property 
of another is in the nature of a quasi-servitude over that property.”453 For that 
                                                 
449
 Cuis est solum eius est usque ad caleum et usque ad inferos. 
450
 Except in the case of special legislation, for example the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
451
 1911 TPD 577 590.  
452
 Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA). 
453
 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA) 371. 
 152 
reason, the owner of the servient property is bound to allow the holder of the 
servitudal rights to do whatever is reasonably necessary for the proper 
exercise of those rights. The holder of the servitude is in turn bound to 
exercise his rights civiliter modo, that is, reasonably viewed, with as much 
possible consideration and with the least possible inconvenience to the 
servient property and its owner.454  
 
Applying these principles to mineral rights, the holder is entitled to go onto the 
property, search for minerals and, if he finds any he is entitled to remove 
them.455 Further, in accordance with the Latin maxim translated as 
“whosoever grants a thing is deemed also to grant that without which the 
grant itself would be of no effect,”456 that must include the right on the part of 
the holder of mineral rights to do whatever is reasonably necessary to attain 
his ultimate goal as empowered by the grant. Therefore, in the absence of an 
express or tacit term in the grant to the contrary, if it is reasonably necessary 
for the mineral rights holder to let down the surface by withdrawing subjacent 
support in carrying out his mining operations, he may do so, so long as he 
does so in a manner least injurious to the surface owner. If the landowner 
wants to reserve certain aspects of his use and enjoyment of the land surface, 
for instance to preserve the land surface from invasive strip mining, he must 
reserve that right in the grant of mineral rights. 
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In contrast, the position in English law is that the holder of mineral rights 
becomes owner of a particular layer below the surface. Such an owner 
becomes a “vertical neighbour” of the surface owner, so to speak. This is why 
the court in Humphries v Brogden457 said that the principle of lateral support 
governing the relationship between two adjacent landowners would be useful 
to the court in deciding the question of subjacent support that was before it. In 
English law, the right of subjacent support is therefore, like the right of lateral 
support, in the nature of a natural right inherent in the ownership of land. 
Therefore, conflicts between the landowner and a mineral stratum owner in 
English law are resolved in accordance with principles of neighbour law. In 
view of the Anglo Operations decision, this solution is now clearly impossible 
in South African law, where the relationship is governed by the principles of 
servitude law. 
 
Minerals are by their nature usually found under the surface of the land. The 
right granted to the holder of mineral rights to extract and remove the minerals 
can generally only be exercised by excavating the land.458 Damage to the 
surface of the land is inevitable and so is the curtailment or even deprivation 
of the rights of use normally enjoyed by the owner of the surface. It was 
therefore concluded in chapter 3 that, in the absence of an express or tacit 
term to the contrary in a grant of minerals, the right to withdraw subjacent 
support should exist and form part of the common law subsidiary or ancillary 
rights of the mineral rights holder in carrying out his operations. However, this 
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submission comes with the qualification that this right can only be exercised 
where and in so far as it is reasonably necessary. 
 
However, it was also established in chapter 3 above that the decision in Anglo 
Operations v Sandhurst Estates459 was only concerned with the pre-Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act position.460 The Supreme Court 
of Appeal in delivering its judgement only concerned itself with old order 
mineral rights which were granted to a holder by a landowner by way of 
contract. The court did not consider the new order mining rights created by 
the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act. Under this new 
order, as was discussed above, rights to the minerals on a landowner’s 
property are not granted to the subsequent holder by the landowner himself 
but by the state in its capacity as custodian of all the mineral and petroleum 
resources of the nation.461 As was pointed out in chapter 3, this places the 
conflict between a landowner and a mineral rights holder with regard to the 
right of subjacent support in a new light. Before, a landowner had the 
opportunity to protect himself through the deed of grant, by stipulating that the 
holder of mineral rights was precluded from withdrawing subjacent support. 
However, now it is not the landowner who contracts his mineral rights, but it is 
the state that issues licences in respect of those minerals, and consequently 
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the landowner is arguably left exposed and without protection when a miner 
withdraws subjacent support (unless the Act provides otherwise). That is 
because the quasi-servitude formulation of the Anglo Operations decision is 
no longer applicable under the new regime of state controlled mining rights 
and permits. 
 
The first part of this chapter will investigate the constitutionality of the finding 
made in Anglo Operations v Sandhurst Estate462 that, in the absence of any 
express or tacit term to the contrary in the grant of mineral rights, the mineral 
rights holder was entitled by virtue of a term implied by law to conduct open-
cast mining (thereby withdrawing subjacent support) where it was reasonably 
necessary in the course of his operations. This first section will consider 
whether the above proposition is in fact an arbitrary deprivation of the 
landowner’s property as meant by s 25(1) of the Constitution. The second part 
of this chapter will then ask the question whether a landowner under the new 
system of state controlled mineral rights is expropriated or arbitrarily deprived 
of his property where a miner withdraws subjacent support in the course of his 
operations, even if it was reasonably necessary. The would-be 
constitutionality of the Minerals Act’s provisions that would have affected the 
quasi-servitudal relationship between a landowner and a mineral rights holder, 
had the Act still be force will be discussed alongside the new Act. 
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4.2 Section 25(1) of the Constitution and the Anglo Operations463 
Decision: Brand JA’s Judgement 
Section 25(1) of the Constitution464 provides that no person may be deprived 
of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may 
permit arbitrary deprivation of property. It can be argued that permitting a 
mineral rights holder to withdraw subjacent support when carrying out his 
mining operations is tantamount to depriving a landowner of the use and 
enjoyment of his land. All beneficial use of his land (farming and other 
developments) is lost to him when the surface is destroyed, at least as far as 
the affected piece of land is concerned. Therefore the question that has to be 
considered is whether this amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of property as 
contemplated in s 25(1) of the Constitution. 
 
In Anglo Operations465 the respondent argued that the implied term contended 
for by the appellant, namely that the mineral rights holder could destroy the 
surface if it was necessary for mining, was in conflict with the guarantee 
against arbitrary deprivation of property afforded by s 25(1) of the 
Constitution. This argument found favour with the court a quo. The High 
Court’s reasoning led it to the conclusion that the applicant’s contention 
resulted in a term being implied by the court to the effect that the owner is 
deprived of the use of the surface. What the court a quo objected to was that 
the implied term had the effect of the owner being deprived, without him 
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agreeing, of the last remaining aspect of his ownership that was of any 
practical value.466 However, on the facts the Supreme Court of Appeal refused 
to accept the court a quo’s reasoning. Brand JA argued that the owner cannot 
be said to be arbitrarily deprived of anything because he, the owner or, on the 
facts, his predecessor in title, had sold those rights. Brand JA said the 
following: 
 
“[T]he purpose of the whole exercise is to determine the nature and ambit of 
what had been sold. It is true that if the ambit of the merx is extended, he will 
be deprived of whatever the extension entails. But by the same token it can be 
said that, to the extent that the merx is reduced, the buyer will be deprived of 
what he bought. That is why I hold the view that the notion of arbitrary 
deprivation does not enter the picture at all.”467  
 
Brand JA also refused to accept the further argument of the High Court that s 
39(2) of the Bill of Rights was applicable and that there was accordingly a 
duty for it to develop the common law in a manner that promoted the spirit, 
purport and object of the Bill of Rights.468 In his view, this could not be the 
case because, as in the case of servitudes, what had to be resolved was a 
conflict between the contradictory interests of two individuals who have 
agreed on the content of their respective rights. Both in the case of servitudes 
and in the case of mineral rights, there could be no reason why one of these 
conflicting interests would be preferred by any of the values underlying the Bill 
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of Rights, considering that the parties had agreed to the grant that caused the 
conflict in the first place. He consequently found that it was not conceivable 
that application of s 39(2) would yield an answer different from that which the 
common law provided.469  
 
4.3 Constitutionality of Legislation in Regard to the Withdrawal of 
Subjacent Support 
4.3.1 Introduction 
As was indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the decision in Anglo 
Operations v Sandhurst Estates470 was only concerned with the pre-Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act position.471 The Supreme Court 
of Appeal did not consider the effect of the new order of mineral exploitation in 
South Africa ushered in by the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act. Under this new order, rights to the minerals on a 
landowner’s property are not granted to the subsequent holder by the 
landowner himself but by the state in its capacity as the custodian of all the 
mineral and petroleum resources of the nation.472 As was highlighted above, 
this places the conflict between a landowner and a mineral rights holder with 
regard to the right of subjacent support in a new context. It was seen that in 
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the old order of private mineral rights a landowner had the opportunity to 
protect himself by stipulating that the holder of mineral rights was precluded 
from withdrawing subjacent support in the deed of grant. 
 
However, as was made clear above, that even before the introduction of the 
new Act, there had always been legislative interference with the landowner’s 
contractual powers in constituting a quasi-servitude. The old Minerals Act 
restricted this common law right by providing in s 68(5) that its provisions 
would not be affected by any term or condition in any agreement, regardless 
of whether the agreement was entered into before or after the 
commencement of the Act. Thus, the provisions of the Minerals Act could be 
invoked to override any contractual restriction or limitation that could 
otherwise have prevented or militated against the optimal utilization of any 
mineral resource.473 However, under the old Minerals Act, the quasi-servitudal 
formulation of Anglo Operations would have found limited application. Section 
68(5) of the old Act left very little room for repressive terms that would have 
had the effect of frustrating the objects of the Act. In spite of the heavy 
regulation, a landowner still had a semblance of control in that the decision to 
grant mineral rights remained with him. However, once he had constituted that 
personal quasi-servitude of mineral rights, the restrictive terms in his 
agreement with the mineral rights holder, which frustrated the objects of the 
Act, could be overridden by the provisions of the Act. 
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As was seen in chapter 3 above, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act has had a much more dramatic effect on the quasi-servitude 
formulation of Anglo Operations. It is not conceivable that this quasi-servitudal 
construction can still find application under the new order of state issued and 
controlled mining rights. It has been replaced by a statutory process designed 
to allow a landowner to raise objections where his rights are threatened in 
terms of s 54 of the new Act. Unlike the quasi-servitudal formulation described 
in Anglo Operations where a landowner could completely exclude detrimental 
mining practices by contract, s 54 only provides a landowner with the 
opportunity to insist that a miner be barred from employing mining practices 
that are detrimental to his rights where it is not reasonably necessary for him 
to do so. In this regard, he has a right to have the conflict between himself 
and the mining right or permit holder resolved by a competent court.474  
 
Nonetheless, in a situation where it is reasonably necessary for the mining 
right or permit holder to make use of a particularly prejudicial method of 
mining, such as open-cast mining, the landowner has little or no choice but to 
accept the agreed compensation with no further recourse. Therefore, since it 
is no longer the landowner who contracts away mineral rights to his land, but 
the state that issues licences in respect of those minerals, the question that 
arises is whether it can be said that the landowner has been expropriated or 
arbitrarily deprived of his property where a miner withdraws subjacent support 
and the landowner loses the use and enjoyment of his land. 
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A similar question could have been posed with regard to s 68(5) of the old 
Minerals Act. In such a scenario there would have been a quasi-servitude 
agreement between the respective parties in place. If the mineral rights holder 
had invoked s 68(5) of the old Act to override the terms of the quasi-servitude, 
could it have been said that the landowner was expropriated or arbitrarily 
deprived of his property?  
 
Before we delve into these taxing questions, the next sub-heading will briefly 
investigate the possibility of independently expropriating the right of support. 
 
4.3.2 Can the Right of Support be Independently Expropriated? 
In Elektrisiteitvoorsieningskommissie v Fourie475 it was held that the 
landowner’s right to lateral and surface support was not a right stricto sensu 
and further, that it was not a right in, over or in respect of land as was 
intended in s 43 of the old Electricity Act,476 which could be expropriated. 
Fourie was the owner of land that contained considerable deposits of coal. In 
terms of a prospecting agreement, the mineral rights in respect of the coal 
deposits vested in a company called Alpha Coal Ltd. The right to actually 
mine the coal was ceded by Alpha Coal Ltd, by means of a prospecting lease 
agreement, to certain respondents who were referred to in the crucial 
agreements as the Joint Venture. By virtue of further agreements entered into 
by EVKOM and Alpha Coal Ltd, and again by Alpha Coal Ltd and the Joint 
Venture, all the coal mined on Fourie’s property was to be supplied to 
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EVKOM, which in turn obtained the sole right to purchase the coal. In order to 
meet the demands of EVKOM, the Joint Venture had to abandon conventional 
mining methods and apply high-recovery mining techniques. This would have 
required the disturbance of the surface and subterranean layers of Fourie’s 
land. However, the notarial prospecting contract in force expressly stipulated 
that mining operations would leave the surface of the land intact and also 
made provision for pillars and props to prevent the surface and bedrock from 
caving in. EVKOM consequently entered into negotiations with Fourie for the 
acquisition by itself of the right of support pertaining to the surface and bottom 
layers of the land. Fourie refused to contract away the right of support, and 
instead offered to sell his land to EVKOM. EVKOM thereupon set formalities 
in motion for the state to expropriate Fourie’s right to surface and 
subterranean support in terms of s 43 of the Electricity Act.477  
 
Kriegler J found in favour of Fourie. He held that what the EVKOM sought to 
expropriate was not a right within the meaning of s 43 of the Electricity Act; 
and even if it were a right, the applicant would not be eligible to acquire that 
right. The court said the right appeared to be merely a capacity arising from 
ownership or an entitlement of ownership. Even if it was accepted that the 
surface owner's claim to support was a right as was intended in s 43, it did not 
necessarily follow that it could be acquired by an outsider in respect of the 
land, whether by voluntary or forced purchase. The relevant right existed only 
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as between the surface owner and the person entitled to the mineral rights 
and hence it is an incident of the relationship between them and the land in 
respect of which they have separate and potentially conflicting claims. 
 
In analyzing this decision, Van der Vyver478 submits that Kriegler J in 
delivering this judgement touched upon important theoretical concepts and 
distinctions. The most important theoretical concept and distinction touched 
upon for our purposes concerns the difference and relationship between a 
right and the entitlements of the holder of a right. The crux of the Fourie 
judgement was that the right of support was not an entitlement of ownership 
and was therefore not capable of being expropriated separately. Stated 
differently, the right to support was not shorthand for the right to use and 
enjoy property but an inseparable aspect of the relationship between the two 
parties. 
 
According to Van der Vyver, the claim of the person who has a right to what 
might be called the integrity or inviolateness of the object of his right, is 
fundamental to the exercise of the entitlements in a right. He submits that this 
is where the question of lateral, surface and subterranean support comes in. 
He agrees with Kriegler J’s submission that the expectation of an owner that 
the object of his right should be kept intact is not an independent right but an 
integral part of ownership, not an entitlement and more specifically not the 
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owner’s entitlement to use and enjoy the object of his right but an aspect of 
the relationship between the two parties.479 
 
However, the difficulty Van der Vyver had with the above construction in the 
Fourie decision was that the concept of entitlement was commonly equated to 
what a person could do with a legal object; and the inviolate disposition of the 
object was obviously fundamental to the exercise of all the entitlements 
included in the particular right.480 Whereas, he continues on the same page, a 
competence signifies what a person by virtue of being a legal subject in the 
juridical sense could do; an entitlement entails that which a legal subject, by 
virtue of having a right, could lawfully do with the object of his right. The right 
of support was neither of these. 
 
Van der Vyver suggested that, because of the definition of an entitlement, it 
would perhaps be more accurate to classify the claim of an owner and other 
persons with a right to the integrity or inviolateness of the object of their right 
as part and parcel of the subject-third-parties relationship, rather than trying to 
construct it as an ingredient of the subject-object relationship, that is, as an 
entitlement. The implication of this approach, he submits, would be, inter alia, 
that the so-called right to lateral, surface and subterranean support cannot be 
transferred to another person, and consequently cannot be expropriated, 
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separate from ownership of the land as such. However, it would still be open 
to the owner to renounce it, in which event the corresponding obligation of 
third parties to refrain from impairing the object would lapse.481 
 
In light of the above, it is clear that the right of (lateral) support cannot be 
transferred to another person or be expropriated separately from the 
ownership of the land. This is because the right to support is an aspect of the 
relationship between the landowner and others who have to respect his right, 
and not shorthand for the right to use and enjoy property. A landowner can 
accordingly not be deprived of this right of support as it will be tantamount to 
him losing his ownership. However, it is open to the owner to renounce it, in 
which event the corresponding obligation of third parties to refrain from 
impairing the object would lapse.482 
 
What is not clear is whether the same considerations hold true for the right to 
subjacent support. Van der Vyver refers to both the rights of “lateral” and 
“subterranean” support in the same breath, as was common in the period 
before the Anglo Operations decision.483 The facts in 
Elektrisiteitvoorsieningskommissie v Fourie484 dealt with subjacent and not 
lateral support. However, the court treated lateral support and subjacent 
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support as if they were synonymous concepts with identical applicable 
principles. The court in Fourie failed to appreciate the distinction between 
lateral support and subjacent support. If it had been lateral support that was in 
question in Fourie, the court’s ratio in reaching the decision it did would have 
been on point. Had the Fourie case been argued correctly, namely, from the 
point of view that the right to the minerals on the property of another is in the 
nature of a quasi-servitude, the outcome would have still been in favour of 
Fourie, although on different grounds. The result would have been consistent 
with the submission made in chapter 3, that is, in the absence of an express 
or tacit term to the contrary in the deed of grant of mineral rights, it is open to 
a mineral rights holder by virtue of a term implied by law to make use of the 
most invasive mining method, thereby withdrawing subjacent support where it 
is reasonably necessary. In that case it would have been possible to say, in 
line with the subsequent Anglo Operations decision, that the right of surface 
support is an inherent aspect of the relationship between the landowner and 
the holder of servitude or quasi-servitude rights to the land, with the 
implication that this right can be restricted or waived as between the two 
parties, but not transferred to another person or held independently of their 
relationship. 
 
Under those circumstances a landowner could be deprived of subjacent 
support, even if it meant he would have lost all use and enjoyment of property. 
This is because the right to the minerals on the property of another was in the 
nature of a quasi-servitude. The following section asks the question whether 
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such a deprivation is arbitrary and therefore in conflict with s 25(1) and (2) of 
the South African property clause. 
 
4.4 Is The Landowner Expropriated or Arbitrarily Deprived of His 
Property by the Legislation? 
4.4.1 Is the Landowner Expropriated? 
Section 25 of the Constitution refers to two categories of limitations on 
property, namely, deprivations and expropriations. Van der Walt485 points out 
that since the Constitutional Court’s decision in First National Bank of SA Ltd 
t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services and 
Others (FNB),486 expropriations are regarded as a special subset of 
deprivations. Accordingly, some deprivations amount to expropriations, others 
do not, but expropriations are always deprivations. 
 
It cannot be said that s 68(5) of the Minerals Act had the effect of 
expropriating a landowner under the old order of private mineral rights. This 
was because it was he, the landowner, who constituted the quasi-servitude of 
mineral rights of his own volition. Furthermore, under that old order the 
landowner still retained some contractual power with which he could protect 
himself against harmful activities of a mineral rights holder. At most, s 68(5) 
was just a regulatory provision. The effect of this provision on a landowner’s 
rights will be discussed in greater detail in the following sub-heading that 
deals with deprivations. 
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In regard to the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, Dale 
argues that the acquisition by a holder of a permission, permit or right to 
entry487 constitutes an expropriation of the landowner’s entitlement to use the 
land, for which the state is liable to pay compensation in terms of s 25(2) of 
the Constitution and item 12 of Schedule 2 to the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act. The state, rather than the holder of a permit or 
right, is liable to pay compensation for such expropriation.488 
 
Dale’s contention in this regard,489 cannot be upheld in South African law. 
This is because as was seen in the preceding chapter, s 55 of the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act specifically provides for 
expropriations in terms of the Act. Section 55 of the new Act stipulates that, if 
it is necessary for the achievement of the objects contained in s 2 of the Act, 
the Minister may, in accordance with s 25(2) and (3) of the Constitution, 
expropriate, any land or any right therein and pay compensation in respect 
thereof. This section is invoked by s 54(5), where the compulsory negotiations 
aimed at the agreement of the compensation to be paid to the landowner fail. 
 
As was seen above s 54 of the new Act provides some measure of protection 
for a landowner who has suffered or is likely to suffer loss or damage as a 
result of the operations of a mining right or permit holder as the case may be. 
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What Dale refers to is the deprivation of property brought about by state 
action that regulates or controls the use of property without taking it away for 
public use, and for which no compensation is payable, even though it may 
cause serious financial loss for the property owner.490 Therefore, in 
circumstances where the regulation becomes excessive and has dire 
consequences for the landowner, for example where he loses or is likely to 
lose all use and enjoyment of his property because a mining right holder 
makes use of the open-cast method of mining and thereby withdraws 
subjacent support for the surface, s 54(4) of the Act should come into 
operation. If open-cast mining is reasonably necessary under the 
circumstances, the landowner should then be expropriated in terms of s 55 of 
the Act, which has to adhere to the s 25(2) and (3) of the Constitution.491 
Failure to expropriate a landowner under those conditions will turn the 
deprivation into an arbitrary deprivation that will therefore be invalid in terms 
of s 25(1) of the Constitution. 
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To say that the state’s assumption of custodianship and administration of 
mineral rights can be seen as a move towards expropriation cannot be correct 
in South African law. This is because custodianship and administration of 
rights concerning the use and exploitation of scarce resources might indicate 
exactly the opposite, namely regulatory exercise of the state’s (non-
expropriatory and hence uncompensated) police power.492 In addition to this, 
it was seen in chapter 3 above, that the previous order of mining and mineral 
laws was not totally devoid of state interferences in the then quasi-servitudal 
relationship between a landowner and a mineral rights holder. State regulation 
was admittedly not as far reaching as the regulation brought about by the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, but it could not be said 
that a landowner under that order was entirely autonomous in his dealings 
with a mineral rights holder. 
 
In light of the above, there are two questions that still remain. Firstly, whether 
a landowner under the old order of private mineral rights suffered an arbitrary 
deprivation of property where a mineral rights holder had invoked s 68(5) of 
the old Minerals Act. As was seen above this provision could be invoked to 
override a term in the grant of mineral rights that had the effect of preventing 
the optimal mining of a mineral resource. 
 
Secondly, in light of the fact that the quasi-servitudal formulation of mineral 
rights enunciated in Anglo Operations is no longer applicable under the new 
order of state issued and administered mining rights and permits, can it be 
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said that the landowner under this new system is arbitrarily deprived of his 
property where subjacent support is withdrawn in the course of the mining 
operations? Stated differently, because of the fact that it is now the state that 
grants minerals rights in respect of a landowner’s property, can it be said that 
he is arbitrarily deprived of his property in the event that a mining right holder 
is permitted to carry out open-mining? 
 
 
4.4.2 Is the Landowner Arbitrarily Deprived of His Property? 
As was seen above s 68(5) of the Minerals Act could be seen as a severe 
regulatory provision. The effect of this provision would have been to deprive a 
landowner of his property regardless of the fact that there was a quasi-
servitudal agreement between himself and the mineral rights holder. 
 
Under the new regime of mining and mineral laws introduced by the Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act, it is clear that a landowner is 
deprived of his property when a miner withdraws subjacent support in the 
course of his operations. This is because, unlike in the old system of private 
mineral rights, where his relationship with a mineral rights holder was 
regarded as being in the nature of a quasi-servitude (constituted by the 
respective parties), he no longer has the opportunity to preclude the possibility 
of open-cast mining that inevitably leads to the withdrawal of support for the 
surface. The landowner stands to lose all use and enjoyment of his land when 
subjacent support for the surface is withdrawn. It is clear that he is indeed 
deprived of his property. 
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However, the question that remains is whether the above two landowners 
were/are arbitrarily deprived of their property in the sense spelt out in First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Services and Others.493 
 
In the FNB case it was concluded that a deprivation of property is arbitrary as 
meant in s 25 of the Constitution when the law referred to in s 25(1) does not 
provide sufficient reason for the particular deprivation in question or is 
procedurally unfair. The court devised a test to establish “sufficient reason.” 
 
According to the test, sufficient reason is to be established by evaluating the 
relationship between the means employed, namely the deprivation in question 
and the ends sought to be achieved, that is the purpose of the law in 
question.494 Further, a complexity of relationships has to be considered. In 
evaluating the deprivation in question, regard must be had to the relationship 
between the purpose for the deprivation and the person whose property is 
affected. In addition, regard must also be had to the relationship between the 
purpose of the deprivation and the nature of the property as well as the extent 
of the deprivation in respect of such property.495 Generally speaking, where 
the property in question is ownership of land or a corporeal moveable, a more 
compelling purpose will have to be established in order for the depriving law 
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to constitute sufficient reason for the deprivation than in the case when 
property is something different and the property right something less 
extensive.496 Furthermore, when the deprivation in question embraces all the 
incidents of ownership, the purpose for the deprivation will have to be more 
compelling that when deprivation embraces only some incidents of ownership 
and those incidents only partially. 
 
Depending on such interplay between variable means and ends, the nature of 
the property in question and the extent of its deprivation, there may be 
circumstances when sufficient reason is established, in effect, no more than a 
mere rational relationship between means and ends; in others this might only 
be established by a proportionality evaluation closer to that required by s 36 
(1) of the Constitution.497 Whether there is sufficient reason to warrant the 
deprivation is a matter to be decided on all the relevant facts of each 
particular case, always bearing in mind that the enquiry is concerned with 
arbitrariness in relation to deprivation of property under s 25.498 
 
Van der Walt submits that the essence of the FNB decision was that: 
“a deprivation of property (a state action that regulates or controls the use 
of property without taking it away for public use, and for which no 
compensation is payable, even though it may cause serious financial loss 
for the property owner) would be arbitrary and therefore in conflict with s 
25(1) of the Constitution if the general law in terms of which the 
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deprivation is effected or authorized does not provide sufficient reason for 
the deprivation or is procedurally unfair.”499 
 
In a different work, the same author argues that sufficiency of the reasons for 
deprivation is tested with reference to a “thick” complexity of contextual 
factors and, depending on the context, the test can vary from mere rationality 
to something closer to a s 36-type proportionality test.500 
 
In the context of the subjacent support question the thicker proportionality test 
will be the more appropriate. Because the deprivation concerns rights in land 
and the landowner stands to lose almost all use and enjoyment of his 
property, perhaps irrevocably, a strong reason for the deprivation will be 
required. The affected right is ownership, so there must be a strong nexus 
between either the affected owner or the affected property and the purpose of 
the deprivation.501 
 
The reasons for the deprivation that would have been brought about by s 
68(5) of the Minerals Act would have been deducible from the long title of the 
Minerals Act. Therefore, the Act was enacted to regulate the prospecting for 
and the optimal exploitation, processing and utilization of minerals. According 
                                                 
499
 Van der Walt AJ Law of Property Casebook for Students 6th ed (2006) 399; Van der Walt 
AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 154. 
500
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 154; First National Bank of South 
Africa t/a Wesbank v Commissioner of the South African Revenue Services and Others 2002 
(4) SA 768 (CC) 810. 
501
 First National Bank of South Africa t/a Wesbank v Commissioner of the South African 
Revenue Services and Others 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 815; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law (2005) 154. 
 175 
to Kaplan and Dale, the legislature wanted to prevent the possible frustration 
inter alia of optimal utilization by contractual limitations or restrictions; as such 
limitations and restrictions were not uncommon in mineral right titles.502 The 
two authors submit on the same page that s 68(5) was enacted specifically to 
guard against restrictive terms that would impede the objects of the Act. In my 
opinion because of the importance of mining to the South African economy, 
these reasons would have constituted sufficient reason for deprivations 
effected by the Minerals Act. 
 
As an addendum to the above, under the old Minerals Act it might be useful to 
distinguish between cases where the quasi-servitude existing between the 
landowner and the mineral rights holder was agreed upon by the mineral right 
holder himself and those where it was agreed upon by his predecessors in 
title. In the former case where a mineral rights holder had agreed to terms of 
the grant himself, then seeks to rely on s 68(5) to override them would seem 
unfair and prejudicial to a landowner.  
 
It must also be added in relation to the position under the Minerals Act, that in 
this old order of mining and mineral laws, the landowner still had a say in how 
the mineral rights holder exercised his rights. In terms of the grant of mineral 
rights between himself and the mineral rights holder, he could also negotiate 
for the compensation that would have been payable to him for the loss he 
would have endured. However, and more importantly, the landowner under 
that old system that recognised that mineral rights formed part of the property 
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of the landowner was not obliged to grant the mineral rights to a third party. 
He could have simply sat on his minerals or held out for the best possible 
terms relating to compensation before he granted the mineral rights to a third 
party. 
 
The position of the landowner under the new Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act is more precarious than that of his counterpart 
under the old regime of private mineral rights that were related to the land. 
With that said the reasons for the deprivation under the new Act can mostly 
be derived from the objects of the Mineral Resources Development Act.503 
These objects include the substantial and meaningful expansion of 
opportunities for the historically disadvantaged, in order to facilitate greater 
participation in the mineral and petroleum industry by the relevant persons. 
This object is to enable these persons to benefit from the nation’s mineral and 
petroleum resources.504 The second objective is to promote economic growth 
and mineral and petroleum resources development in South Africa.505 The 
third is the promotion of employment and advancement of the social and 
economic welfare of all South Africans.506 The fourth is the provision of 
security of tenure in respect of prospecting, exploration, mining, and 
production operations.507 The final object gives effect to s 24 of the 
Constitution, which grants an environmental right by ensuring that the nation’s 
mineral and petroleum resources are developed in an orderly and ecologically 
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sustainable manner while promoting justifiable social and economic 
development.508  
 
In the new state regulated system of mineral rights, a landowner who loses 
the use and enjoyment of his land because a miner has conducted open-cast 
mining which leads to the withdrawal of subjacent support, cannot be said to 
have been arbitrarily deprived of his property. The objects contained in s 2 of 
the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act constitute sufficient 
reason (as contemplated in the FNB decision) for the heavy state regulation of 
the landowner’s relationship with the mining right holder which results in the 
former losing the use and enjoyment of his property. More importantly, the Act 
makes provision for the protection of the landowner’s interest.  
 
Section 54(1) of the Act, affords the landowner an opportunity to be heard 
and, accordingly, to raise objections. Thus, if in the opinion of the regional 
manager the owner or the occupier has suffered or is likely to suffer loss or 
damage as a result of the proposed operations, the conflicting parties will be 
required to enter into negotiations aimed at agreeing to the payment of 
compensation for such loss or damage.509 Further, in terms of s 54(4) if the 
parties fail to reach an agreement, compensation must be determined by 
arbitration in terms of the Arbitration Act510 or by any competent court. If, after 
considering all the issues raised by all the respective parties and 
recommendations by the Regional Mining Development and Environmental 
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Committee, the regional manager concludes that any further negotiations may 
be detrimental to some of the objects of the Act, he may recommend to the 
Minister that such land be expropriated in terms of s 55 of the Act.511 In terms 
s 54(6), if however the regional manager determines that failure to reach an 
agreement is the fault of the holder of the mining right or permit, the regional 
manager may in writing prohibit commencement or continuation of the mining 
operations until the dispute is resolved by a court of law. This is consistent 
with the common law principle that the right to carry out open-cast mining 
(thereby withdraw subjacent support) should be available to a mining right or 
permit holder only where it is “reasonably necessary” to do so. This provision 
was enacted specifically to protect landowners who were in danger of losing 
the use and enjoyment their land. 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
As was seen above, the quasi-servitudal formulation of the Anglo Operations 
decision has no application under the new scheme of state-issued and -
controlled new-order mineral and mining rights and permits. The quasi-
servitude formulation of mineral rights has been replaced by a comprehensive 
statutory scheme that vests custodianship of all the mineral and petroleum 
resources of South Africa in the state. Accordingly, it is no longer the 
landowner who grants the mineral rights that relate to his land to the 
subsequent mining right or permit holder, but the state. This means that the 
landowner no longer has a role to play in defining the extent of the mining 
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right holder’s powers. Does this mean that a landowner is arbitrarily deprived 
of his property where a landowner loses the use and enjoyment of his land as 
a result of the use of an invasive mining method by the miner?  
 
It cannot be said that the new Act arbitrarily deprives a landowner of his 
property because its provisions abolish the quasi-servitudal formulation of 
Anglo Operations. It was seen above that this quasi-servitude construction 
was replaced by a comprehensive statutory framework that protects the 
interests of a landowner. What the landowner was deprived of was the right to 
negotiate with mineral rights holder on his own terms. However it was seen 
above that even before the inception of the new Act, severe inroads on the 
common law rights of a landowner in his dealings with a mineral rights holder, 
had already been made by provisions like s 68(5) of the old Minerals Act. The 
Act therefore provides sufficient reason for this deprivation in terms of its 
stated objects as contained in s 2.512 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As is evident from the above, South African courts have preferred the theory 
that explains the right of lateral support as a natural right inherent in the 
ownership of property over the servitudal theory. The right of lateral support 
was clearly received in Rouliot513 as a natural right incidental to the ownership 
of the property and not as a servitude or as an easement. From the 
discussion of buildings and the right of lateral support in chapter 2, it was 
seen that the natural rights theory was endorsed by the decision in 
Johannesburg Board of Executors v Victoria Building Company.514 In holding 
that the right of lateral support was not only available to land in its natural 
state but also to land that was encumbered by buildings, the court in Victoria 
upheld the natural rights theory. Subsequent to this case515 a few other 
cases516 confirmed the same view, until it was wrongly decided in Douglas 
Colliery v Bothma,517 that the right of lateral support was in the nature of a 
servitude. However, as was emphasized above Douglas Colliery v Bothma 
was a mining law case, therefore different provisions existed/exist in South 
African law regarding rights to land essentially used for mining purposes. For 
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that reason, a clear distinction had to always be drawn between the rights of 
support as existing in private property law and as existing in mining law; and 
that in the field of private property law the view that the right of support is 
owed both to land and buildings was to be preferred.518 
 
5.2 The Distinction Between Lateral Support and Subjacent 
Support 
The problematic distinction between the right of support as existing in private 
property law and in mining law again manifested itself, in the Coronation 
Collieries v Malan519 decision where Bristowe J extended the rules of private 
property law of support to the field of mining law. There was an uncritical 
acceptance of the extension of the rules of lateral support to regulate the 
relationship of mineral right holders and land surface owners in both case law 
and academic writing. As was seen above the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Anglo Operations v Sandhurst Estates brought some clarity by rejecting this 
controversial extension of lateral support principles to conflicts between 
landowners and mineral right holders in respect of the same land.520  
 
It was seen in chapter 3 above, how the Supreme Court of Appeal in rejecting 
the extension brought about by Coronation Collieries521 distinguished lateral 
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support from subjacent support. Lateral support clearly referred to a 
neighbour law situation that involved two properties adjacent to each other as 
described in chapter two. Whereas, subjacent support referred to the 
relationship between a landowner and a mineral rights holder in relation to a 
single piece land which derived vertical support from the underlying minerals 
that were the subject matter of a mineral right holder’s rights. It was therefore 
seen in chapter 3 that the question of subjacent support only becomes 
important upon the severance of mineral rights from the title to the land. This 
is because the landowner’s interest in maintaining the surface in its natural 
state is threatened where a mineral rights holder begins to extract the 
minerals that prop up the landowner’s surface. 
 
As was seen above, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Anglo Operations v 
Sandhurst Estates522 finally settled the matter when they held that a right to 
minerals in the property of another was in the nature of a quasi-servitude over 
that property.523 Thus, as in the case of a servitude, the exercise of mineral 
rights will almost inevitably lead to a conflict between the right of the 
landowner to maintain the surface and the mineral rights holder to extract the 
minerals underneath.524 Therefore the correct approach in resolving this 
conflict did not lie in adopting the English law doctrine of subjacent support. 
This inherent conflict had to be resolved in accordance with the principles 
developed by our law to resolve conflicts between the holders of servitudal 
                                                 
522
 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA). 
523
 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA) 373. 
524
 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA) 372. 
 183 
rights and owners of servient properties.525 Therefore, the owner of the 
servient property was bound to allow the holder of the servitudal rights to do 
whatever is reasonably necessary for the proper exercise of those rights. The 
holder of the servitude is in turn bound to exercise his rights civiliter modo, 
that is, with as much as possible consideration and with the least possible 
inconvenience to the servient property and its owner. In applying these 
principles to mineral rights, the holder was entitled to go onto the property, 
search for minerals and, if he found any, to remove them and carry them 
away. This had to include the right on the part of the holder of mineral rights to 
do whatever was reasonably necessary to attain his ultimate goal.526 And in 
terms of South African common law, in the absence of any express or tacit 
term to the contrary in the grant, the mineral rights holder was entitled by 
virtue of a term implied by law to conduct open cast mining. Therefore in the 
absence of such a term, if it was reasonably necessary for the mineral rights 
holder to let down the surface in carrying out his mining operations, he could 
do so, so long as he did so in a manner that was least injurious to the surface 
owner. 
 
5.3 The Significance of Legislation for the decision in Anglo 
Operations  
As was stated above, an in-depth enquiry into the implications of the decision 
in Anglo Operations was necessary because the court did not refer to the 
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effect of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act527 in 
reaching their decision. The second half of the thesis illustrated how the new 
Act removed mineral rights from the private domain, and how, in doing so the 
relationship between the landowner and the mineral rights holder was further 
complicated. It was suggested that the quasi-servitudal formulation of the 
relationship between the landowner and the mineral rights holder described 
by Anglo Operations was abolished by a comprehensive statutory framework 
that defined the respective parties’ rights. A landowner under the new 
dispensation no longer has the opportunity to preclude, by contract, the 
possibility of open-cast mining being conducted by a mineral rights holder, 
whereas under the common law system of private mineral rights he could 
protect his use rights by reserving certain surface use rights in the grant of 
mineral rights. The change is brought about by the systemic changes 
introduced by s 3(1) of the new Act. In terms of this provision, the mineral and 
petroleum resources of South Africa are the common heritage of all the 
people of South Africa, and the state is the custodian thereof. This means that 
the landowner no longer has the power to contract his mineral rights to the 
subsequent holder, it is now the state that does so. 
 
It was argued that this interference with a landowner’s common law rights by 
the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act was not a novelty. 
Section 68(5) of the Minerals Act528 provided that its provisions would not be 
affected by any term or condition in any agreement, whether such agreement 
was entered into before or after the commencement of the Act. This provision 
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was enacted to prevent the possible frustration inter alia of optimal utilization 
by contractual limitations and restrictions. Therefore the provisions of the 
Minerals Act could be invoked to override any contractual restriction or 
limitation that might have otherwise prevented or militated against optimal 
utilization of any mineral resource.529 Therefore, I argued that the common 
law rights of the landowner (to negotiate terms with the mineral rights holder) 
had already begun to be eroded before the inception of the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act. However unlike the new Act, the 
Minerals Act would not have wholly done away with the quasi-servitude 
formulation of Anglo Operations. This was because the principle that the 
owner of the land was also the owner of the mineral rights was still functional 
at the time. Accordingly, it was still the landowner who granted mineral rights 
to the subsequent holders of mineral rights. In doing so, the Minerals Act gave 
him some autonomy in his dealings with a mineral rights holder. Therefore to 
some degree the relationship between a landowner and a mineral rights 
holder would have still been governed by the quasi-servitude construction 
described in Anglo Operations. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
As was seen above, the quasi-servitudal formulation of the Anglo Operations 
decision was abolished by the new Act and therefore has no application under 
the new order of state issued and controlled mining rights and permits. The 
quasi-servitude formulation of mineral rights has been replaced by a 
comprehensive statutory scheme that vests custodianship of all the mineral 
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and petroleum resources of South Africa in the state. Accordingly, it is no 
longer the landowner who grants the mineral rights that relate to his land to 
the subsequent mining right or permit holder, but the state. This means that 
the landowner no longer has a role to play in defining the extent of the mining 
right holder’s powers. The question was asked in chapter 4 whether the 
landowner is expropriated or arbitrarily deprived of his property where he 
loses the use and enjoyment of his land as a result of the use of an invasive 
mining method by the miner. 
 
In referring to the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, Dale 
argues that the acquisition by a holder of a permission, permit or right to 
entry530 constitutes an expropriation of the landowner’s entitlement to use the 
land, for which the state is liable to pay compensation in terms of s 25(2) of 
the Constitution and item 12 of Schedule 2 to the Mineral and Petroleum. 
 
However, it was argued above that Dale’s contention is misplaced because to 
suggest that the state’s assumption of custodianship and administration of 
mineral rights could be treated as a move towards expropriation could not be 
accurate in South African law. This was because custodianship and 
administration of rights concerning the use and exploitation of scarce 
resources could indicate exactly the opposite, namely regulatory exercise of 
the state’s (non-expropriatory and hence uncompensated) police power.531  
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Furthermore in regard to the previous point, as was seen in chapter 3 above, 
the previous order of mining and mineral laws was not totally devoid of state 
interference. State regulation was admittedly not as far reaching as the 
regulation brought about by the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act, but it could not be said that a landowner under that order 
was entirely autonomous in his dealings with a mineral rights holder. 
 
In addition to this, Dale’s argument falls down in light of the fact that the new 
Act specifically provides for expropriations in terms of s 55. Therefore, where 
a deprivation is excessive and too prejudicial to a landowner (as it seems 
Dale is suggesting), the landowner would have to be expropriated in terms of 
s 55 of the Act. Failing which, the deprivation will be deemed arbitrary and 
therefore invalid. 
 
In respect of the Minerals Act it was determined that, it could not be said that 
that s 68(5) of the Act had the effect of expropriating a landowner under the 
old order of private mineral rights. This was because under that old order the 
landowner still retained some contractual power with which he could protect 
himself against harmful activities of a mineral rights holder. At most, s 68(5) 
was a regulatory provision that begged the question whether its application 
would have arbitrarily deprived a landowner of his property. 
 
With regard to the question whether the new Act arbitrarily deprives a 
landowner of his property because its provisions abolish the quasi-servitudal 
formulation of Anglo Operations, it was seen above that this was indeed a 
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deprivation but not an arbitrary deprivation as contemplated by the FNB532 
decision. The Act has replaced the quasi-servitude formulation of mineral 
rights with a comprehensive statutory scheme that protects the interests of the 
landowners.533 The new position of landowners under this new scheme is not 
as attractive as it was under the old order of private mineral rights, but this in 
itself does not constitute an arbitrary deprivation. The Act provides sufficient 
reason for the deprivation in terms of its objects as contained in s 2.  
 
These objects include the substantial and meaningful expansion of 
opportunities for the historically disadvantaged, in order to facilitate greater 
participation in the mineral and petroleum industry by the relevant persons. 
This object is to enable these persons to benefit from the nation’s mineral and 
petroleum resources.534 The second objective is to promote economic growth 
and mineral and petroleum resources development in South Africa.535 The 
third is the promotion of employment and advancement of the social and 
economic welfare of all South Africans.536 The fourth is the provision of 
security of tenure in respect of prospecting, exploration, mining, and 
production operations.537 The final object gives effect to s 24 of the 
Constitution, which grants an environmental right by ensuring that the nation’s 
mineral and petroleum resources are developed in an orderly and ecologically 
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sustainable manner while promoting justifiable social and economic 
development.538  
 
Furthermore, the landowner’s rights are also protected by s 54(1) of the new 
Act which affords him procedural fairness. This provision requires the parties 
to enter into negotiations, in the course of which a landowner is given the 
opportunity to raise objections. Section 54(6) ensures that a landowner’s 
rights are not lightly infringed. In terms of this provision, where the 
negotiations between the parties fail to reach a successful conclusion, their 
conflict is referred to a court of law for adjudication. In terms of this provision, 
a landowner is protected from unwarranted use of invasive mining methods 
that endanger the use and enjoyment his property. Where a landowner feels 
that the proposed mining practice is not reasonably necessary under the 
circumstances, the landowner may have his objections thereto referred to a 
court of law for adjudication. 
 
With regard to the Minerals Act, the question whether a deprivation resulting 
from the invocation of s 68(5) by a mineral rights holder to override a 
contractual term between himself and a landowner would have been 
justifiable in terms of s 25(1) of the Constitution, was asked and left open. It 
was suggested that in deciding this question, it might be helpful to distinguish 
between a quasi-servitudal agreement that was entered into by the mineral 
rights holder himself, and one that was entered into by his predecessors in 
title. However, Kaplan and Dale submit that the legislature in crafting s 68(5), 
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had in mind the intention to do away with contractual terms and agreements 
that impeded the stated objects of the Minerals Act, the optimal utilization and 
exploitation of mineral resources.539 The importance of mining to the South 
African economy would have been seen as sufficient reason for depriving a 
landowner of his rights. 
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